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ABSTRACT
John Henniger Reagan served the State of Texas as 
judge, representative, Confederate cabinet member, senator, 
and first Texas Railroad Commissioner from IB46 to 1903.
His ideas and arguments won him popularity in his home 
state and recognition on a national basis. He was best 
known for his arguments against the centralization of 
government and his defense of the rights of the individual 
against economic and political infringement.
The study was limited to the consideration of the 
ideas contained in Reagan’s speeches since the concepts he 
advocated were nationally significant. The study was 
further limited to four speeches chosen for their typicality 
of issue, theme, and development. The four selected speeches 
dealt with: (1) the abuses of the railroads and monopolies;
(2) Reagan’s arguments against the Blair Education Act;
(3) a plea for the remonetization of silver; and (4) denunci­
ation of the Force Act. The analysis of these speeches 
included a discussion of the background of the specific 
issues involved, the audience composition and alignment, the 
themes developed, and the proofs used in their development. 
Finally his speeches were evaluated.
v
Reagan's political ideology was based upon two 
primary concepts: preservation of states' rights and
protection of the individual. His themes were derived 
from these two basic concepts and concerned the infringe­
ment upon these basic rights. Although Reagan offered 
logical, ethical, and emotional proof to support these 
themes, he relied most heavily upon logical proof, employing 
most often example, authority, and causal relationship. His 
more than twenty years as a Representative in the lower 
House, where he voiced his ideas on the pertinent issues of 
the day with knowledge and intelligence, allowed him to 
address the Senate with an already established ethical 
stature. He added to his established ethos by his indi­
cation of good character and intelligence throughout his 
speeches. Reagan employed emotional appeals less frequently 
than logical or ethical appeals.
An evaluation of effectiveness was difficult to 
ascertain since Reagan's speeches were political in nature 
and given to an audience that was influenced by such outside 
elements as: (1) the popular national will as reflected
through periodicals; (2) the will of the constituents who 
elected the senators to represent their particular interests
(3) influence of special interest groups; (4) partisan and 
sectional alignments; and (5) other speeches given on the 
same issue. However, Reagan's speeches were undoubtedly
VIX
influential in the initiation of some early governmental 
controls over monopolies and railroads, the defeat of the 
Blair Education Act and the death of the Force Act.
These conclusions were drawn from Reagan's speeches: 
Reagan's ideas in these speeches belonged basically to the 
school of progressive idealism; the one exception was 
Reagan's strict conservative tie with the past through his 
states' rights concept. There seemed to be evidence that 
this conservative tie was a carry-over from his earlier 
experiences in the Civil War and its aftermath. Reagan's 
progressive ideas were innovative and well supported.
History appears to vindicate most of his progressive con­
cepts. The final conclusion drawn from the study is that 
John H. Reagan was a deep logician, a far-sighted intellectu­
al and statesman of whom Texas, and the nation, should be 
proud. However, he apparently was not an outstanding 
orator although his ideas were presented well enough to 
influence the outcome of legislation that affected national 
policies then and now.
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Depression, drought, tremendous growth in the number 
of immigrants, general increased population, westward 
mobility of the people, organizations of labor, farmers, 
and miners, and growth of tremendous corporate giants all 
characterized the national scene when John H. Reagan was 
elected Senator from Texas in 18$7»
He had already served his state as congressional 
representative more than twenty years beginning in the 
pre-Civil War period and including post-Reconstruction years 
and the early years of economic upheaval. But with the 
imminent approach of the climax of some of the nation's 
most crucial problems, including monopoly control, silver 
remonetization, and the Republican's renewed attempts at 
centralization, Reagan, always an outspoken contestant in 
the debates surrounding these issues, decided to enter the 
Senate. Ben H. Proctor, in a biography of Reagan, stated 
that with
. . . many crucial issues fast approaching a climax 
in Congress, he (Reagan) wanted to be in a position 
where he could best make his voice heard and his presence 
felt. Tired by the labors which the boisterous unwieldy 
House exacted of its members, he decided that the more
1
2sedate, less crowded, and better organized Senate was 
the place for him.l
Although he was treated upon his immediate entrance
to the Senate with less respect than he may have antici- 
2
pated, his stature soon increased with his determined
stand on issues of importance. One historian describes
the period that saw Reagan on the senatorial stage in the
following manner:
Without denying that other decades have had their trials 
outside of war, there is reason to maintain that during 
the twelve years, 1885 to 1897, more and widely differ­
ing problems pressed upon this country for solution than 
in any other equal period, unless it be that following 
the establishment of our government in 1789.-'
The same author further described those issues and their
importance on the national scene.
The contest for a silver standard, the regulation of 
great corporations and monopolies, the rising strength 
of organized labor, the awakening ambitions for an 
aggressive foreign policy, the purification of politics 
by a radical change in the methods of appointment to 
office, are questions which will never sink into 
comparative obscurity, whatever the future may hold
Ben H. Proctor, Not Without Honor: The Life of
John-H. Reagan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962),
p. ll.
2
Although Reagan had shown outstanding leadership 
on all parallel committees in the House, he was the last 
named member to the Senate's committees on Interstate 
Commerce, Post Office, and Post Roads, and Coastal Defenses. 
United States Congress, Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 
1st Session, p. lo.
3
Davis Rich Dewey, The American Nation: A History of
National Problems. 1885-1897 (.New York: Harper and Brothers
Publications, 1907), p. xiv.
in store for us. Rather they will stand out as the 
beginning of a new stage in our nation's history.4
John Henniger Reagan, Senator from Texas from 1$$6 
to 1$91, was an active participant in the legislative 
debates during that crucial period of change in the nation's 
history. Reagan was a veteran representative in the legis­
lative halls and he spent the majority of his time on the 
floor of the United States Senate speaking on the key issues, 
the issues that occupied the greatest minds of the day and 
that were shaping a new national destiny.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the 
ideas that Reagan presented in selected senatorial speeches 
on the great issues of the period.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Reagan was a study in a combination of progressive 
ideas and conservative ties. His two basic ideological 
guidelines as expressed in his speaking seemed to bind him 
to two eras. His preoccupation with the conservation of 
states rights through strict Constitutional construction 
seemed almost reactionary when compared to his ideas that 
stressed the rights of the individual. Perhaps an expla­
nation of the union of these two ideas can be seen in 
Reagan's belief that the solidity of a political unit,
^Ibid.
i.e., the Democratic Party, was a necessity for the preser­
vation of the southern rights; to him all efforts at
I
centralization seemed to be a move against the South.
5
Historians basically refer to Reagan in two roles. In 
explanation of his defense of the southern rights and states 
rights, his name was most widely mentioned as Postmaster 
General of the Confederacy. The second role was as an 
anti-monopolist.
Reagan was an important figure on the Texas 
political scene. He was twice offered the governorship 
which he refused. He took a leading role in the re­
establishment of the Democratic Party in his state and in 
the revision of the state constitution. Following the Civil 
War, as soon as he was granted amnesty, he was sent back 
to his pre-War seat in the House, and he was consistently 
re-elected to that position for over twenty years. When he 
decided to run for the Senate, he was opposed by the long­
standing incumbent Samuel Bell Maxey, ex-Governor John 
Ireland, and Alexander Terrell, a respected state senator. 
Reagan entered the race late, yet he won the heavily
c
^T. R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas
and Texans (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968),
pp* 399, £21, and John A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth, 
1S77-1&9Q (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 19&8),
pp. ll$, 117, are examples.
contested battle and took his seat in the Senate in 1$S$. 
Once more the voters of his state had rewarded him for his 
defense of the people and his attacks on monopolies. He 
had achieved this vote of confidence from his constituency
despite heavy adverse coverage during the campaign from
7 $the Dallas Morning News, and the Austin Daily Statesman,
both of which questioned his judgment concerning many
issues including railroad regulations, monopoly control,
g
and prohibition. The vote was 102 for Reagan who needed 
only 69^^ votes for election.
Reagan's ideas and arguments had won him popularity 
in his home state and had won him national recognition 
also. His states rights concept received some periodical 
coverage because of his arguments in favor of decentrali­
zation, but his defense of the rights of the individual was
For coverage of the campaign and voting see Austin 
Daily Statesman (January 13, 20, 21, 26, 1S$7).
^Dallas Morning News (April 23, 25, May 15, August 
14, 1S87).
d
Austin Daily Statesman (August 5» 11> 1387).
g
This coverage was also discussed in several 
letters: Silas Hare to Reagan, May 16, 1$$7; Reagan to
Phelps, August 2, 1&$7; Reagan to Johnson, September 21, 
1$$7. All are in Reagan Papers: Letters, Texas State
Archives. The Reagan Papers will hereafter be referred to 
as R.P.
"^Austin Daily Statesman (January 27 and February 3> 
1SS7). --------------
nationally discussed. His progressive arguments that
sought railroad and monopoly control through legislative
measures and his demands for the free and unlimited coinage
of silver, which he saw as a panacea for the ills of the
South and West, were covered by periodicals through the
nation.^ His fight for the rights of the individual
brought him an offer of a vice-presidential nomination by
12the National Anti-Monopoly Party. He refused the offer 
and remained a Democrat.
Reagan’s fight to bring on the initial politico- 
economic controls needed within this chaotic period was a 
long-range and seemingly tireless effort. While not always 
popular throughout all sections of the nation, Reagan’s 
ideas were certainly well-known. He was a spokesman for 
the people and was identified with their cause of individual 
rights.
The newspapers were not always in agreement about 
Reagan’s concepts. For example: the New York Tribune was
anti-Reagan on the railroad issue from start to finish. 
Gerald Nash in ’’The Reformer Reformed: John H. Reagan and 
Railroad Regulation,” Business Historical Review, Vol. 29 
(1955) took much of his material from the Tribune. The 
Baltimore Sun saw Reagan as "a bold fearless aggressive 
opponent of the corporation influences and of centralizing 
tendencies of the Republican Party," (February 2, 1$$7).
The Crawford County, Missouri Democrat (April 20, 1$91) 
considered Reagan a true "servant of the people." Within 
his home state, there were opposing views. For pro-Reagan 
coverage see The Houston Post and for consistent anti- 
Reagan coverage see ballas Daily Herald.
12
Reagan to Henry Nichols, March 2&, 1&&4; Reagan 
to James B. Weaver, May 26, 1S&4, in R.P.: Letters.
7Although Reagan’s ideas were pertinent to the great 
issues of the era of politico-economic change during the 
years 138B-1391, a study of Speech Monographs and 
Dissertation Abstracts revealed no previous treatment of 
his senatorial speaking. The present study was conducted 
in order to ascertain how Reagan's senatorial speeches 
contribute to an understanding of the issues about which 
he spoke.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Two basic limitations have been imposed upon the 
study. The first limitation was on the number of speeches 
chosen for special investigation and analysis. All of the 
texts of Reagan’s speeches to the United States Senate 
were readily available in the Congressional Record. These 
were closely studied and four were chosen for their 
typicality of issue, themes, and development. The speeches 
chosen dealt with railroad-monopoly abuse, the centralizing 
efforts of the Blair Education Act, the silver coinage 
issue, and the Force Bill, which sought interference in 
the elective franchise rights of the states.
The second limitation imposed upon the investigation 
was the decision to limit the study to the ideas contained 
in Reagan’s speeches. Reagan lived and spoke during 
troubled times in the nation’s economic and political 
history. His contribution through the concepts he advocated
to the United States Senate were significant. For this 
reason, the study focuses only on the invention found 
within Reagan’s speeches to the Senate and deliberately 
excludes a study of style, delivery, and arrangement. An 
additional reason for the exclusion of delivery was that 
although Reagan’s ideas and arguments received coverage 
for their importance, little was to be gleaned from the 
same sources concerning his delivery of the ideas. There 
was a scarcity of general references to his delivery and a 
dearth concerning the particular speeches under consider­
ation. So any conclusion drawn about the delivery of 
these speeches would be only conjectural and may or may not 
have held true of these particular speeches. Reagan’s 
ideas were contained in the inventio of his speeches. His 
contribution to the nation's well-being was found in the 
ideas he advocated and thus the focus of the study is upon 
these concepts.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
General histories of the era and issues were con-
13suited first for background knowledge. Academic journals 
within the field of speech were then studied for relative
13^Quarterly Journal of Speech, Speech Monographs, 
Southern Speech Journal, Western SpeechJournal were examined 
for materials relative to the study.
9materials. One long biography"^ and several short bio-
15graphical sketches of Reagan were available. Two members 
of Reagan’s family kindly granted interviews and shed 
light on aspects of Reagan’s life and career. Reagan’s 
granddaughter, Mrs. May Reagan Orr Mathes, resides in 
Beaumont, Texas. She freely and graciously gave of her 
time, as did Reagan's great-grandson James P. Ferguson of 
Houston, Texas.
Texts of all Reagan’s speeches came from the 
Congressional Record; that source was further studied for 
materials relative to the issues, audience interaction, 
and outcome of the speeches.
Thirty-two newspapers including The Houston Post, 
the Dallas Daily Herald, the Galveston Daily Hews, the 
Palestine Advocate, The New York Times, the New York 
Tribune, the New Orleans Picayune, the Saint Louis Daily 
Globe-Democrat, and the Baltimore Sun were examined for 
materials pertinent to the study. Periodicals of the time, 
including Harper's Weekly and Nation, were consulted.
^Proctor, Not Without Honor.
15'William McGraw, Professional Politicians 
(Washington, D. C.: The Imperial Press, 19^0); Paul M. Angle,
A Pictorial History of the Civil War (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., lyh1?); W. D. Wood, Reminiscences of 
Reconstruction in Texas and Reminiscences of fexas and Texans 
Fifty Years A^o (n.p.j, l90£; other biographical glimpses 
of Reagan's life were gleaned from histories and articles 
on specific issues.
10
The Texas State Archives and the University of 
Texas Archives were searched for materials. Reagan’s 
Papers, letters, speeches, clippings and microfilm were 
consulted there along with other collections that were 
useful to the study. The most outstanding were the Hogg 
collection, the Blake collection, and the Roberts collection.
After the materials were assembled, they were 
examined to determine the setting of the speeches and to 
reconstruct the pertinent biographical data necessary to 
understand Reagan's background. In analyzing the speech 
settings, materials were sought which would provide an 
understanding of the historical circumstances which called 
forth the speeches and which would illuminate the nature of 
the audiences to which Reagan spoke. The biographical data 
were investigated to provide an understanding of Reagan's 
life which would shed light on the ethos which he brought 
to the speaking situation; an attempt was also made to 
determine those aspects of his political and social 
philosophy which might provide further insight into the 
positions which he advocated.
The speeches themselves were searched to determine 
the principal themes which he developed and the kinds of 
supporting material employed to develop those themes. 
Supporting materials were divided into logical proof, 
ethical proof, and emotional proof.
11
An attempt was then made to draw some conclusions 
from the data yielded by the analysis. Those conclusions 
included an assessment of the immediate and long-range 
effects of the speeches, but went beyond the questions of 
effectiveness to consider also what Reagan's ideas and his 
method of development revealed about the man and the causes 
which he advocated.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study was organized into six chapters:
Chapter I gives a biographical sketch of the speaker 
and the background that shaped the concepts which found 
voice in his senatorial speaking.
Chapter II presents an analysis of Reagan's ideas 
and their development in his speech on railroad-monopoly 
abuse delivered to the United States Senate on February 27»
1889.
Chapter III deals with an analysis of the ideas in 
Reagan's senatorial speech on the fourth Blair Education 
Act given on February 26, 1890.
Chapter IV is an analysis of inventio in Reagan's 
speech asking for remonetization of silver. The speech 
was delivered to the Senate on December 30, 1890.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the ideas in one 
of Reagan's last speeches to the Senate. This speech dealt 
with the Force Bill and was delivered on January 16, 1891.
12
Chapter VI presents a summary of Reagan's use of 
invention within the four speeches examined in the study, 
and draws some general conclusions from the investigation.
CHAPTER I
THE SPEAKER
John H. Reagan was tanner, farmer, surveyor, 
lawyer, judge, state legislator, and national congressman 
before the Civil War. He was Postmaster General of the 
Confederacy, and, for a short while, simultaneously 
Secretary of the Treasury. He twice declined the office 
of Governor of Texas. Imprisoned with Jefferson Davis, he 
returned to be selected as the spokesman for the people of 
Texas in the House of Representatives in Washington until 
1$$7, when he was elected Senator. It is his Senatorial 
speaking from 1$&7 to 1$91 that is the object of inquiry 
in this study. The present chapter will describe John H. 
Reagan’s lineage, experiences, and behavioral pattern that 
will shed light on his Senatorial speaking.
JOHN H. REAGAN
In 1S17, Timothy Richard Reagan married Elizabeth
1 2 Lusk and this marriage produced six children who were
■^Unpublished data in possession of Mrs. May Reagan 
Orr Mathes, Beaumont, Texas.
2
These children were John Henniger, Richard B., 
William R., Morris, Joseph D., and Sarah.
13
raised according to teachings of the Colonial American
O
Methodist Episcopal Church. On October 3, I$l8, John
Henniger Reagan, the first child, was b o m  in Sevier
County, Tennessee.^
Reagan’s family was poor; although Timothy Reagan
was an accomplished tanner, blacksmith, silversmith, and 
5
locksmith,' his business acumen seemed to be small and he
was never quite able to provide for the needs of his
family. As the eldest child, John H. was forced to take
on responsibility early in life and he worked with his
£
father at the tannery and later on the farm. His father 
taught him the rudiments of education and he attended 
Nancy Academy at Sevierville, but his formal education 
was interrupted by his father's business failure when 
John was about thirteen. When he was about sixteen years 
of age John undertook the task of securing his own
3
^John H. Reagan to his children, written at Fort 
Warren, Boston, June 28, 1 865. This letter was written 
while Reagan was imprisoned there. It is in possession 
of James P. Ferguson, Houston, Texas. This letter will 
hereafter be referred to as Reagan to his children.
^Ibid.
5Ibid.
£
John H. Reagan, LLD., Memoirs: With Special
Reference to Secession and the Civil War CNew York: ‘The
Neale Publishing Company, 190b), p. 23, hereafter referred 
to as Reagan, Memoirs.
education, and began it "by hiring myself to Major John
Walker for one year at farm work, at nine dollars a month,
7
payable in corn at two shillings a bushel." With the 
money secured from selling the corn, Reagan purchased 
clothing and books. Paying his board by working evenings 
and Saturdays for Willis Franklin, who operated a farm, 
extensive flour mills, and sawmills for a wealthy planter, 
John Brabson, Reagan was able to attend Boyd's Creek 
Academy for two sessions. In 1^36, Willis Franklin died, 
and with him died Reagan's means of support. Forced to 
leave the academy, Reagan was then hired to take a flatboat 
of produce and furniture down the Tennessee River to north 
Alabama. His first venture out of his home territory, the 
assignment provided Reagan with a means of gainful employ­
ment .
Upon Reagan's return home, Brabson hired him to 
take on Willis Franklin's former position. He worked at 
the milling business from the winter through the summer of 
1 $ 3 7 e a r n i n g  enough to return to school at Southwestern
7ibid.
g
Ben H. Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 11.
9
Reagan to his children.
16
Seminary in Maryville."^ He applied himself diligently to
his studies and complained of a lack of time for the
inclusion of everything he wished to attain.^ His
curriculum consisted of arithmetic, algebra, geography,
English grammar, Latin grammar, natural philosophy, moral
12philosophy, logic, and rhetoric. Logic and rhetoric
fascinated him and he avidly read about these subjects.
To supplement the knowledge acquired from books, he joined
a literary society "formed for the improvement of its
13members in writing and speaking." ' The society met every
Friday afternoon, during which time two members read
original compositions, two gave criticisms, four debated a
previously selected question, and two persons criticized
the compositions and speeches as to language, manner, and
s t y l e . " I n  this atmosphere, Reagan formulated the basic
principles of logic as his future guide, and shaped and
polished his writing and oratory, so important to his later 
15endeavors." With the return of summer Reagan found
^Ibid. The school is now Maryville College; it is 
located at Maryville, Blount County, Tennessee.
11Ibid.
l2Ibid.
13Ibid.
^Ibid.
15Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 13.
17
himself once more without funds and without much hope for
local employment. After a number of his classmates suggested
he go out of the state to seek employment with greater 
l6compensation, he decided to accept the advice. He sought
and secured recommendations from the faculty and students
17of Maryville Seminary. '
Reagan worked as a clerk and bookkeeper until the
1$season when the boats would "begin to run." On November 13,
191&3&, he again took employment on a flatboat to Decatur
and from there journeyed by train and stagecoach to Vicksburg
and Natchez. He sought employment as a clerk in Natchez,
which depression had strongly marked, but he found none.
His poor physical condition prevented him from earning
20wages at manual labor. Since he had found no employment 
and news of a tutorial position in the nearby countryside
1 ^
Reagan to his children.
■^A letter of recommendation by Augustus M. Foute 
to his father Jacob F. Foute can be fdund in the original 
at Maryville College. This is reproduced on microfilm in 
Reagan Papers at Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas.
Also see: Keagan, Memoirs, p. 25.
1 APeter L. Thompson to Reagan, August 1$, 1&3&, 
in R.P., microfilm.
^Reagan to his children. Reagan received his 
regular pay plus $25 from his employer's son as a parting 
gift.
20Ibid.
13
had reached him, he decided to investigate. Concerning
his state of mind at that moment he wrote in his Memoirs:
On the way, when I had got out of the city, overcome 
by a feeling of helplessness, among strangers in a 
strange land, and without money enough to pay for a 
night’s lodging, I sat down by the roadside and took 
a hearty cry.21
He was offered two positions at this time, one as
tutor and one as manager of Dempsey P. Jackson’s plan-
22tation; he took the latter since the pay was higher and
he remained in the position until May, 1339• He resigned
because of the treatment of the slaves. When the men
23’’complained of not having enough meat,” Reagan confronted 
Jackson with this problem. Jackson refused to alleviate 
the condition and so Reagan resigned.
Reagan started out toward Alexandria, Louisiana, to 
the home of General Isaac Thomas, a family friend. How-
p  J
ever, a sense of adventure and the promise of a good job ^ 
in Nacogdoches, Texas, encouraged him to cross into that
newly-formed republic. The job failed to materialize but 
21Reagan, Memoirs, p. 25*
p  p
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 26. His salary was $500 for 
the remainder of the year.
23Ibid.
^According to Memoirs, the job offered by a 
merchant named Colonel Jeremiah Strode, paid $300 per year. 
In his earlier letter to his children, June 23, 1365, the 
amount was $1000.
19
another friendship caused Reagan to trudge thirty miles to
Fort Lacy. There he was involved in the Indian War brought
25on by the Sam Houston-Mirabeau B. Lamar conflict.
Reagan participated in the Indian negotiations and
was particularly impressed with Chief Bowles who stated
that if he fought the whites he would be killed by them,
and if he did not he would be killed by the red man.
Reagan’s attitude favored race differentiation expressed in
some descriptive words found in his letters that stated
’’savages, and even semi-civilized people” were ’’suspicious
and jealous of persons of higher type and different race."
However, he respected Bowles and agreed with the Indian
Chief's concept that there should be means other than war
to settle disputes. He also respected and honored Bowles
for his steadfastness of purpose once he had made a 
27decision. 1
Soon after the Indian conflict public attention was 
focused on the fertile lands of Texas. The County Surveyor 
of Nacogdoches County stated:
25For an excellent account of this conflict see 
Anna Muckleroy, "The Indian Policy of the Republic of 
Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVI (1922), 
pp. 12S-TJZJ!7
P  A
Reagan to his children.
27Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 30-32, and Reagan to his
children.
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Land is the cry. Speak to one, his answer is land. 
Inquire kindly of his family and he answers in Leagues 
and Labors. The land mania is great. . . .We have 
shipped off the Cherokees.^o
Reagan answered the call of "land” and spent approximately
two years alternately surveying the land and battling a
2Q
"bilious fever." He completed his survey of the counties
of Henderson, Van Zandt, Wood, Kaufman, the south part of
Hunt, Anderson County west of old Trowel Trace, and that
part of Dallas County which lies north of the Trinity
on
River, in March, 1S41, and returned to Nacogdoches and
another Indian uprising. The latter conflict was followed
closely by a depression that affected all economy including
surveying, so Reagan began to farm to supplement his 
31income^ and during this time was elected justice of the
peace and also Captain of the militia for his Nacogdoches 
32precinct.
Warren A. Ferris to his sister, Sarah Lovejoy, 
October 8, 1$39. R. B. Blake Collection, Texas State 
Archives, Austin, Texas.
^Reagan to his children. Reagan probably had 
malaria since much of the land surveyed was swampy.
•^John H. Reagan, Letter to his Father, March 3> 
1B41, R.P., microfilm. Also see Reagan, Memoirs, p. 37.
•^ The Houston Post (undated) clipping in R.P.: 
Printed Matter, Letters, and Circulars.
^^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 44• Also: Bonham Weekly
Chronicle, October 14, 1897 > clipping in R.P.: Printed
Matter.
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In 1843t Reagan accepted a position as tutor to
Colonel John Durst*s children.  ^ The position as tutor
served as a mental stimulus for this man who had neglected
books for a long period of time. He had access to the
excellent library in the Durst home and became acquainted
with a number of prominent men of state who visited in the
home.^^ The influence of these three factors, coupled
with Reagan*s insatiable search for knowledge, particularly
learning that dealt with logical presentation of facts,
caused him to begin to study political philosophy and then 
3 5law. It was at this point that Reagan married a widow, 
Martha Music, and shouldered the responsibility of her four 
children. ^  His wife died within two years after their 
marriage•
Around 1844, Reagan studying law by reading 
Blackstone's Commentaries and using Webster’s Unabridged
■^Colonel Durst came to Texas in the early l800's 
and became wealthy and prominent in Texas. For a fuller 
account, see W. D. Wood, ’’Sketch of the Early Settlement 
of Leon County, Its Organization and Some of the Early 
Settlers,” Quarterly Journal of the Texas State Historical 
Association/ IV (I96O), pp. 211-212.
•^ The Houston Post (undated) clipping in R.P.: 
Printed Matter.
3 5•^ Reagan, Memoirs, p. 51.
36The Music children seemed to drop from the 
picture, but Mrs. Mathes stated he provided for them until 
they were adults. Interview with Mrs. Mathes, April 18, 
1971, at Beaumont, Texas.
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37Dictionary and Bouvier's Law Dictionary. 1 Since the
nearest lawyer was some sixty miles away, Reagan’s self-
education went slowly, but, in 1846, he procured a license
to practice law in the district and inferior courts. He
was elected in the same year to probate judge in Henderson 
38County.
By hard work and diligent single-mindedness, Reagan 
educated himself. The influence of an impoverished child­
hood caused him to have a strong need for continuing upward 
progress. His strong colonial Christianity forced him to 
be even more mindful to discipline himself for he feared 
that he ’’might have added dishonor and disgrace to poverty 
and toil."3*3
On February 19, 1846, President Anson Jones spoke 
in Austin, to the people of Texas about the annexation of 
Texas. He captured the general feeling of the Texans when 
he stated: *' . . . (Texas) has become fixed forever in
that glorious constellation . . . The American Union. . . . 
The final act in this great drama is now performed. The 
Republic of Texas is no more."^*3 So it was in the State of
37-"Reagan, Memoirs, p. 51.
3^Ibid., p. 52.
39Reagan to his children.
^President Anson Jones, Executive Record Book 
Number 47, pp. 50-51, mss.
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Texas, rather than in the Republic of Texas that in 1&47> 
Reagan began his public service. He was elected as a 
representative from the Nacogdoches district^ and served 
on the following committees: judiciary, public land and
land office, apportionment of representation, federal 
relations and enrolled bills.
Reagan, in his Memoirs, related an incident that 
illustrates his thoroughness as legislator and skill as a 
speaker at this very early stage of his career. He was 
asked to prepare resolutions for the Federal Resolutions 
Committee and was unaware that in so presenting them he
I p
was required to defend them. Another member^ offered a 
substitute for Reagan's resolution, speaking strongly in 
favor of this substitution. Reagan reported:
I was expecting some other member to reply to 
him; but no one seemed to do so; and I saw all eyes 
directed to me. It then flashed on me that having 
made the resolutions I was expected to defend them.
I was a young and new member, and had never addressed 
the House, but I made the best argument I could; and 
when I sat down, M. B. Lamar, ex-president of the 
Republic, then a representative from Webb County, 
arose and said he had examined the resolutions with
^ This district was composed of what now comprises 
the Counties of Nacogdoches, Angelina, Cherokee, Smith, 
Henderson, Kaufman, Van Zandt, Rockwall, Rains, Wood, the 
west half of Upshur, the north half of Dallas, and eight 
and one-half miles in width of the south end of Hunt 
County.
I p
Benjamin Epperson, a Whig who was a member of 
the legislature.
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care, and that they stated the views of the people and 
of the South very clearly and correctly and that he 
hoped they would be passed by the House unanimously 
without the crossing of a t or the dotting of an i.
There were three votes for the substitute and the 
resolutions were adopted,4-3
Reagan was defeated at the polls in the State
Senatorial race in 1&49. Because he refused to sanction a
bill to validate clouded titles of settlers in the Peter's
Colony dispute, his popularity decreased enough to lose
the election by a small majority. In his Memoirs, he
stated: " . . .  I deliberately accepted defeat rather
than promise the people to do what I felt would operate to
their injury."^
In December of 1$52, Reagan married Edwina Moss
45Nelms in Anderson, Grimes County, Texas. Proctor stated 
" . . .  he found love and affection he had long done 
without. From her he acquired social grace and poise he
i /L
had never known. . . . Six children were born to this
i n
union; four of them lived to maturity.
^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 53•
^Ibid.
^Clarksville Northern Standard (February 5, 1$53).
^Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. $9.
^One child died at birth and another at a very 
young age. Reagan, Memoirs, p. 60; as reported in an inter­
view between May Reagan Orr Mathes, at Beaumont, Texas, and
G.M.J.S., April IS, 1971.
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In the spring of 1#4$, Reagan had received his 
regular license to practice law. He was licensed to 
practice in the Supreme Court of the State at the same 
time. In 1&57, he was licensed to practice in the Supreme
id
and inferior Courts of the United States. He was elected
I
to a six-year term and served as district judge from 1&52 
to IS56. In I&56, he resigned the position of judge before 
his term expired. His reason was two-fold. The first was 
that the redistricting of the counties had changed the 
electorate. He stated that ” . . .  it would be fair to 
allow the two newly added counties to have a voice in the 
selection of their judge." The second reason was that, 
in 1$56, the legislature voted to increase judges’ salary^ 
saying that the previous sum was not sufficient to secure 
the best of legal talent for the bench. Reagan’s resignation
4$Ibid, p. 57* Reagan was the fifth person to 
receive an honorary degree of doctor of laws from Tulane 
University in Louisiana. He received this degree in 1896. 
In 1903, he received the same degree from Baylor University 
in Texas.
49Reagan, Memoirs, p. 57. Also see: Crawford
County Missouri Democrat, April 30, 1$91. This action was 
only a part of Reagan's demonstration of fairness, at the 
price of personal cost, to his constituency. It may have 
been the reason that he continued to be referred to with 
the title of "Judge" throughout his life, and even after 
his death.
50Gammel, Laws, Vol. IV, p. 249. Also see:
Governor Pease to Reagan, April £, and June 25, 1&56, 
in R.P.: Letters. This was reported in Clarksville,
Texas, Northern Standard (April 26, IB56).
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for these two reasons was immediately followed by his 
announcement of candidacy for re-election, "giving as the
i
reason for my action that if the increased salary might
enable the people of the district to select an abler judge
51it was my duty to give them a chance to do so." He was 
re-elected to district judge for another six-year term, but 
this was not an easy victory, for the Know-Nothing Party 
was making its final bid, in this race, for state-wide
power through Reagan's opponent, Harvard-educated John C.
52Robertson. Reagan found himself one of the "leadingl
53spokesmen" for the Democratic Party. He tirelessly
i 5/,
traveled and spoke the length and breadth of his district y* 
the people listened and were impressed. Reagan had won the 
election and the Know-Nothings were crushed in their Texas
^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 60; also: Bonham Weekly
Chronicle (October 14, 1897;•
52y Letha Crews, "The Know-Nothing Party In Texas," 
M.A. Thesis, University of Texas, 1925. Platforms of 
Political Parties in Texas, <ed. by Ernest William Winkler 
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 1916).
^Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 94.
■^Edwina M. Reagan to her husband, May 11, 1356,
R.P.
^E. M. Pease, Executive Record Book Number 276, 
1353-1357, mss, p. 542, the official returns for the Ninth 
District Judge were: Reagan 3,553; Robertson 2,050. For a
synopsis of Democratic success, see Clarksville Northern' 
Standard (August 23, 1356). Also see: James M. Wiggins
to Reagan, August 5, 1356, in R.P.: Letters.
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In 1857, Reagan’s name was prominently before the
people. General Henderson, along with many other Democrats,
urged Reagan to run for governor, especially if Houston
should decide to enter the race, because they believed he
was the only man who could meet ’’Old Sam” in debate and
beat him. Some clamored for him to contest the popular
L. D. Evans for Congress and thus to erase the Know-
Nothings from the political scene completely; still others
56urged him to accept ei her nomination tendered him.
Reagan at first refused to consider their requests, for he
had been recently re-elected judge and " . . .  I did not
want to be placed in the position of seeking one office
57while filling another." However, he finally stated that
if he were nominated, he would not "feel at liberty to
decline the c o n t e s t . O n  May 13, 1857, the Democrats of
the Eastern District, assembled at Tyler, Texas, nominated
59Reagan for Congress. Evans, the incumbent, was a man
•^Henderson to Reagan, March 31, 1857, in R»P«• 
Letters; Reagan to Roberts, April 15, 1857; Reagan, Memoirs, 
p. 6£; Clarksville Northern Standard (March 1 A, 1357T* :
57'Reagan, Memoirs, p. 62.
^Reagan to Roberts, April 15, 1857, in Roberts
Papers.
59Francis Richard Lubbock, Six Decades In Texas, ed. 
by C. W. Raines (Austin: Ben C. Jones and Company, 1900),
pp. 212-213. Also see: Marshall, Texas, Texas Republican
(May 30, 1857), and Reagan, Memoirs, p. o2.
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with considerable political experience and was backed by
the Know-Nothing Party and thus by its leader, General Sam
Houston. John H. Reagan was facing a difficult race
against the influence of "that fine old reprobate” as he
referred to Houston in later years. He was more diplomatic
at this point, however, for he stated:
I had necessarily to meet and overcome the influence 
of General Houston, who had led the army of the 
Republic to a great victory at San Jacinto, who had 
been twice elected President of the Republic, and who 
had served the State in the Senate of the United States 
three terms. In combating his views I always did so 
with great respect for his character, his distinguished 
public service, and his greater age, dealing only with 
the political principles involved in the contest and 
never in personal unkindness.°1
Reports reached Reagan and other residents of East Texas
that Houston and Evans were touring the Northern counties
together. Friends and supporters urged Reagan to begin
immediately on his campaign.^
Reagan proposed a joint campaign that would force
1 I
Evans to separate from Sam Houston. Such action would remove 
Evans from his home territory and force him into the position 
of verbally combating on a strange battlefield. He sent the
&0
May Reagan Orr Mathes stated her grandfather, John
H. Reagan, constantly referred to General Sam: Houston by 
this name. Interviewed by G.M.J.S., April 1$, 1971*
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 63.
A. T. Rainey to Reagan, May 18, 1857; and W. R. D. 
Ward to Reagan, June 3, 1857 > R.P.: Letters.
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proposed schedule to Evans with his request stating ” . . • 
that if the dates and places of appointment did not meet 
his approval, and he would prepare a list that suited him 
I would join him in it.” * As Evans was unable to decline 
without an embarrassing explanation, he accepted in an
/I i
unfriendly fashion and the campaign was launched.
Reagan's first speech was at Palestine on June 6,
and he spoke briefly at Crockett before meeting Evans at
65Woodville for the beginning debates. Then the opponents
met in forty-eight joint discussions in thirty-six counties
66by the first Monday in August.
Reagan's Democratic Platform was based on three 
fundamental objections to the platform of the Know-Nothing, 
or American Party. Those objections were: (1) there
ought to be no religious test in politics; (2) the birth­
place of a citizen should not be the test of his political
6 *5
■^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 63.
^Austin, Texas, Texas State Gazette (July 11, 
1857). This article is an interesting account of Evans' 
irritation at Reagan's challenge.
65Several of the debates are discussed in the 
Henderson Democrat (June 27, 1857), anc^  ‘t*ie Marshall, 
Texas, Texas Republican (July 17, 1857).
^Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 63-64. Also see: William
McGraw, Professional Politicians, pp. 188-189.
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standing; and (3) secret political societies were un-
1^7
American and unwise.
During the final debate at Jefferson, Reagan made 
a dramatic finish by reading a letter handed him with a 
note of permission for its usage, from Mrs. M. J. Claugh 
of Marshall, that proved Evans ” . . .  had advocated dis­
union as early as 1$50 and had eagerly desired that year
to attend the Nashville Convention composed of Southern 
6$extremists.” According to Lubbock’s description: Evans,
beside himself with rage, jumped to his feet and drew his
six-gun, denouncing Claugh for giving a private letter and
Reagan for using it. Reagan also drew but facing him said
’’Judge Evans, let’s put up our six-shooters; I do not wish
to kill you, nor do I wish to be killed. I want to go to
69Congress, and I am going there.” Reagan was elected by
an overwhelming majority by the Eastern District of Texas
70to the United States Congress.
The Thirty-Fifth Congress to which Reagan proceeded 
was filled with strife. The Panic of 1$57 had shaken the 
nation's confidence and intensified the sectional
67'Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 65-66.
6$Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 97.
^Lubbock, Six Decades, pp. 21&-219.
^Austin Texas State Gazette (October 10, 1$57)> 
and Clarksville Northern Standard (October 24> 1857.
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animosities. The proposed admission of Kansas had widened
the gap between the North and the South. The Dred Scott 
71Case had not solved the nation’s slavery issue by a
Supreme Court decision and President James Buchanan was
72determined to bring Kansas in as a slave state. In
earlier years, extremists had harangued to half-empty
halls; now both Northerners and Southerners thronged to
Washington, believing in strength in numbers, to add support
73to their representatives in the fierce slavery struggle. 
There was still hope that a peaceful solution might be 
found to prevent the irrepressible conflict between the
•Jl
two sections and cultures.
71Chief Justice Roger B. Taney declared that since 
Dred Scott was a Negro, he was not a citizen and, there­
fore, could not appeal to the Supreme Court. Taney reasoned 
that Scott was still a slave, that slaves were property and 
under the Fifth Amendment Congress could not deprive people 
of property without due process of law. Then he concluded 
by declaring that states could exclude slavery from their 
territory but Congress could not; consequently, the Missouri 
Compromise of 1&20 was unconstitutional.
72Alexander H. Stephens to his brother Linton, 
January 20, 1$5$, in Richard Malcolm Johnson and William 
Hand Browne,'Life of Alexander H. Stephens (Philadelphia:
J. B . Lippencourt, lB'/B;, p. 329.
73Ben Perley Poore, Perley's Reminiscence of Sixty 
Years In The National Metropolis, vol. I (Philadelphia:
W. A. Houghton, 1887)» pp. A-bO-340. < A description of 
Washington at this time is found in sketchy form in George 
W. Smyth to Reagan, September 15, 1&57> in R«P»: Letters.
^ I t  was in 1&5S that Seward first used the term 
’’irrepressible conflict.” See: Frederick Bancroft, The
Life of William H. Seward (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1900), pp. 458-460.
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Reagan was nearly forty years old and no longer 
the frail sickly young man who had come to Texas twenty 
years before. Proctor described Reagan's appearance in 
185^:
Heavy muscled now and powerfully built; he appeared 
rather stocky and much shorter than he actually was, 
although well over six-feet tall. His broad, high­
cheekboned face, bronzed and burned by the sun and 
partially hidden by a full black beard and long lion­
like mane, marked him with a certain fierceness and 
ruggedness, or perhaps even stubbornness, so symbolic 
of the frontier. And his most outstanding feature, 
dark fathomless eyes, almost piercing at times, gave 
ample warning to friend and foe alike to think well 
and long before contesting him.75
During the first months in Congress, Reagan did little
1
speaking until he was sure of procedure and in full
ry /1
knowledge of detail involved in the issues.
Sectionalism continued to gain more and more 
momentum and the Southern extremists were in favor of 
filibustering to acquire additional territory from Mexico, 
Cuba, and Central America, and for re-opening the African 
slave-trade, to create additional slave States and to
7 *5Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 101. Also see: 
Wood, Reminiscences.
Reagan to Roberts, September IS, 1&57, in 
Roberts Papers., Reagan made his first motion in the House 
on December 23, 1&57, hut was ruled out of order. He made 
two attempts to introduce a bill on January 15 and 1&, 
1&5&; he failed. On January 20, he introduced a bill 
concerning Texas boundaries. United States Congress, 
Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 171,
5137 32i; 345.----
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restore the balance of power between the North and the 
South. Upon his views being challenged on this point, 
Reagan answered:
Now, in regard to the other question, as to 
whether my sentiments favor the South, or agree with 
the North, I desire to say this: That I have been,
and, I trust am, as faithful an advocate of the , 
doctrine of rights of the South, and of a strict 
construction of the Constitution, as any man in the 
country; and that whenever aggressions from any 
source, or from any cause, shall be made on any of 
the States, to strike down the rights of the States, 
or deprive the people of any of their liberties, I 
will unite with my people in any necessary movement 
to protect their rights from aggression. I have 
always professed to be a national man; and in twelve 
speeches that I made in my district last summer, I 
declared that I never'advocated a sentiment in Texas 
which I would not advocate in every State, district 
and township in the Union.
I repudiate all sectional heresies. I repudiate 
everything that is not national; everything that 
looks to the violation of the moral law, to build up 
political parties, or sectional parties. . . .  I do 
not love public life; and I would scorn it whenever 
it is to be held by a sacrifice of that manly dignity 
which ought to envelop every American freeman. I 
denounce fanaticism in the South with the same 
distinctness that I denounce the fanaticism of 
abolitionism in the North. They are both heresies.
They are alike dangerous to the Constitution and the 
Union; alike dangerous to the mission of this great 
and glorious Republic; alike opposed to every noble 
aspiration of an American statesman and patriot.77
Reagan returned home after the 35th Congress 
appalled at what he had witnessed. He had seen the leaders 
of the nation enraged, motivated by passion, and inexorably
771'Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, 
Part II, p. 1467.
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rosolved to uphold their own positions. He had seen his
bills requesting frontier protection for Texas, reimburse-
ment of Texas funds for expeditions against Indians,
79settlement of the Texas-New Mexico boundary, and the
go
impeachment of Judge John C. Watrus ignored or repudiated. 
He watched with alarm the bitterness brought on by the 
defeat of the Cuban bill, homestead bill, the Post Office 
appropriations, the Pacific Railroad, and internal
gl
improvements. Reagan realized that men desiring union 
and moderation were the only hope for the nation to con­
tinue united. For this reason, although he stated earlier
go
he would not seek re-election, Reagan ran again for 
Congress on this moderate and unionist platform. When 
Southern firebrands attacked him, influential citizens 
such as George V. Smyth, J. W. Latimer, Samuel De Morse,
7 g
Reagan was appointed to Indian Affairs Committee. 
See: Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, pp.
31, 725, 1 0 7 2 ,  1177» 1475, and 2nd Session, pp. 21&-219, 
1046-1047, II64-I4O7.
7 9
Ibid., 35th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 321.
go
Austin Texas State Gazette (December 29, 1&5& 
and February 16, 1859); and Clarksville Northern Standard 
(January 8, and 29, 1859).
gl
Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American 
Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948J,PP.
229-240.
Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 70, 72-73.
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do
and James W. Scott rose in defense.  ^ Even Sam Houston 
added to the praise that Reagan was a man of ” . . . genius,
di
integrity, and industry.” ^
Reagan won the Congressional contest and the 
support of the Texans for the union and returned to the 
political boiling pot of the 36th Congress of the United 
States. He stated:
1
I remained thus devoted to the Union until the 
Republican party obtained the control of the govern­
ment and answered our appeals for the protection 
afforded by the Constitution, by saying they were in 
the majority and that we had to submit; thus proposing 
to substitute the will of a popular majority of the 
people of the Union for the Constitution of the United 
States, with its limitations on the powers of the 
Federal Government. I loved the American Union with 
a passionate devotion, and witnessed with an aching 
heart the unjust and unconstitutional crusade which 
led to disunion and war. . . .  Up to this time I had 
been an ardent Unionist, denouncing all schemes and 
views favoring its disruption, whether they came from 
the North or the South. But when we were told that 
we must submit to the violations of the Constitution, 
the overthrow of the rights of the States and the 
destruction of three thousand million dollars worth 
of property in slaves,— property recognized by the 
Constitution, Federal and State laws, and by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the Unites States,—
I could no longer agree to such a Union, and determined 
to join in any measure which might defeat it.°5
do
Smyth was a former Congressman; Latimer was editor 
of the Dallas Herald; Scott was part owner of the Houston 
Telegraph and Texas Register; De Morse was editor of the 
Clarksville Northern Standard. See: R.P., Clippings from
Galveston Civilian (April 26, 1359)» and lyler Reporter in 
R.P., and Reagan to Smyth, May ll, 1359, and Smyth to 
Reagan, May 21, 1359, in Smyth Papers.
^Dallas Herald (April 17, 1359).
^Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 72-32.
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On December 14, 1&59, Reagan joined twenty-nine
Congressmen to issue a manifesto stating all arguments had
been exhausted and "that the primary object of each slave-
holding State ought to be its speedy and absolute sepa-
86ration from the Union with hostile States.” On
r
January 15, Reagan decided it was useless to remain in
Washington and he gave a farewell speech to the House. He
still maintained:
I have to say in the end, that yet, almost hopeless as 
it seems, I would be glad to see an effort made toward 
conciliation. . . . Give us security in the Union. 
Respect our rights in the common territories. So act 
among yourselves as to let us know that we need no 
longer live under continual fear of the consequences 
of your actions.®'
Reagan had made a strong bid for the continuing
I
Union and had lost. His destiny was now with Texas and
the South. He was made a delegate to the Montgomery con-
88vention along with Louis T. Wigfall and five others.
When he arrived Davis had already chosen, for their ability 
and geographic representation, these men: Robert Toombs
of Georgia as Secretary of State; Christopher C. Memminger
86Marshall, Texas Republican (January 12, l$6l).
87'Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session,
PP. 3^9-3977^---- --------
SBThe five other delegates were John Hemphill, 
General T. N. Waul, John Gregg, W. 0. Oldham, and William
B. Ochiltree. See: Clarksville Northern Standard 
(February 23, lS6l); Austin State Gazette (February 9, 16, 
lS6l).
of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury; Judah P. 
Benjamin of Louisiana as Attorney General; Leroy Pope 
Walker of Alabama, Secretary of War; and Stephen R. Mallory 
of Florida, Secretary of the Navy. Davis offered the Post­
master General position to Reagan, who twice declined it 
on the grounds that it would be newly-created, unorganized, 
and without funds. The people were accustomed to regular 
service and would surely brand the Postmaster General as 
incompetent. Reagan stated: ” . . .  while I would gladly
perform my duty to the Confederacy, I did not desire to
go
become a martyr.” However, he was prevailed upon a third
time and accepted reluctantly ” . . .  instead of feeling
proud of the honor conferred on me, I felt that I was to
90be condemned by the public for incapacity."
At first his ability to organize and administer was
loudly praised9 -^ but the inevitable occurred and the postal
92department began to be bitterly assailed. Reagan was 
limited by a provision in the Confederate Constitution
go
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 110.
9QIbid.
9"4)allas Herald (April 21, 1&61); Austin Texas State 
Gazette (April 27> 1861); Montgomery, Alabama, Weekly £ost 
(.April lo, 1B61).
^Richmond Enquirer (June IS. l$6l), Richmond Daily 
Examiner (September 18, 19, 21, 1G61), and Nashville Banner 
(September 20, l£6l) are good examples of the tirade upon 
the postal department and Reagan.
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requiring a self-supporting Postal Department by March 1,
1^63. He discontinued a number of small post offices,
reduced the franking privileges, drove hard bargains with 
93the railroads, and increased the postal rates; in this
manner he managed to show a profit in his department.
Proctor summed up Reagan's position as Postmaster
General when he stated:
Yet against all opposition, against criticism and 
abuse, against weariness caused by the never-ending 
demands on his position during wartime, against the 
demoralizing realization that the Confederacy was 
being slowly but ruthlessly devastated, Reagan stood 
unwaveringly performing his duties as best he could.
To the end, he remained loyal to his President, his 
people and his new country.94
This loyalty was the exception rather than the rule.
Clement Eaton stated:
During the four year existence of the Confederacy, 
fourteen appointees held the six cabinet positions. 
Stephen Mallory and John Reagan were the only members 
who retained their original positions until the end 
of the war.95
Loyalty and full agreement are not necessarily
synonymous. Such was the case with Reagan, the President
and other members of the Confederate cabinet. Reagan
stated that he disagreed with the President "oftener" than
^Montgomery Daily Mail (April 29, 1361). 
^^Proctor, Mot Without Honor, p. 140.
QK
Clement Easton, A History of the Southern 
Confederacy (New York: The 5*ree Press, 1954)> p. 59.
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other members of the cabinet. He offered to resign if he
was causing Davis embarrassment. Davis replied that if
the cabinet should accept without question the opinions of
the President, he did not well see what their use could be
96as advisors of the President.
The Confederacy’s days grew short and instructions 
for its cessation began. Reagan’s last instructions to 
his postal department in Richmond, on April 2, 1365, con­
cerned the destruction of some materials and the means of
preserving others. The cabinet began its southward
97journey to Danville, Virginia, Greensboro, North 
93Carolina, and Charlotte. Lee had surrendered and the 
cabinet was in danger; they now had a cavalry escort and
99were fleeing to Washington, Georgia. The cabinet members 
left one by one until only Davis, Breckinridge, and Reagan 
were left. By then the situation was so serious that
96
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 162.
97Ibid., p. 154* Also see: Joseph T, Durkin,
Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy Chief (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1954)> P» 33^ ..
^Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory, pp. 339-340.
99At Charlotte, Attorney General George Davis 
decided to remain and care for his children; Secretary of 
Treasury George A. Trenholm, who was seriously ill, took 
his leave; the faithful Mallory left for his home in 
Florida; and at the Savannah River, Benjamin left them for 
Louisiana. See: Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 203-224; Lubbock,
Six Decades, pp. 560-563; Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory,
PPTJ& i=JIZ .
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Breckinridge ordered Reagan, who had been appointed 
Secretary of the Treasury by Davis after Trenholm's resig­
nation,'*'^ to distribute the silver coin among them.'*'^ '*' 
Breckinridge and Reagan left Davis only long
102enough to complete their tasks in Washington, Georgia.
Reagan completed his first and rode on to join Davis in
103his flight to Florida. J Lubbock was encountered on 
this ride and joined them; thus it was that the Confederate 
States of America ceased to exist entirely with the capture 
of Davis, Reagan, and Lubbock by the Federal Troops.
Davis was determined that Reagan also accept 
the Secretary of Treasury post. Although Reagan strenu­
ously objected to holding two cabinet posts simultaneously 
he finally accepted. Reagan, Memoirs, p. 209; Lubbock,
Six Decades, p. 565.
"^^Reagan, Memoirs, 214.
102Reagan's postal tasks were few but the 
Treasury was another matter. He paid the salaries of all 
within the escort; handed over much of the Confederate 
gold and silver to James A. Semple, a bonded naval 
officer, and Mr. Tidwell, his assistant. He deposited 
the funds of the Richmond banks in vault at Washington, 
Georgia, and burned large boxes of Confederate paper 
money. See: Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 213, 216; Lubbock,
Six Decades, pp. 56$-5fc>9; iLor a detailed account of the 
Confederate bank funds, see: Otis Ashmore, "The Story
of the Virginia Bank Funds,” Georgia Historical Quarterly, 
Vol. II (1918), pp. 171-197.
103Davis had intended to go south to a point not 
occupied by Federal troops, and then turn west to Texas. 
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 212.
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Reagan was imprisoned at Fort Warren Prison,
Boston Harbour, Massachusetts.'^^' He continued to feel a 
close tie with Texans and he realized from newspaper 
accounts that they were in danger of military government 
and total Negro suffrage if they continued in their 
embittered hostility to the Yankees. In an open letter 
for general publication on August 11, 1865,^^ he wrote 
to the citizens of Texas that they could avert disaster 
only by renouncing slavery and secession and, if the Federal 
Government required it, by enfranchising the freedman. He 
stated:
. . .  to secure those desirable ends we must bury 
past animosities with those of our fellow citizens 
with whom we have been at war, and cultivate with 
them feelings of mutual charity and fraternal good­
will. . . .  I know the painful struggles against 
education, and habit, and tradition, and prejudice, 
which such a course will require you to encounter, 
and how hard it is for human nature to overcome such 
difficulties. But my sincere prayer is that God, in 
His goodness and mercy, may enable you to exhibit
For a vivid account of his life in prison, see: 
Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 224-225; Reagan’s letter to his 
children, June 2$, 1365. An interview with May Reagan 
Orr Mathes with G.M.J.S., on April 18, 1971, also added 
to this picture. For a more picturesque description of 
prison life, see: Alexander H. Stephens, Recollections:
His Diary When A Prisoner At Fort Warren, Boston Harbour, 
1865, ed. by Marta Lockett Avary (New York: 'Doubleday, 
Page and Company, 1910), pp. 149, 210-211, 378-389, 
457-458.
105This letter is known as his Fort Warren Letter. 
See: Reagan to Major General Hooker, August 11, 1865,
R.P., and New York Times (October 18, l8o5).
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this last crowning evidence, in the midst of your 
calamities and sorrows, of your greatness and 
wisdom.10°
Shortly after this letter was written, Reagan was
107united with Alexander H. Stephens for a visitation
period each day and gradually the prison restrictions
disappeared until they were released on October 12,
1865.^^ Upon arriving in G a l v e s t o n , R e a g a n  was
informed that the attitude of the people of Texas was
cold. Their animosity extended to the belief that
. . .  every man in Texas who expects to be a candidate 
for anything from governor to constable seems to 
regard it as his duty to denounce you morning and 
night, under the supposition that while in prison you 
weakened in your devotion to the South and had come 
out for Negro suffrage.H O
So John H. Reagan, the man Stephens described as
"a clever, upright, honest man . . . The real foundation
i
of his character are truth, integrity and energy" returned
1 r\£L
Reagan, Fort Warren Letter.
^■^Stephen’s, Recollections, pp. 457-531; Reagan 
to Mrs. Solter, August 29, 18fc>5, in R.P.; Letters. Also 
see: Dallas Herald (November 11, 1865); Boston Herald
(October 10, 12, 1865)•
■^^Boston Herald (October 12, 1865); and Dallas 
Herald (November 11, 1865).
■^^Orders of Extension of Parole, October 28, 
1865, in R.P.: Letters: and Galveston Flakes Daily 
Bulletin (December 5, 1865).
^■■^This was ex-governor Henderson's statement to 
Reagan, in Houston, just after Reagan's return. Reagan, 
Memoirs, p. 234.
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to his home after four years of toil, imprisonment, and 
self-sacrifice in behalf of the people of the South, only 
to find he was denounced by his own people. He returned 
to Fort Houston, just outside of Nacogdoches, Texas, to 
his wrecked home, burned fields, and his motherless 
children.
i
Reagan foresaw what was going to happen in Recon­
struction but his unpopularity was only enhanced when he 
issued another public letter to Governor Throckmorton
along the same lines as the Fort Warren Letter. The advice
112fell on hostile ears. Reagan farmed his land and on
113May 31t 1366, he was married again to Molly Ford Taylor.
The Reconstruction did fall on Texan backs and
with it came a return of faith in R e a g a n . B u t  as Reagan
11S
lamented, it was "Too late! Too late!" At this time 
General Griffin, in charge of the Department of Texas, 
offered Reagan the governorship of Texas because Reagan
111
His wife had died, in Virginia, during the
Civil War.
1“|p
Reagan to Thomas J. Ward, September 2$, 1866, 
R.P.: Letters; Dallas Herald (November 10, 1866);
Marshall Texas Republican (November 17, 1366).
"^Dallas Herald (June 30, 1866); Reagan, Memoirs, 
p. 235; Reagan to Jeff Davis, May 21, 1867, R.P.: Letters.
■^^Reagan to A. G. Caultey, March 14, 1867, in 
R.P.: Microfilm.
■'■■'■^ Dallas Herald (April 13, 1867).
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was a conservative man. Reagan refused the offer stating 
that only by choice of the people would he accept the
Reagan began to be active in politics once more,
toward the end of the Reconstruction for he believed that,
by a strong Democratic Party organization, Texans could
present a solid front and legally deter the Radical 
117power. ' He worked diligently and arduously for the
Democratic Party and for the ratification of the 1$69 Texas 
11$Constitution. In 1$74> Reagan, whose citizenship had
, 1]Q
been restored on December 27 > 1873 > was selected as
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 240. The second time it 
was virtually offered was in 1$7$ when there was a dead­
lock in the Democratic Convention and Reagan was asked to 
accept the nomination and almost certain election. Reagan 
refused because his Interstate Commerce Bill was to be 
introduced in the next session of Congress and he con­
sidered this more important "to the interest of the whole 
country." Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 245-246. Lubbock, Six 
Decades, pp. 614-613"!
^■^Reagan to Burney, September 9, 1$6$, in R.P.:
Letters.
11$Once more Texas was in the Union and the 
people under the United States Constitution and Reagan 
wrote " . . .  there is a future for me, for my wife and 
children, for my country." Reagan to Haynes, May 20,
1$69, in R.P.: Letters.
^^United states Congress, Statutes at Large, 
Vol. XVIII, pt. 3, p. 529.
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the Congressional nominee for the Democrats of the First
120Congressional District of Texas.
Although he was virtually elected, as the Demo­
cratic nominee, Reagan campaigned hard against his
121Republican opponent. His platform was simple:
i
I shall endeavor to do everything to promote the 
interest of my State, but while I shall resist un­
democratic rules of policy, it will be my duty to 
fight against the contest of war . . .  to heal the 
deep wounds of.the past, and restore fraternal re­
lations. ^22
Reagan was elected on this platform of reconciliation and 
sent to the House of Representatives from the State of 
Texas to the 44th Congress of the United States, in 1875-
f
He remained in Congress as a Representative from
I
1$75 through 1$S7 when he was elected by the people of 
Texas to the United States Senate. During his years as 
Representative, he served on the Committee on the Expendi­
tures of the Post Office Department and, throughout his
i
term in the House, he served on the Commerce Committee,
^Galveston Daily Hews (September 3» 5* 6, 1$74)» 
121His Republican opponent was Judge William C. 
Chambers. Dallas Herald (September 22, 24> 26, 29> 30, 
October 1$, November 1, 1&74; covers this campaign well.
^^Galveston Daily News (September 24> 1$74) 
quoting his Jacksonville, Texas, speech.
46
123acting for ten years as chairman.  ^ Many issues occupied 
Reagan's Congressional career. Among the foremost issues, 
he was active in securing the necessary appropriations for 
the improvement of southern rivers and harbors; he also 
worked for the revision of the Revised Statutes regulating
( “I p i
internal and ocean navigation. He spoke for the re­
uniting of the Union and defended the southern cause on
125the floor of the House. He worked toward securing the
^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 248. He was made chairman 
on October 29, 1877; see: United States Congress, Con­
gressional Record, 45th Congress, 1st Session, p. 197.
■^^For some of Reagan's work toward this betterment 
of industry through improved rivers and harbors, see: 
Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 3rd Session, pp.
1155," 1215, I P ^ I W O , 1512, 1571, 1622, 1639, 22$5,
2365-236$; 46th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 3399, 3434-3441, 
4314-4315, 4338-4343, 4346-4347, 4379-4380; 46th Congress, 
3rd Session, pp. 1356-3158, 1391, 1522-1538, 1612-1633, 
1635-1663, 1665-16$7, 2232, 2387-2490; 47th Congress, 1st 
Session, pp. 4959-4961, 5058, 6145. One of his most 
outstanding speeches on the floor of the House was made 
in behalf of preserving the Pensacola Naval Yards, 44th 
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3217-321$.
125In voting for the appropriations bill for the 
Centennial on January 19, 1$76, Reagan addressed the House 
asking for restoration of citizenship to the men of the 
South who were still disenfranchized. Congressional 
Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 507-568. 307so
see: Reagan, Memoirs, p. 242. For other instances of
speaking in defense of the Southern cause see: Con-
fressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 386, 89-390, 610, 4035; 44th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.
702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 335, 696; 45th 
Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 3275, 3799, $546; 45th Congress, 
3rd Session, pp. 97, 198.
47
"I
defense of the frontier of Texas. Historians agree 
that the most noted work of John H. Reagan, in the House 
of Representatives, was that which was concerned with 
securing the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act and 
the regulation of railroads.
He presented the first bill on May 8, 1878, asking
the regulation of interstate commerce and the prohibition
127of unjust discrimination by common carriers. He summed 
up the content of that bill and the concepts he fought for 
in regard to its immediate passage and the later ramifi­
cations of this regulatory legislation in his Memoirs.
He listed the following principles:
1. That railroads receive their franchises from 
the public for the public good as well as for the 
profit of the stockholders.
2. That monopolies and perpetuities are contrary 
to the genius of a free people, and cannot be allowed 
or maintained in this country.
3. That the political authority of this country 
cannot, either in the States or Congress, create a 
power, whether corporate or otherwise, superior to 
the power and authority of the people themselves; one 
which may oppress and wrong them without lawful remedy 
and control; for all power is inherent in the people 
and all just and legal government is designed to promote 
the public welfare.
4. That railroad corporations are in an important 
sense public corporations, and are always recognized 
as quasi-public corporations. 1
1 oA
Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, 
pp. 295-2977 218b, 4b39-4bZt.l. Also see: Reagan, Memoirs,
p. 242.
127'Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 2nd Session, 
pp. 3096-3097, 3275-3280; Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 243-244*
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This is so:
5. Because they are created by the public political 
authority to promote the public good.
6. Because, for the purposes of their being, they 
are clothed with the right of eminent domain. And/ 
this cannot be conferred under our constitutional form 
of government on private persons or for private uses. 
Private property can only be taken for public uses 
and upon just compensation.
7. Railroad companies and others engaged in the 
general transportation of merchandise are carriers 
for hire.
8. They are engaged in a public employment affect­
ing the public interest.
9. Hence they are subject to regulation and 
control by the political authority.128
He offered legal supportive authorities here and throughout
his prolific speaking on these topics.
12$
Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 243-244* Also see: Con-
fressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, p. 5029;5th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 19-23; "Arguments and 
Statements before the Committee on Commerce in Relation to 
Certain Bills Referred to that Committee Proposing Con­
gressional .Regulation of Interstate Commerce," United States 
Congress, 47th Congress, 1st Session; United States Con- / 
gress, House Committee Reports, 45th Congress, 2nd 
Session, Report number &45.
129Since this was one of the most debated pieces 
of legislation to occupy the House floor during Reagan's 
Congressional terms, it is not feasible to list all of 
the pages in the Congressional Record that dealt with 
Interstate Commerce and Railroad Regulations. For the most 
illuminating materials see those listed in footnote 127 
and in Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 3rd Session, 
pp. 19, 93-102; 46th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 1079-1081, 
1154-1155, 3409, 3936-3987, 4338-4343; 46th Congress, 3rd 
Session, pp. 132-134. The Galveston Daily News (September 
7, 22, 25> 26; October 4> 5; December 15, 20, 1878;
June o, 1879; February 20, 25, 1880) covered parts of the 
debate and reaction of the people. For partial coverage 
of the reaction in the North to these measures see:
New York Daily Tribune (December 6, 7, 13> 1879 and 
January 3, I80O). ”
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Reagan served in the United States Senate from 
1SSS to 1S91. At this time he resigned to accept the
130position as chairman of Texas' first Railroad Commission.
He served in this capacity until 1903, when he retired to 
write his memoirs. His decision to write the account him­
self was probably best stated in a letter to a friend in 
1900. He said: "(I) . . . fought life's battles unaided
and . . .  (preferred) to maintain this position during
131the few remaining years.” The years remaining to 
John H. Reagan were not many. On March 6, 1905, the "Old 
Roman” of Texas died of pneumonia.
In 1962, Dr. Ben H. Proctor published a biography 
of John Henniger Reagan entitled Not Without Honor: The
Life of John H. Reagan. His closing is succinct and 
apropos:
Thus died John H. Reagan, a man who came from 
humble beginnings, who with unyielding tenacity edu­
cated himself, and who by sheer determination and 
integrity of character became one of the outstanding 
men of his time. Throughout his life he had fought 
the good fight; he had kept faith with his people; 
he had remained true to his convictions. To Texas 
and the South this made him a statesman, yea, even a 
prophet. And, even in his own country, in death as 
in life, he was not without honor. 132
130Reagan, Memoirs, p. 249.
^Reagan to C. H. Jones, March 26, 1900, R.P.:
Letters.
132pr0ctor, Not Without Honor, p. 301.
CHAPTER II
THE RAILROAD-MONOPOLY ABUSE SPEECH 
TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 27, 1889
ISSUE AND OCCASION
By the late l870’s, railroads had become such a
vast, complex lifeline to the whole nation’s economy that
a series of problems arose. A utility this huge, uniting
the great number of industries and the United States’
agricultural locales, needed some legal basis of making
order out of chaos.^ Railroad business practices were
in utter confusion.
Some 300 independent companies, large and small, 
with a total capital of $2.5 billion in 1870, and 
$4.2 billion in 1$78> operated in a partly unexplored 
corporate legal jungle, in which even the ’’honest” 
entrepreneurs felt compelled to fight the predatory 
type with every weapon of competition between many 
lines serving major points. . . . small, short rail­
roads were sometimes built solely to steal traffic
Not just the railroads were in a chaotic con­
dition but the whole nation’s life was rife with unrest.
The scandalously corrupt and disputed Presidential election 
was occurring, neglected State governments were hotbeds 
of dishonesty, and a deep economic depression existed. 
Unemployment was at an unmeasured high and competitors 
in business were cutting each other's throat.
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away from the major roads in critical areas, with the 
ultimate aim of forcing the big company to buy up the 
parasite at a large profit to its promoters.2
Although labor trouble created some national excitement
in 1377) the real economic problem was rate setting.
Each railroad had some area of monopoly in transportation
and each railroad could, and did, levy high rates. The
high costs had to be met by the captive shippers who had
no access to competing roads. Under the fairest system,
the allocation of cost would have been impossible to
standardize because of the loading and unloading expenses.
A railroad could take a large load at a cheaper price
because a total car could be shipped and unloaded only
once, while smaller loads necessitated the delay of an
entire train at the destined points of the cargo.
Another complexity was the value of the shipped 
merchandise. If business was slow, the freight agent 
could cut the price by altering the classification of 
goods. This ability of the freight agent to make on-the-spot 
decisions was in itself an entanglement. The whole intricate 
situation abounded with potential and actual discrimination.
o
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Railroads: Their
Origin and Problems, "Introduction to the J. and J• Harper 
Edition," by Thomas C. Cockran (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. xiii.
•^Thomas C. Cockran, Railroad Leaders 1345-1390:
The Business Mind in Action (Cambridge: Harvard University
PressT 1933")', pp. 174-175".
52
State regulation had been imposed but was generally 
ineffective because the railroads crossed state lines.
Reagan supported the Interstate Commerce Act in the House 
and saw it passed there. In the Senate, a special com­
mittee to investigate railroads was formed and was headed 
by Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois. His findings contained 
the familiar abuses of high local rates, discrimination 
between persons, places, and classifications of freight, 
secret rebates, passes, and watered stock in the companies.^ 
The Reagan bill in the House and the Cullom bill in the 
Senate were molded by conferences into the Interstate 
Commerce Act which became law in January, lS$7.
The bill's language was vague. It stated that all 
rates would be "reasonable and just.” It also prohibited 
the common practices of rebates, drawbacks, and pools.
The railroads were required to publish rate schedules, 
post them in their depots and file them with the govern­
ment. They were also to charge the same rate for short
£
and long hauls. A five-man Interstate Commerce Commission
^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 4396-4423-
^United States Statutes at Large, XXIV, pp. 379-3&1-
Thomas Cooley, a judge from Michigan, William R. 
Morrison of Illinois, August Schoonmaker of New York,
A. F. Walker of Vermont, and Walter Bragg of Alabama formed 
the Commission.
53
was formed to administer the act and enforce its prohi­
bitions; the enforcement was to be achieved through 
federal courts.
The law proved difficult to administer and enforce, 
and the court was almost immediately inundated with com­
plaints; ” . . .  over a thousand questions and complaints
7
poured in upon it in the first few months.” The "short
haul provision" and the interpretation of "reasonable and
just" provided the courts with difficult problems. Stover
stated in American Railroads:
Qualified though the new Commissioners were, the task 
of applying the law to the complicated railroad rate 
structure was like "cutting a path through a jungle." 
Just what were "reasonable and just" railroad rates?
. . . The major flaw in the total regulation lay in 
the lack of any effective means for the Commission to 
enforce the decisions it might make. Its cease-and- 
desist orders were often ignored by the carriers, and 
any resulting court action was slowed by appeals or 
demands for new hearings. In the nineties the average 
court case lasted for four years and many dragged on 
much longer.®
Informal rulings to railroads and refusal to give 
informal opinions to shippers was the cause of much con­
cern in the early years of the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission. The Commission decided it would "not express 
opinions on abstract questions, nor on questions presented
^John A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth, 1677-1690 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. Il8.
John F. Stover, American Railroads (Chicago: 
University Press, 1961), p T T J
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by ex-parte statements of fact, nor on questions of the
q
construction of the statute, . • ." But the Commission
"not infrequently broke this rule, as it did many others,
for the giant railroads.""*"^ According to one historian,^
a shipper to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission had
refused a preliminary opinion had three alternatives. He
could forget about it, he could allow the Commission to
mediate with the road with a hope that a settlement would
12be worked out and the railroad would be charitable, or 
he could initiate a formal case against the roads. How­
ever, the "last alternative of initiating a formal case
against the road, was incredibly expensive and time con-
13suming for the average shipper."  ^ The railroads met to 
try to heal their own problems^ and at least some railroad
Q
Interstate Commerce Commission, First Annual 
Report, December 1, 1&&7> Washington; File 459S> p. 25.
"^Railroad Gazette, Vol. 21 (August 30, l££9),
p. 565.
■^Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulations. 1&77-1916 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19o5),
pp. 55-56.
12The Commission wrote in l£$7 that this the second 
method of letting the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
railroads mediate was the best method, stating: "This
method of disposing of complaints is believed by the Com­
mission to be more useful than any other. . . ." I.C.C.,
First Annual Report, p. 26.
13Ibid., p. 56.
^Kolko, Railroads and Regulations, pp. 53-63.
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leaders felt that the "railroad system must heal itself;
no act of Congress, or repeal of any act of Congress, will
15greatly help it." But the Senate did attempt to alleviate
l6some problems by amending the legislation that caused the
flooding of the federal courts.
The federal courts were so overcrowded by 1$&9
that Congress attempted to straighten out some of their
problems by amending parts of the Interstate Commerce Act
and adding specifics. The House had sent up a bill to
attempt the regulation through the third and seventh
amendments. Senator Sherman had spoken at length in
behalf of the third amendment intended to strengthen the
section dealing with rate control but had dismissed the
seventh amendment that concerned state courts' jurisdiction
17with approval but few words. ' Senator Reagan from Texas
15Speech of Charles Frances Adams, Jr., December, 
lSSS, in C. C. McCain, ed., Compendium of Transportation 
Theories (Washington: Kensington Publishing Co., 1&93)V
p T “O T 7 ”
1_6
House Bill S2$51 to amend an act entitled "An 
Act to Regulate Commerce," approved February l+, 1$£7«
17Relative to the third amendment, Sherman stated:
"There are two amendments to this bill not dis­
posed of by the conference committee, one of which I shall 
comment upon in a moment, and the other gives to the State 
courts jurisdiction in certain cases of matters arising 
under the interstate-commerce law. I am not prepared to 
give any opinion upon the second amendment except to 
express the general belief that in all questions of internal
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obtained the floor to support Mr. Sherman's amendment and 
to include a possible solution to the problem by supporting 
the seventh amendment sent from the House. The proposed 
solution involved the sanction of Congress for the trial 
of such cases to be allowed also in the State courts of 
the person filing the complaint against the railroads.
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
As late as 1937» when railroads were still the 
main artery of the nation's economy, experts continued to 
discuss the confusion caused by the Interstate Commerce 
Act's relationship to railroads. A former member of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Thomas F. Woodlock, stated 
that
. . . the "public mind"— in that phrase I include the 
public itself, Congress and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission— has from the very beginning been con­
siderably confused in dealing with this matter of 
competition in the railroad industry, and . . .  this
commerce local in character the State courts may properly 
be intrusted with the enforcement of national law.
"There never has been any difficulty growing out 
of the jurisdiction given to the State courts in suits in 
which national banks are interested, and I do not believe 
there will be any serious difficulty in conferring upon 
the State courts jurisdiction in respect to the matters 
of interstate commerce, reserving, however, the right to 
appeal to or transfer those cases to the courts of the 
United States." Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 2375.
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confusion is still one of the main ingredients in 
what we call the ’’railroad problem.”1°
Certainly the confusion existed during the beginning years 
of this act's inception with a Senate majority of Re­
publicans torn between anti-monopoly laws and loyalty to 
the northern entrepreneur. The railroads and Standard Oil 
were two of the great trusts that forced these laws into 
the foreground.
In 13$4> the Republicans ignored the trust problem 
and Democrats only vaguely hinted at limiting monopoly 
power but, by l£S$, Cleveland and Harrison both listened 
to their constituency and spoke against the "iron heel" 
of the trusts.
Some of the states, including Texas as an out- 
10standing example, were spelling out illegalities and 
imposing specific penalties on violators of state anti­
trust acts. However, most of these states were either 
located in the West or in the South, where few industries 
existed, and so were ineffective. They were also
ISThomas F. Woodlock, "Competition Within and 
Without The Railroad Industry," Proceedings of the Academy 
of Political Science, Transportation Development in the 
United States, ed. by John A. Krout C^ Jew York: The
Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 1937)>
p. 66.
^The Texas Antitrust Act of 1$99 carried heavy 
penalties against combinations restricting trade, fixing 
prices, or limiting production. See: Fehrenbach, Lone
Star, pp. 621-622.
ineffective because most combinations were engaged in 
interstate commerce.
But, with some of the Republicans espousing the
antitrust and interstate commerce laws, the Senate found
strange bedfellows in northern and southern leaders.
Senator Sherman of Ohio and John Reagan of Texas found
themselves now on the same side of the issue. Sherman
spoke on the need to sanction the third amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act sent for senatorial ratification
from the House. This amendment dealt with monopoly
control. Sherman gave cursory treatment to sanctioning
the seventh amendment to the bill dealing with state
courts. Reagan spoke in much the same vein as Sherman
but gave fuller treatment than Sherman to the seventh
amendment, which would confer ’’concurrent jurisdiction
with the United States courts . . .  upon State courts of
20competent jurisdiction.”
Not all the Republicans were for monopoly control 
and the proponents of strong third and seventh amendments 
to the Interstate Commerce Act found opposition in two 
outstanding Republicans. Senator Platt of Connecticut 
and Senator Hoar of Massachusetts were two of the most 
outspoken opponents of these measures.
20Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 23&1*..
DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
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One of the basic concepts that seemed to form the 
nucleus of Reagan’s political speaking was presented in 
his speech on railroad-monopoly control. This concept 
was that the rights of individuals must be preserved and 
protected against economic and political infringement,
Reagan was a frontiersman as his father had been 
before him. In his youth, he had found gainful employ­
ment in working to survey and carve the State of Texas.
He was a man of the land and of the people and was cognizant
of the problems of the people. He was aware that this was
21a new era characterized by an increased scarcity of land
22and a rapid expansion of population. He was also aware 
that combined elements of land scarcity and population 
expansion were forcing the people into a new frontier that 
was completely changing their lifestyle. The land was no 
longer available so men turned to the rapidly increasing
21In lSBO, there were five territories which had 
less than fifty thousand inhabitants each, and, in 1900, 
only Nevada and Wyoming had not passed the one hundred 
thousand mark. The western lands available for homestead­
ing was being rapidly exhausted. United States Department 
of Agriculture Year Book (1&&9), p. 327*
22Between lB&O and 1900, twenty-six million people 
were added to the population. This number was greater 
than the entire number of inhabitants in 1&50. Davis 
Rich Dewey, National Problems, 1885-1897 (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1907), p. 5.
industrial complexes to earn their livelihood and thereby 
increased again the advance of industry. With this 
advance of industrial employment came a need for transpor­
tation of raw materials, finished products, and foods.
The increased need for these goods and services gave rise 
to the railroads and to monopolistic corporate giants.
These monopolies infringed upon the rights of the 
individual citizen all too often according to Reagan’s 
concept and he identified himself with the movement to 
eliminate some of those infringements through legislation. 
Earlier in the House, Reagan had stated that "the Govern­
ment has been run in the interest of specially favored 
classes . . .  to the injury and oppression of those
engaged in agriculture, in the mechanical arts, and in
23labor, and in professional vocations. He had applied 
himself to the task of trying to alleviate this injury 
and oppression while in the House^ and in the present 
speech he was again concerned with the same task.
^Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st Session,
p. 4591.
2^Some examples of Reagan’s attempts to help the 
individual may be found in his speeches reported in Con­
gressional Record, Hearings of 1882, pp. 235-269; 47th"" 
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 4541—4543f 4959-4961, 5009,
5018, 5059, 5065, 6145, 6176, Appendix, pp. 130-142; 2nd 
Session, pp. 306, 348, 381, 971-974, 1743, 2235, 3585,
2825; 48th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 117, 223, 1527,
1546, 2350-2352. Examples of newspaper coverage of 
Reagan's work in this area may be found in Galveston Daily 
News (April 1, May 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 27, 21, 1882) and
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Reagan developed the theme of individual rights 
by the use of a pattern reminiscent of debate. He first 
attempted to prove that the economic rights of individual 
citizens were being infringed upon and then he spoke for 
a plan to solve some of the economic problems through 
political means. He used the two amendments to House Bill 
S2B51 as a divisional apparatus, -arranging the development 
around the two amendments.
Reagan maintained that the small shipper of oils 
was being discriminated against since the Standard Oil 
Trust could, and did, ship their oil in tank cars at a 
discounted price and that this same price should be 
afforded all shippers or should be discontinued. His 
first disclosure of the discrimination theme was developed 
through documented proof of attempted control of the 
industry by the stockholders of Standard Oil. The con­
trolling stockholders of Standard Oil also owned the major
25stock in subsidiary companies ' and in the railroads. This
in the Dallas Weekly Herald (June 1 4, 2$, 1$$3)» Dis­
cussion of the topic can be found in the letters of James 
Jones to Reagan, May 1, 1$£2, R.P.: Microfilm; J. G.
Carlisle to Reagan, August 23, 1882, Reagan to' Roberts, 
January 10, 1S$4, and Reagan to L. M. Swan, January 24, 
1SB4, in R.P.: Letters.
25'For example, Reagan pointed out that Standard 
Oil manufactured and owned three-fourths of all tank cars 
used for the transporting of oil by rail.
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multi-business ownership had become so large that the 
stockholders were in a position to discriminate against 
small companies at will and they were exercising this 
power against smaller competition. The smaller shipper 
was forced to ship by barrel and thus paid twenty percent 
more than the tank car shipper.
The theme was developed smoothly and with relative 
thoroughness up to this point. Reagan produced factual 
evidence to substantiate his arguments. However, he broke 
his pattern by the inclusion of a long digression con­
cerning the relative safety of tank cars as compared to 
barrel transportation. This passage was apparently 
inserted to substantiate a rumor to the effect that tank 
cars were unsafe and Reagan apparently introduced the idea 
in anticipation of a point that might later be made.
Reagan realized the irrelevance of the argument to his 
overall organization for he stated that it " , , . may be 
as well here as elsewhere to discuss the question of 
relative danger of transporting oil in tank cars and in 
barrels.” This might well have been good persuasive 
strategy but it did not seem relevant to the organization 
patterns which he had developed.
n Zl
Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. £380.
Reagan, having completed his thematic patterns to 
augment his contention that the third amendment to the 
railroad-monopoly control bill be upheld, turned to the 
seventh amendment. Here he again hoped that the Senate 
would support the seventh amendment that would allow the 
state civil courts to try some railroad-monopoly dis­
criminatory cases. At this point, Reagan attempted to 
develop the idea that state courts should be used to 
accommodate the "less-moneyed litigant” in suits against 
the railroads and monopolies when economic infringement 
by these parties occurred. This theme was less lengthy 
in presentation but was more complicated in development. 
In this section Reagan not only spoke about the rights of 
individuals but he also appeared to relate that theme to 
another basic theme, the rights of the states to govern 
themselves.
It must be remembered that the old statesman’s 
background of political upheaval surely must have colored 
his thinking on issues that concerned the rights of the 
states. He had begun his political career with con­
troversy over the division of state and federal power in 
the pre-Civil War Congress and he had continued the con­
troversy through the years of the total disintegration of 
the southern states, the reconstruction period and the 
gradual resumption of these states rights. He was aware 
of any attempt to infringe upon these rights and he took
6 4
every opportunity to defend and extol the states' right to
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govern their own.
Although Reagan had worked in the House to secure 
the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, which gave 
more power to the federal government, he did so to protect 
the several states of the south and west from the vio­
lation of their rights by the northern monopolists and 
railroad magnates. He worked toward federal legislation 
only after it became apparent that the laws of the states 
could not control the railroad lines that crossed their 
territorial boundaries. Texas had the most stringent of 
these laws and yet Reagan's home state could not gain 
effective control of monopoly. In the speech to the 
Senate, he developed the theme that individual rights 
were being violated and that a remedy for these violations 
was at hand. This remedy was to allow the state courts to 
have the right of trial in the home state of the injured 
party. Such a procedure would not only expedite a quicker 
clearing of the over-burdened federal courts but would also 
put power into the state courts using nationally binding
^For some examples of Reagan's comments and ideas 
on states rights see: Congressional Record, 44th.Congress,
1st Session, pp. 50$, 610; 45th Congress, 1st Session, 
pp. 335, 69d ; 45th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3275; 45th 
Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 97-9$; 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, p. 1724; 51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 917,
B546.
laws. He attempted to develop this theme by the reading 
of a source concerning civil cases with particular emphasis 
on the situation of two banks. His second theme was 
stronger not so much in supporting evidence as in the 
presentation of the plight of small claimants.
MODES OF PROOF
Reagan used logical, ethical, and emotional proofs 
in the railroad-monopoly abuse speech. The object of this 
portion of the study was to examine these proofs and their 
development.
LOGICAL PROOF
Reagan’s senatorial audience held a variety of 
sectional interests. At most times the audience was split 
according to the section and/or belief of the immediate 
speaker. Reagan chose to use logical argumentation most 
heavily in his attempt to convince the majority of his 
senatorial audience that his ideas should be considered 
for legislation. He made use of reasoning from example, 
authority, and causal relationship within the speech.
Reasoning from example
Reagan used a number of examples to support his 
arguments within the speech. He used examples to prove 
the discrimination of the Standard Oil Company and the
railroads against the smaller shippers of oil. As one 
instance of discrimination, he pointed out that the small 
shipper could not use tank cars since Standard Oil manu­
factured and owned three quarters of all existing tank 
cars, amounting to about four thousand tank cars, and the 
next largest holder of tank cars was the Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company, These companies could ship their oil in 
tanks, which gave them a twenty percent advantage since 
the barrel shipper must also bear the weight of the barrel. 
Specifically, the tanker shipped 400 pounds of oil at the 
same price that the barrel shipper transported 325 pounds 
of oil. A second example of discrimination was the pay­
ment of three-fourths cent per mile trackage to the tanker. 
He used the South Improvement Company and rate tables from 
affected rail routes as examples of that type of dis­
crimination. He also used the court cases of Rice vs. the 
Railroads and the Railroad Company vs. Pratt as examples 
of the discriminatory practices of railroads. The example 
used from the Pratt case dealt with suitability of the 
type of haulage vehicle that the railways were ordered to 
supply the shipper. His example from Rice vs. the Railroad 
was concerned with an oil producer's use of a wagon to 
transport his oil forty miles because it was cheaper than 
rail rates under the discriminatory practice procedure.
Reagan employed specific examples to prove the 
growth of the giant corporation known as the Standard Oil
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and Trust Company and their control of subsidiary railroad
stock. He listed the names and holdings of its trustees
who controlled "one-seventh of the railroads of this 
23country." These stockholders owned and controlled an
aggregate of " . . . 19>144 miles of railway, with assets
aggregating $£12,350,167.24."
Reagan also used examples from newspapers from
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on two dates and one from
Denver, Colorado, to prove that tank cars were less safe
29than barrels in shipping.
Most of the examples used by Reagan against the 
monopolistic infringement on individual rights were 
factual and applicable, and they supported his arguments. 
However, one group of examples that was not strong tended 
to discount the validity of the theme of tank car safety.
23Reagan's examples included: H. M. Flagler and
Benjamin Brewster (trustees) were directors in the Minnesota 
Iron Company with a capital of $20,000,000 and owned the 
capital stock in the Duluth and Iron Range Railroad. H. M. 
Flagler also was a director of Western Union Telegraph 
Company which had capital of $30,000,000. He stated:
" . . . the trustees of the Standard Oil Company are 
presidents and directors of in 9,493 miles of railroad, 
with assets amounting to $14^,733,^33.75, while the 
subordinate officers of the various corporations merged 
into and belonging to said corporation are shown to be 
presidents and directors of 9,616 miles of railway, with 
assets amounting to $394,076,330.49. . . . "  He also gave 
the amount of $90,000,000 in stocks as examples of the 
capital and companies under their control.
^The dates given were May 4th and August 27th, 
from Philadelphia newspapers and May 14th from Denver.
No year was given nor was the newspaper name mentioned.
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He attempted to support that idea with newspaper examples. 
The news items appeared to be weak evidence from which to 
draw his conclusions. It appeared to be unreasonable to 
condemn tank cars as unsafe simply from the evidence of 
three fires that had been attributed to wreckage of the 
haulage vehicles.
Reasoning from authority
Reagan was a lawyer and a firm believer in the 
letter of the law. His speaking was characterized by 
extensive quotations from laws and court precedents and 
rulings to prove his arguments. He relied extensively 
upon this form of proof in his speech concerning railroad- 
monopoly abuse. He read four somewhat lengthy passages 
from the Interstate Commerce Commission's ruling in the 
case of Rice against the Railroads to authenticate his 
argument that discriminations against smaller oil shippers 
existed. He also read an extract from the ruling on a 
similar case of the Railroad vs. Pratt on the same point 
and added the authoritative proof of direct excerpts from 
the hearings themselves in these two cases.
Reagan also read an excerpt from the First Annual 
Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission asking the 
national legislature for more binding laws if they required 
"miles of equality and justice" between shippers. He 
further used a less lengthy excerpt from the then existing
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Interstate Commerce Act to prove that rate sheets showing 
the locale, the classification of freight, and the 
’’terminal charges’’ were to be available to large and small 
shippers to avoid discriminatory practices.
These instances of the use of authoritative proof 
were valid and substantially proved Reagan's arguments 
concerning the existence of discrimination in shipping by 
rail.
Reagan used two other instances of expert opinion 
to substantiate the discrimination. Both were of question­
able reliability as proof. In attempting to point out 
that Standard Oil was a ’’powerful and evil” monster 
corporation, Reagan read an excerpt from an address which 
Judge Cooley, Interstate Commerce Commission president, 
made to a meeting of the Boston Merchants; the statement 
was published in the Buffalo Express, January 14, 1389. 
Judge Cooley spoke generally of the curse of huge trusts 
but Reagan inserted his own interpretation when he 
interrupted his quotation to state that ”He (Cooley) un­
doubtedly refers to this Standard Oil Company.” Cooley 
did not mention that trust by name and Reagan might well 
have used the generality rather than the interpretation 
more effectively.
Another authority that Reagan failed to establish 
as valid was a pamphlet written by George Rice entitled 
"Railway Discrimination as given to the Standard Oil
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Trust.” The only qualification given this pamphlet was
that the pamphlet bore the author's name.
Reagan again used authority as a mode of proof
when he quoted a House member's words to state his own
case for use of state courts. Representative Anderson of
30Iowa had presented arguments^ for the use of state courts 
in civil cases and Reagan presented an excerpt from this 
speech as his only argument upon the point of legality 
of state court usage in civil cases. He stated that this 
quotation was the "shortest method in which I can present 
that subject." Reagan did not attempt to qualify the 
source of the quotation; he simply offered the excerpt as 
"remarks . . . which contain a sufficient statement on 
the subject." Whether the remarks were the expert judg­
ment of a man familiar with the position of state courts 
vs. federal courts or were simply an opinion was in no 
way made clear.
Reasoning from causal relationship
Reagan employed reasoning from causal relationship 
three times within his railroad-monopoly abuse speech.
His first use pertained to the discriminatory practice of
30The remarks centered around a case which Reagan 
apparently was using as precedent. The case involved the 
National Phquioque Bank vs. the First National Bank of 
Bethal, Connecticut, reported at page 3$3> 14 Wall.
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the railroads in their mode of shipment. He summed up
the cause and effect succinctly with this statement:
The railroads provide only one method for the ship­
ment of oil, that is, in boxcars, for the smaller 
refiner of oil, thus forcing him to accept barrel 
rates with which he is unable to compete with the 
Standard Oil Trust, using tanks.31
The second use of cause-effect reasoning was more 
lengthy and involved. Reagan presented the argument and 
substantiated it liberally with examples that the Standard 
Oil magnates were controlling many other related and sub­
sidiary trusts, including railroads, and were thereby 
causing injury to the nation’s economy. He argued that 
this trust was in control of much of the oil producing, 
hauling, and refining industry and was crushing the small 
competition. After presenting his evidence and examples, 
he stated:
I present this to show the wonderful combination 
of capital concentrated in the Standard Oil Trust and 
the railroads co-operating with it and using their 
power to crush out the smaller refiners and shippers, 
and to give the Standard Oil Trust and the officers of 
these railroads the entire and exclusive control of 
this vast business of refining, shipping, and selling 
27,000,000 barrels of refined oil a year.32
Reagan asserted that the consolidation was causing a 
situation in which "there can be no hope for healthy compe­
tition."
•31
J Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 2379.
32Ibid., p. 23S3.
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His third use of this mode of proof was perhaps 
the most vital proof in support of his second thematic 
contention. He stated that the individual citizen was 
being denied political redress through the courts for 
discriminatory wrongs inflicted upon them by the rail­
roads and monopolies. This situation was caused in part 
by the refusal of the legislators to open the state civil 
courts to the "less-moneyed litigants" so that those 
litigants might have easier access to court action against 
abuse. He again summed up his causal relationship reason­
ing in a succinct passage by observing:
If the law is right in providing for civil suits for 
wrongs done by transportation companies, then it 
follows as a logical consequence that justice requires 
that the trials of those causes should be in the 
courts most convenient to the parties injured. It is 
illogical and unjust to say that the parties shall 
have a legal remedy and then to place the remedy so 
far from them as to make it unavailable to them.-^
Reagan’s use of causal reasoning was logical in construction 
and well-developed. He followed a consistent pattern of 
developing cause-effect relationship which made his reason­
ing clear and easy to follow.
ETHICAL PROOF
Reagan may have had the status of a junior senator 
at the time this speech was delivered but he had the
33Ibid., p. 2335
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reputation of a senior statesman in the area of anti- 
monopoly legislation. While in the House, he had fought 
for anti-monopoly laws and had n . . . achieved national 
prominence as a man of the people and as a staunch
O I
defender of their rights."-^ He had become sufficiently
prominent on this stand that the National Anti-Monopoly
Party and the Greenback Party sought him as a running
mate for their Presidential nominee Benjamin F. Butler.
However, Reagan had little respect for Butler because of
3 5his Civil War record and refused their overtures. He
also refused the nomination to the governorship of Texas
or to the Senate that year-5 in order to continue his push
37to have anti-monopoly laws enacted in the House. He was 
strongly mentioned as a cabinet member under Cleveland
•^Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 252.
"^’Reagan to Henry Nichols, March 2$, 1$£4; Reagan 
to James B. Weaver, May 26, l£$4; and Weaver to Reagan, 
April 28, 188I+, in R.P.: Letters. For an account of the
National Anti-Monopoly Party and the Greenback Party see 
Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency From 17&& to 
1897 (New York: Houghton, Miffling and Co., 1898), pp.
7^21=426.
For accounts of these actions see: Galveston
Daily News (May 1I+, 17, 1&, 19, 23, 1S§2); Paris Tribune 
(.April 6, June 19 > 1882)', James H. Jones to Reagan, May 1, 
l£$2, in R.P.: Microfilm.
37^'He was nominated to the position of Repre­
sentative from Texas by acclamation in l££2. Galveston 
Daily News (May 31> 1$&2).
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because of his national reputation for work in the anti­
established prior to the occasion of his speech to the 
Senate. There were two limited overt attempts to reinforce 
his ethos within the railroad-monopoly abuse speech. Both 
the attempts were apparently intended to establish good­
will toward his audience. He first attempted to praise 
his audience by means of a somewhat negative statement.
He referred to the high position and intelligence of his 
senatorial audience by stating:
The idea of presenting an argument to anybody, much 
less to the American Senate, to prove that to make a 
monopoly is t ’ '1 ' ' ’ rd that I
He made one other attempt to arouse a feeling of 
goodwill within his audience. He referred to the powerful 
position held by the members of the Senate through their 
legislative rights and obligations. He stated that 
” • • . I judge no question as to the right of Congress to 
confer jurisdiction on the State courts to hear and de­
termine civil suits under this law will be raised."^
o g
monopoly field.? Reagan's reputation on the monopoly 
issue constituted a strong ethical appeal.
His character and intelligence were already
feel ashamed
p .  2 3 $ 4 .
^QIbid., p. 2385.
■^Dallas Weekly Herald (November 20, 1SS4).
39Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd Session,
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Although both attempts to arouse goodwill were 
limited, they appeared to be direct endeavors by Reagan to 
establish his ethos within the speech. Reagan also de­
veloped a certain ethical aura by maintaining his image as 
a defender of the people by espousing the cause of the 
states and their citizens. He felt that there should be 
equality in rates for all transporters of oil in particular 
and for all shippers in general. He also felt the less 
affluent litigants should be afforded closer access to 
courts of claim if justice was to be accomplished and he 
stated this concept strongly.
Reagan's character and intelligence were already 
established prior to the present speech through his earlier 
political reputation in the field of anti-monopoly. He 
continued to maintain the position he had assumed as an 
anti-monopolist within the speech itself. Much of the 
ethos in his speaking situation then rested upon his prior 
reputation. He made two rather limited attempts to establish 
goodwill in his audience through reference to their intelli­
gence and position as a body.
EMOTIONAL PROOF
In the railroad-monopoly abuse speech, Reagan relied 
heavily upon logical argumentation and drew at least limited 
support from ethical appeals, but the speech contained
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little emotional content. He endeavored to arouse a 
limited feeling of fear in his audience and made a slightly 
stronger appeal to their feeling of compassion.
Reagan briefly employed a fear appeal in his 
speech. He did not try to arouse personal fear but made 
a limited attempt to arouse within the nation's elected 
leaders fear for the nation's economy and well being.
The objects of fear, in Reagan's concept, were the giant 
monopolistic corporations which he described as those 
which ” . . .  even now may be too strong to be subordinated 
to the law or controlled by the government.”^  He feared 
the demoralizing economic ramifications of these giant 
corporate networks upon the people, particularly small 
business people, of the nation. He suggested that unless 
monopoly control was forthcoming, ” . . .  it will dis­
courage enterprise, it will demoralize the people and 
cause them to lose faith in the wisdom and justice of
I O
Congress.” This was an isolated emotional appeal and 
was brief in presentation.
Reagan's strongest emotional appeal in the speech 
was to the feeling of compassion in his audience for the 
smaller litigants in railroad abuse cases. While the
^Ibid., p. 23 34 
^2Ibid.
77
overall appeal to the compassionate feelings of his 
audience for the smaller claimants was there, it was less 
emotional than logical. He presented facts that would 
tend to arouse compassion but he did not attempt to 
deliberately magnify the emotional content of these 
facts.
Although Reagan made some attempts to arouse 
emotion, these attempts were weak. The nature of the 
appeals was such that deemed emotion a minor role in 
Reagan’s speech on railroad-monopoly abuse,
EVALUATION
One universal test of the value of a speech is 
the effectiveness of the speech in achieving the stated 
goals of the speaker. In any political speech, the 
interests of and influences upon the individual members of 
the audience will affect the achievement of those goals 
and will intensify the difficulty in isolating the effect 
of the particular speech. Within the congressional halls, 
all speeches were of political nature and thus the effect 
of the ideas presented in any single senatorial speech, 
particularly when the debate was strong, was difficult to 
ascertain. Two of the basic elements that affect such an 
audience were: (1) the popular will of the nation as
depicted by the periodicals; and (2) the will of the 
particular constituents who elected the senators to
7#
represent their interests. In the particular case of 
Reagan's speech to the Senate concerning railroad-monopoly 
abuse, the basic influential elements were present and 
combined with the personal and political influences 
exerted by the powerful monopolistic special interest 
groups to affect the voting on the bill.
Not only were these influences at work but another 
difficulty in isolating the effect of a single speech 
stemmed from the number of speeches given in support of 
or in opposition to the bill. Sherman of Ohio and 
Senator Faulkner of West Virginia were the most outspoken 
voices that joined Reagan's to attempt to get the amend­
ments passed. They were opposed principally by Senator 
Platt of Connecticut and Senator Hoar of Massachusetts—  
both men known as strong speakers.
Still another influence that warranted consideration 
in an attempt to assess the effects of Reagan's speech was 
his senatorial standing. As a senior member of the House 
of Representatives he had gained his reputation as a 
strong verbal opponent to monopoly. He delivered his 
speech on this topic as a junior member of the Senate. The 
speech on railroad-monopoly control was one of his earlier 
speeches delivered to that body.
Whatever the influences that affected the senators, 
they voted to send this bill to joint committee with the
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House. The announcement of the names of the men appointed^ 
to that Senatorial Committee foretold the future of the 
bill. Senators Cullom, Platt, and Harris were named. At 
least two of the men were highly prejudiced. S. M. Cullom 
had headed the drafting of the original Senate bill that 
bore his name and he had no desire to see it changed.
Platt had been an outspoken opponent to the amendment on 
the Senate floor.
The Committee was appointed on February 27, 1#$9> 
and asked ” . . .  leave to present a report that requires 
no action by the Senate” four days later. On March 2,
1$89, the following report was read:
The committee on conference on the disagreeing 
votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the 
House to the bill (S2&51) to amend an act entitled 
”An act to regulate commerce,” approved February 24> 
1$S7, having met, after full and free conference have 
agreed to recommend and do recommend to their 
respective Houses as follows:
That the House recede from its amendments 
numbered 3 and 7 . ^
Although efforts to curb monopolistic control of 
economy failed in this particular legislative confrontation,
^ The managers of the Senate were S. M. Cullom,
0. H. Platt, and Isham G. Harris. The Managers on the 
part of the House were Charles F. Crisp and Charles 
O'Neill. Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 2611.
^Ibid
SO
45Reagan's arguments, joined by the voices of those 
Senators and Representatives who had like desires for 
monopoly control, continued to hammer at the giant net­
works. Yet for almost "twenty years after its passage," 
the Interstate Commerce Act remained ineffective and "did 
not accomplish wide-spread rate reduction or eliminate
i /:
discrimination." The Interstate Commerce Act was 
described as one that satisfied popular demand for "the 
governmental supervision of railroads" yet at the same 
time was "almost entirely nominal."^ While the initial 
efforts of Reagan and his contemporaries were unfruitful 
in their control policies, they did constitute an opening 
wedge for legislative control in economic affairs. 
Ultimately, after a great number of years of struggle, at 
least partial governmental control of the economy was 
achieved. The railroad regulation became a fact and opened 
the door for other controls. Kolko described the long 
range effect of early anti-monopoly endeavors when he stated
^ E x a m p l e s  0f Reagan's later arguments on this topic 
appear in Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, 
pp. 2469-24707 2b01-2bO2, 2bl+5; 2nd Session, pp. 2004-2006.
^William Current Friedel, History of United States 
Since I&65, p. 184* Also see: Kolko, Railroads and
Regulations, passim, and Adams, Railroads, Their Origins, 
passim.
^Ibid.
81
" . . . federal railroad regulation was the first of many- 
successful efforts to create rationalization and stability
I
in the economy by political means.”
Reagan's ideas were among those early considerations 
of extension of governmental powers to stem the rise of a 
trend toward monopolized national economy and to make the 
government cognizant of both the economic plight and the 
rights of the individual citizen.
SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
Railroads and monopolistic trusts were growing 
rapidly. State governments had tried to govern their own 
economies and had failed because the state boundaries were 
not coincidental with the railway and industrial boundaries. 
Some legislators, including John H. Reagan, fought for and 
achieved a "nominal” law to control interstate commerce.
This law proved to be ineffectual in railroad and monopoly 
control because it was too vague. The House attempted to 
put some teeth into the law through the third and seventh 
amendments to the House Bill S2$51« Senators Sherman, 
Faulkner, and Reagan spoke to the Senate to support these 
amendments. Reagan's speech to the Senate on this topic 
was the subject of analysis in this chapter.
^ Kolko, Railroads and Regulations, p. 239.
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Two of Reagan's basic political ideological con­
cepts formed the themes found within the speech. Reagan 
developed his speech in two sections. The first section 
dealt with both amendments on the Senate floor. His first 
theme of protection of the individual citizen’s economic 
rights from infringement by railroad-monopoly abuse was 
presented in both sections of the speech. The second 
theme of states rights was added to the second section of 
the speech, and that theme asked that the State courts be 
used in conjunction with the Federal courts to facilitate 
more equitable handling of the cases that concerned 
railroad-monopoly abuse. This theme was less well-developed 
but was present.
Reagan used example, authority, and causal reason­
ing as logical proof. His reputation as a defender of the 
people constituted a strong ethical position to which he 
added minimal attempts at ethical appeal within the speech 
itself. The attempts to arouse emotion were weak enough 
to deem emotion a minor proof used by Reagan.
Evaluation of Reagan's speech was difficult since 
it occurred during debate on the floor in conjunction with 
Senators speaking both pro and con on the issue to an 
audience influenced by personal and political pressures.
The legislation for which Reagan spoke was defeated by 
joint committee decision without necessitating a senatorial 
vote. Although the efforts of Reagan and his political
contemporaries were not successful at the time, these 
pioneer efforts for governmental control of the economy 
were at least an opening wedge for legislative con­
sideration of the individual rights of the citizenry.
CHAPTER III
THE BLAIR EDUCATION ACT SPEECH TO THE SENATE,
FEBRUARY 26, 1S90
ISSUE AND OCCASION
After the Civil War, leaders in both the North and 
South increasingly recognized that something was needed to 
reduce the high rate of illiteracy in the nation, par­
ticularly among the freedmen in the South. Reconstruction 
governments had established public schools systems in the 
South for these people but the economic depression coupled 
with the political inertia that characterized the Southern 
states until the late 1$70*s caused a failure of the 
financial assistance necessary to maintain these systems. 
Toward the end of the 1B70’s and the early lBBO's, those 
involved in improving southern education became in­
creasingly interested in securing national financial aid. 
With the 1S77 Compromise, and the resultant cooperation 
between Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats, the 
South looked more favorably on this means of receiving 
assistance in the Negro education problem. One hundred 
delegates from nine states interested in procuring these
BA
national school funds petitioned Congress in 1$7$> asking 
for assistance from public land revenues for "immediate 
and pressing" educational needs of the South.^ The idea 
expressed at this point was that the duty of educating 
this large mass of illiterate blacks belonged to the entire 
country rather than the Southern segment.
Several bills were introduced in both Houses and
were killed through apathy in one or the other House. By
lSSO, however, the Republican party favored federal aid,
incorporating the position into their national platform.
The Democratic party contended that common schools should
be "fostered and protected"; however, this statement
appeared in a plank which otherwise opposed centralization
2
of government control.
Senator Blair, a Republican who adherred closely 
to party lines, took a new approach to federal educational 
aid which would also aid the high-tariff proponents.
There was an increasing amount of surplus in the federal 
treasury and, since the high-tariff Republicans and 
Democrats alike feared a lowering of tariff, Blair in iSSl 
introduced his first bill to aid education by direct
^■"Statements and Testimony," Senate Miscellaneous 
Documents, 4$th Congress, 1st Session, No. $5, pp. 39-40.
2
Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National 
Party Platforms, 1^40-1956 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 195b), pp. 56, 61.
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appropriations from the federal treasury. This called for 
appropriations of $105,000,000 to be distributed among the 
states over a period of ten years; the basis of distri­
bution was to be the illiteracy rate. Blair discussed 
this bill in the Senate in lSS2,^ but no action was taken 
during this session.
The second Blair Education Bill provided for almost 
complete state control rather than the joint federal-state 
control of the first bill.^" Discussion brought forth more 
restrictions against racial discrimination in distribution 
of funds. The third Blair bill brought the situation to 
a head with the periodicals of the nation taking sides.
The proponents’ statements were summarized by the New 
Orleans Picayune:
In asking the passage of the Blair bill, it (the 
South) only demands that the General Government 
should recognize an obligation which rests . . .  
equally upon all the sections, and which the South 
has so far borne alone.5
Along with a few others, the Galveston News took the
opposing side in the South, bitterly denouncing the
3
Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session,
p . 227•
^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session,
p . 1 4 7 9 .
^New Orleans Picayune (February 19, 1386).
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bill, and Nation opposed it in the North with such state­
ments as:
The Blair bill is simply . . .  the old hallucination, 
’fifty acres and a mule,' which has caused more 
briars and sassafras bushes to grow in Southern 
fields than all else.7
Perhaps the most acid attack came from the Louisville
Courier-Journal which opposed "the vicious plan of Granny
Blair” who was backed by ’’political demagogue, trick­
ed
sters . . .  and professional philanthropists.” The 
seriousness of the proponents of this bill was evidenced 
in one House Report that claimed that illiterate voters 
held the balance of power in ten Northern and all Southern
Q
states. On the floor of the Senate, those favoring the 
bill asked,
As this illiterate citizenship is protected by the 
constitution in the suffrage, why should not the 
General Government . . . aid in preparing them for 
its wise and intelligent exercise?-^
£
Galveston News (February 13, 15, l&GB, and 
February 2$, 1G90) provide a good account of this feeling.
^Nation (January 21, l££6), p. 52. For an excellent 
account of the felair bill opposition, also see: Nation
(August 1, l£$9), p. &4»
Louisville Courier-Journal, clipping in R.P., 
providing only the year 1SSS.
Q
’’Support of Common Schools,” House Reports,
49th Congress, 1st Session, no. 495, p. 21.
"^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, 
p. 1475.
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Those in opposition were quick in refuting the 
constitutionality of the bill. The Galveston News saw 
this bill as the commencement of " . . • the gradual 
extension of the National Government to supercede State 
Government and even municipal government.^ Senator 
Baynard of Delaware proposed that this type of legis­
lation would "lead inexorably to the overthrow of the
12whole theory of our form of government," and Senator
Beck of Kentucky saw it as a "pandora's box” and "(an)
entering-wedge to absolute Federal domination over edu-
13cation in the States.” ^
The introduction of Blair's fourth educational 
bill provided the specific occasion for John H. Reagan's 
speech.
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
The Blair bill was debated on the Senate floor 
from 1BB4 to 1890, when it was finally killed by a vote of 
forty-two to thirty-six.
Although Federal aid to education was originally 
suggested by southerners interested in educational
■^Galveston News quoted in Louisville Courier- 
Journal (March 1, 1BS6), clipping in R.P.
12Congressional Record, 4&th Congress, 1st Session,
p . 25S4.
13Ibid., p. 2540.
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assistance for their illiterate blacks, it soon was taken 
up by high-tariff proponents, in both the North and 
South, in an effort to use the growing treasury deposits.
The spending would reduce the possibility of lowering 
the tariff rate.
The controversy over the Blair bill clearly 
illustrates the divided mind of the post-Civil War 
politicians in the South. They were all Democrats, but 
they were not all of one mind. The Redeemer, or Bourbon, 
faction of the South strongly fought for federal aid to 
education. These Redeemers placed their faith in the 
business and industrial development and growth which founded 
a necessary alliance with the Eastern section of the nation. 
They expounded those views which would best expedite their 
political and economic thinking. The Blair bill was in 
keeping with their ideas on governmental help. Henry W. 
Blair was the Senator from New Hampshire who proposed the 
four educational bills, and he was supported by a number 
of other northern and many southern high-tariff Senators. 
Outstanding among the northern supporters were Republican 
Senator Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, and Senator 
Benjamin Harrison of Indiana. Consistent support came 
from the Senators from Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Florida, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia, but the 
support was quite passive generally. The open, vigorous
i
support from the South found voice through Joseph E.
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Brown of Georgia, Wade Hampton of South Carolina, A. H.
Garland of Arkansas, and James Z. George of Mississippi,
who asked: "Can you vote money to educate Indians, and
not have the power to vote money to educate Negroes and
white men?”^ 1'
The opposite element of the Redeemer in the South,
those southerners who wished to continue in the same
agrarian economic path that had always been the southern
means of livelihood, constituted the other side of the
audience position on the issue. The agrarian-minded
faction wished to continue in the old-line Democratic
concept of extolling the virtues of low taxes and states'
rights based on direct constitutional interpretation.
One southern senatorial element formed a group that was
not outspoken against the Blair issue but consistently
voted against it. These were the Senators from Missouri,
Maryland, and one each from Alabama, Tennessee, and
Kentucky. Those who actively fought against this bill on
15the Senate floor were Matthew Butler of South Carolina 
and the two Texas Senators, Maxey and Reagan. Aiding in 
the defeat of this bill were the two Senators from
^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st 
Session, p. 1474.
15Wade Hampton, the other Senator from South 
Carolina, actively supported the Blair Act in direct 
opposition to his State-brother Butler.
91
Delaware, Thomas F. Baynard and Eli Saulsbury, who were 
in sympathy with the agrarian South. The opponents from 
the South also found a spokesman in the Republican Senator 
from Kansas, Preston Plumb, who said he could count on 
his fingers those senators who really believed in the good 
of the bill. 16
The proponents of the bill formed a powerful vocal 
adversary and hostile audience to John Reagan’s senatorial 
speech of February 26, 1S90. Part of the southern seg­
ment was fighting for federal aid in the huge job that 
faced the sorely taxed funds of the smaller and more 
populated southern states. Their hostility as an audience 
possibly sprang from the knowledge that a fellow Southerner 
was speaking strongly against that aid. This hostility 
found further motivation when the opposing speaker was 
not only a fellow Southerner but from a state that was in
possession of sufficient public land to support their
17educational needs. Texas also was sparsely populated 
with both whites and blacks making the educational problem 
smaller. However, by the time Reagan spoke against the 
fourth Blair bill, there was enough opposition to federal 
aid to education to swing the vote against it. The bill
■I Z l
Nation (March 11, 1SB6), p. 20$.
^Allen J. Going, ’’The South and the Blair Edu­
cation Bill," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
Vol. No. 2 (September 1957), p. 28.
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was opposed by " . . .  a combination of border and northern
Democrats, by agrarian states rights southerners, and ulti-
13mately by Republican leadership.”
DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
John H. Reagan summed up his developmental themes 
in his final plea of the speech. He asked for the defeat 
of the bill: ”In the interest of the cause of education, 
for the preservation of the rights of local government 
to the States, to prevent converting the Federal Govern­
ment into a popular despotism, and to avoid additional 
fruitful cause of sectional agitation and strife, I hope 
for the defeat of this bill.”
Reagan saw the Blair Act not only as the opening 
wedge in complete federal control of the system of edu­
cation but also as a complete breakdown of the total 
federal system. He feared the federal funding of the 
schools would be the first step in replacing state and 
local governments with a central power strong enough to 
change the entire form of government.
Reagan developed the theme that the existence of 
the system of education, as it was established under the 
autonomous state and local rule, was endangered rather
1 d
Ibid., pp. 239-290, and Dewey, National Problems,
p p . 3 3 - 9 0 .
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than financially assisted by the provisions of the Blair
Act. He interpreted the segment of the bill requiring
” . . . the governors of the States to make elaborate
reports as to the school system of the several States, to
the Secretary of the Interior of the United States . . . ”
as being the intention to subjugate ” . . .  the State,
the inferior, . . .  to the Federal Government, the 
19superior.” Reagan developed this theme by two argu­
ments: (1) control of the money meant control of the
institution; and (2) federal assistance would weaken the 
desire of the states to face their responsibility to 
educate their own citizens. The first argument was 
developed through logical argument that control of the 
money would mean control of the uses to which that money 
would be put, i.e., courses of study would be prescribed, 
textbooks would be chosen, and the duties of teachers and 
administrative staffs would be supervised by central
control. Reagan also suggested that mixed schools might 
20result.
Reagan's second supporting argument for the theme 
that education would be drastically altered was not as
51st Congress, 1st
20The only one of these charges that was challenged 
by Blair from the floor was the one concerning mixed 
schools so they seem to take on validity.
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well developed. He offered no proof that the states
would "relax their efforts and transfer the burden to the
21Federal government" and only asked what right Congress 
had to tax one state to support the education of another.
The theme of preservation of the school system as ad­
ministered autonomously by the state and local governments 
was closely tied to more strongly supported theme of preser­
vation of the right of local government by the state.
It has already been established that Reagan was 
aware of the rights of the states. One of the two 
strongest themes within the Blair Act speech was the preser­
vation of these states rights. This theme was developed 
fully using a strict construction as his basis for develop­
ment. He contended that the preamble of the Constitution 
(the basis of authority claimed for the Blair Act) in no 
way conferred on Congress the right " . . .  to aid the
22
establishment and temporary support of common schools."
He further developed the argument that such a position 
transgressed the rights of the State governments as 
prescribed in the Constitution. He supported this theme 
with authoritative proof. Reagan maintained that this 
funding, unlike an outright gift to the states of public
21Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, p. Iy25.
22Ibid., p. 1722.
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land, would be an assumption of the jurisdiction of the
rights of the states to govern their own people,
Reagan presented another theme closely connected
to the preceding themes. He felt that the Blair Act would
be the entering wedge toward a consolidated government
and the dissolution of the Federal system. He made two
statements within the speech concerning the theme that,
if the ’’general welfare” clause of the Constitution was
interpreted to allow federal funding of schools, it would
remove all limits to the power of Congress. Early in the
speech, he stated that:
This would of necessity destroy our constitutional 
Federal system of government by destroying local 
government in the states; and this would be the 
beginning of a reign of anarchy or of despotism, 
in the place and stead of our benign system of free 
constitutional g o v e r n m e n t.23
Later he restated that centralization ” . . .  would impose
on the people of this country the curse of an imperial
p  I
popular despotism, the worst of all despotisms.” He 
apparently felt that the statements could, and would, 
stand alone without necessity of any more development than 
a reminder of the Senate that experience had taught them 
that there was a narrow boundary between ’’stable government
23Ibid., p. 1723 
24Ibid., p. 1724
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and anarchy.” He offered no substantiating proof of this 
theme. He may have felt that his ethical standing as a 
veteran representative during the time he alluded to as 
borderline ’’anarchial-stable” was enough proof of his 
theme.
Another developmental theme was concerned with 
additional sectional strife that would occur through the 
passage of the Blair Education Act. Sectional strife had 
been a way of political life to the veterans of Congress, 
including Reagan, for a number of years after the War. It 
had been relegated to a lesser place in the senatorial 
foreground for a few years, preceding Reagan’s speech, by 
the pressing economic problems of the era. However, the 
problem of sectional agitation was ever present and found 
voice now in an issue that dealt primarily with the 
illiterates of the South.
Although Reagan indicated that he wished to avoid 
additional section strife through the defeat of the Blair 
bill, he developed the theme that it existed by a com­
parison of the Southern and Western educational systems 
to Northern schools. His theme was that sectional strife 
would increase with the Blair bill passage because the 
act itself had its origin in sectional agitation and was 
discriminatory. He used three arguments to develop this 
theme. The first was that the criticism of the southern 
educational system was too harsh and basically unfounded.
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He supported this contention by a discussion of Texas as 
a southern state which had always provided education on a 
constitutional basis and had supported it monetarily.
This argument was developed as though all southern states 
were in a similar position to the State of Texas; Reagan 
failed to point out that Texas was less populated and was 
an unusual Southern State in that Texas had public lands 
available for funding schools.
His second argument concerned the fourteenth 
segment of the bill, a passage that he deemed sectionally 
discriminatory. The territories and some new Western 
states were to have the power to determine illiteracy by 
unspecified evidence other than the census and this evi­
dence would affect the amount of funding allowed to that 
state. Reagan saw this as a bribe to gain the vote of a 
segment of the Western states. He also pointed out that 
the practice of allowing other evidence than the census 
was again channelling the funds away from the illiterate 
Southern blacks who had been the basis for the bill.
The third argument in support of Reagan's sectional 
agitation theme dealt with the taxing of one state for the 
support of another state's system of education. He 
attempted to develop this theme by alluding to the fact 
that federal funding would eventually fall on the shoulders 
of the taxpayer. He stated that the present plan of taxing
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the internal wealth of a state to provide funds allowed a 
more equitable tax program. He attempted to substantiate 
this argument by an example of Mr. Gould, a wealthy 
financier whose children would receive the same educational 
benefits under the Blair Act as any other taxpayer's 
child. This argument concerning inequality of taxation 
was not fully developed.
MODES OF PROOF
John H. Reagan employed logical, ethical and 
emotional proof within his speech against the Blair Edu­
cation Act. The object of this section is to examine 
those proofs and their development.
LOGICAL PROOF
In his speech against the Blair Education Act, 
Reagan relied most heavily upon logical proof to support 
his contentions. He employed reasoning from examples, 
citation of authorities, and reasoning from causal 
relationship as a means of substantiating his arguments.
Reasoning from Example
Reagan employed example to prove his second theme. 
To support the argument that criticism of southern edu­
cation was unfounded, Reagan used the example of Texas' 
educational system. He used specific examples of
constitutional provisions for education from.the time when
Texas was under the Mexican Constitution of 1827 through
the Texas Constitutions of 1836, 1845, 1866, 1369, and the
1876 Constitution that was then^^ in use. He specified 
26the lands that were appropriated for schools, gave
specific amounts of money that were allocated for 
27schools, and stated the number of months devoted to
p r i
education in the rural and urban areas. On the basis 
of the example- of Texas, he argued that other states were 
capable of supporting their own school systems. The major 
problem with this argument was that the very evidence 
presented in the example proved that Texas was the unusual 
in the southern states.
To prove his contention that the bill was dis-
29criminatory, Reagan pointed out the names of the states
^The Texas Constitution enacted in 1876 is still
in use.
There were then between thirty and forty million 
acres of land that belonged to the common school funds of 
the state, according to Reagan’s example, beside the land 
given to the university of the state and beside four 
leagues given to various counties that were not in the 
school fund but used to that purpose.
27'The aggregate of this funding amounted to 
$3,359,347.39 in 1889.
28These varied in location from five to ten months
per year.
29These included South Dakota, North Dakota, 
Montana, and Washington plus the Territories of the 
United States.
100
that would be aided and also suggested examples of 
' 30states^ that were discriminated against. All of the 
states mentioned were western in locale except Texas. 
However, Reagan seemed to include Texas here as a western 
state also. The examples were apparently included to 
affect the representatives of these relatively older 
western states. He used examples of the increase of 
children in both older and newer states from 1&77 to 1837 
to show discrimination on a state by state basis.
Reagan offered another example to prove that the 
Blair bill would cause further sectional agitation. He 
alluded to the argument that the moneys that were fed 
into the United States Treasury came ultimately from 
taxation and if the central government paid for all the 
state’s educational programs, rather than taxing their own 
internal wealth, the tax program would be unbalanced. He 
used a single example to prove this contention and the 
example was vague. He attempted to point out that if Mr. 
Gould, one of the nation’s wealthiest men, was not taxed 
locally for schools, he would pay no more for educating 
his children than any other citizen. Although the example 
could have borne connotative economic meaning had it been 
developed further, it constituted instead a vague and
30The states he used as examples to receive like 
monetary aid were Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas.
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meaningless insertion that tended to confuse the issue 
rather than offer clarification.
Reagan used some examples to support his second 
theme but he relied entirely on example to support his 
last theme concerning sectional agitation. While most of 
his examples were well chosen to support his themes, the 
one chosen to support the last argument was vague and 
seemed to be irrelevant to the theme that it was intended 
to support.
Reasoning from Authority
Reagan used authority to prove his contentions 
that federal school funding was not constitutional and 
that the states had a right to govern their own people, 
including their education. His reasoning on these themes 
was that no exact grant of power existed in the preamble 
of the Constitution, Article I, section £, which served 
as the basis for the Blair Bill. He argued that those 
powers not relegated to the federal government were 
reserved for the states and the people. He directly 
quoted Article I, section 8, clause 1, of the United States 
Constitution which contained the ’’general welfare” clause. 
The Blair Act was based upon that clause. Reagan refuted 
the claim that the passage contained constitutional power 
for such action by stating: ’’Section 8 of Article I of
the Constitution specifies and enumerates the powers of
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Congress. No power is found to aid in the establishment
31and support of common schools,” He further quoted 
Article X of the Constitution to support this argument. 
Reagan pointed out that Article X had been inserted as 
early as 1791, at the first Congressional session and that 
the amendment relegated all powers not specifically 
belonging to the Federal government to the states. Reagan 
used one other authority to refute the constitutionality 
of the Blair Act. He read a quotation from James Madison, 
a national founding father, concerning an early attempt 
to invoke the "general welfare” clause. The quote 
directly substantiated Reagan’s claim that it was the 
rights of the states, rather than the federal govern­
ment, to regulate and support schools. In order to further 
prove his argument, he offered nine short direct quotations 
concerning the interpretation of these sections of the 
Constitution from Mr. Justice Story’s Commentaries on the 
Constitution. Reagan qualified Judge Story’s authority 
as ” . . . probably as high an authority as there is on 
this subject.”32
As authoritative proof of his contention that 
Texas provided for education in her constitutions, Reagan
31Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, p. 1722.
32Ibid., p. 1722.
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also used excerpts from the Mexican Constitution of 1$27> 
the Texas Declaration of Independence from Mexico, and 
the articles from the Constitution of 1&76 that were 
pertinent to education.
Reagan’s choice of authoritative proof appeared 
to be strong since he quoted from recognized documents 
and Judge Story, a recognized authority on interpre­
tation of the national Constitution.
Reasoning from causal relationship
Reagan argued that the loss of power over funding 
of schools by the states would place all power into the
hands of the central governing body. The effect of the
power exchange would allow the central government to 
” . . . proscribe the course of studies, the textbooks to 
be used, and the duties of teachers and officers charged 
with administration of the funds so appropriated, and 
might require mixed schools of black and white children 
. • .’’33 The last segment of that example pertaining to 
mixed schools drew enough attention to cause Senator Blair 
to break into the speech to ask Reagan if he thought the 
bill itself contained an integration clause. Reagan 
admitted he knew it did not but was conjecturing on the
ultimate outcome of the bill.
33Ibid., p. 1724.
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Another usage of causal reasoning was applied to 
support Reagan's claim that the educational system should 
be left as it was. The reasoning was that the present 
system of education was turning out highly enlightened 
men and had been doing so since the educational systems 
of the states had begun. Thus the effect of well educated 
men as products of the present system of education by the 
states should constitute cause enough to maintain the 
status quo. Since Reagan was addressing an audience com­
posed of state representatives themselves schooled under 
their respective state systems, the usage seemed applicable 
and useful as proof.
Causal reasoning was also applied in Reagan's 
concept of discriminating action outlined by the bill. 
Reagan argued that the illiterate whites of the new west 
would receive the greatest benefits of the bill and thus 
cause the illiterate negroes of the south to be dis­
criminated against once more. Since education of the 
illiterate southern negro had been the original intent of 
the Blair bill, Reagan's reasoning was apropos.
Reagan's reasoning from causal relationship seemed 
to strengthen his thematic pattern within the Blair Act 
speech. He employed cause to effect reasoning in present­
ing the concept that central control of school funding 
would cause central control of school operations. He 
again used cause to effect reasoning in his claim that the
105
Blair bill would primarily aid the illiterate whites of 
the west and the effect would be further discrimination 
against the southern negro. He employed effect to cause 
reasoning by pointing out that the effects of state 
school systems was well educated men and thus cause enough 
to maintain the educational system as it was established.
ETHICAL PROOF
Early in his career John H. Reagan had established
his position as defender of the rights of the states by
strict construction of the Constitution. Prior to the
Civil War, he had assumed the position in several addresses
to C o n g r e s s . T o  the voters of his district, Reagan
stated, in 1$59> that if the rights within the federal
system were denied and ” . . .  the Constitution so
violated, and our rights so affected as to require us to
fall back on the reserved rights of the States . . . ” that
35he would ” . . .  defend them by all means necessary.
Since the ultimate method was war, he upheld his position
•^ Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, 
pp. 1199-12037 1466-1467»* 3bth Congress, 2nd Session, 
pp. 3$9-394> were examples on the congressional floor 
prior to the Civil War.
3 5•^ Circular to the voters within the First Con­
gressional District of Texas from Reagan, April 12, l£59, 
in R.P«: Circulars, Pamphlets, and Speeches.
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by assuming Confederate duties and returned to Congress
to continue to uphold his original position on the
issue. Outside of Congress, his support of states
37rights was expressed in several of his addresses.
Reagan’s reputation as a guardian of the states rights
during his Congressional term followed him into the
Senate. In reporting Reagan's election to the Senate, in
1$$7, t]ie Baltimore Sun described him in this manner:
"In the House he had been recognized as a bold, fearless,
aggressive opponent of . . . the centralizing tendencies
3 Bof the Republican P a r t y . W h e n  the issue concerning 
centralizing of power through educational funding came 
into senatorial focus, Reagan again spoke out against 
infringement upon the rights of the states. In lBBB, he 
firmly opposed the Blair bill for federal aid to education
 ^For examples of his speaking to Congress in this 
vein see: Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 5O7-50B, 610, 32l7-32lB; 44th Congress, 2nd 
Session, pp. 702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 335» 
696; 45th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3275; 45th Congress,
3rd Session, pp. 97-9$; 50th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 
202-205.
37For some noteworthy examples of his theme of 
states rights based on strict constitutional construction, 
see: "Address to the People of Houston, Texas," on the
Conservative State Convention, January 23, 1B6B; "On the 
Election Commission of IB76," Palestine, Texas, March 24, 
1&77; "Address to the Confederate Veterans," San Antonio, 
Texas, April 20, 1B77; "Memorial Address for General John B. 
Hood," Houston, Texas, September 12, 1$79; "Address to 
Texas Veterans," Palestine, Texas, April 21, lBBl. R.P.: 
Speeches, 1B5B-19Q3.
•^Baltimore Sun (February 2, 1BB7).
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partially on the ground that it was an invasion of the
39rights of the states. So Reagan's reputation as a 
states rights proponent had already been established 
prior to the speech to the Senate against the Blair bill 
in 1890.
Within the speech itself, Reagan attempted to 
establish his good character by his advocacy of strict 
obedience to the highest law of his state and his nation. 
He also indicated that his belief in the federal system 
should establish him as a loyal son of his country and a 
defender of its inherent democratic qualities. He 
suggested that he was in favor of peaceful coexistence of 
all sections of the land rather than in favor of a situ- . 
ation fraught with animosity and strife along the lines 
of sectionalism.
Reagan frequently and consistently suggested his 
intelligence by demonstrating his thorough knowledge of 
the materials pertinent to the issue involved.
The introductory remarks of the speech were a 
direct attempt to establish good will. He complimented 
the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Faulkner) and Mr.
39^ Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st 
Session, pp. 2bS-274. Also see: Millage L. Bonham to
Reagan, January 9, 1888, 0. M. Roberts to Reagan, January 
16, 1888, M. F. Mott to Reagan, January 30, 1888, in 
R.P.: Letters; Austin Weekly Statesman (January 25, 1888),
and Dallas Morning News (January 3, 1888).
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Coke, his Texas colleague, as having given " . . .  a very 
learned and able discussion of the subject."^
Reagan's reputation as a defender of the rights 
.of the states and as an opponent to centralizing forces
I
had been established prior to the present speech. His
attitude toward the particular bill on education had been
previously established through an earlier speech^ to the
*
Senate. He maintained the same attitude toward these 
themes in the present speech. He indicated he was a man 
of good character and intelligence, and he attempted to 
establish goodwill in the introduction of the speech.
EMOTIONAL PROOF
Reagan employed emotional appeals in this speech. 
He attempted to create a feeling of pride within the 
Southern Segment of his audience; he made a limited appeal 
to scorn for his opposition; he appealed to the loyalty 
of the Senators to their form of government; and he 
attempted to evoke a feeling of fear.
Reagan displayed pride in his own state in what 
appeared to be an attempt to stir like emotional response
^Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, p. Iy22.
^Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st 
Session, pp. 268-274.
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in the representatives of other states. Of particular 
persuasive interest to Reagan were those Southern Senators 
who favored the bill. He first made a limited attempt to 
discredit Mr. Blair by a reference to his use of only a_ 
priori reasoning without any proof and then attacked the 
long denunciation of the southern school system made by 
the Senator from New Hampshire. Senator Blair’s denunci­
atory speech had been a harsh criticism of the entire 
institution of education in the south and Reagan replied 
with a description of his own state with which he apparently 
hoped to stir the pride of other southern Senators. The 
account appeared to be a plea from a proud old southern 
statesman to evoke enough feeling of sectional pride that 
the other southern Senators would recognize the folly, as 
Reagan saw it, of selling their rights as states for the 
price of school funding.
Reagan's use of the Constitution within his strict 
interpretation established an appeal to the loyalty of the 
Senators. He presented a case that the bill was not only 
questionable constitutionally but was actually designed 
to destroy the federal system. Thus if the Senators were 
loyal to the present system of federalism, Reagan reasoned, 
they would have to be against federal funding of schools.
In like context, Reagan attempted to arouse in his 
audience fear of a "despotic” contralism, a fear that not 
only would the right to govern their educational systems
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be a thing of the past but that all rights of statehood 
would be dissolved. He appeared to bolster this feeling 
of fear by reminding the southern Senators subtly of the 
hated rule of reconstruction.
He also pointed out to the Western sector that the 
bill was created with built-in discrimination for some 
states of the West and against others and the very word­
ing made it an object that might be feared on an economic 
and intersectional basis.
Finally, he made a limited attempt to raise a 
fear of inequality of taxation to support the educational 
system but this was a weak and futile attempt since the 
funding was to come almost directly from import duties.
EVALUATION
A congressional audience poses a unique problem 
in ascertaining the effectiveness of any one speech. There 
were so many speeches presented both pro and con on this 
controversial subject that the effect of Reagan’s speech 
must be combined with all those that refuted the bill.
Another complicating factor was the effect of the 
periodicals reporting on the issue. The reporting, in 
turn, both influenced and at the same time reflected the 
will of the people. At first, the periodical literature
Ill
I n
favored the Blair Act, then the popular will began to
I o
change. To what extent the mass communication and the 
will of the constituency affected their senatorial repre­
sentatives is impossible to ascertain.
However, some conclusions can be drawn from the 
actual voting pattern on the bill. One possible result of 
Reagan's speech was the acquisition of the Western vote.
In spite of the obvious bribe mentioned by Reagan in his 
speech, the traditional Republican West voted against the 
Blair Act. As a result, many of the agrarian southern 
states rights proponents, who at first had favored the 
bill as the only possible means of combating the edu­
cational problem, now realized that the "South . . . was 
growing in prosperity and able to care for her own. • • 
and a majority of these southerners voted against the bill. 
The acquisition of more stable economy had some influence 
upon the southern vote. However, the amount of the funds 
to be gained in their states might well have swung their 
vote to the Blair Act if speakers, including Reagan, had 
not pointed out major flaws in the bill. The most notable
^ F o r  an example of this reported material see 
New Orleans Picayune (February 19, 1$&6).
^Nation (August 1, 13S9), p* &4* For full 
coverage of the Blair Bill see Dallas Daily Herald and 
The Houston Post throughout the years 1884-189t).
^Dewey, National Problems, p. 90.
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of these flaws was the attempt at centralization of power 
and ultimate breakage of the political unity of the 
Democratic South.
This bill had been debated from 1$$4 to 1&90 on 
the Senate floor. Soon after Reagan’s speech, and others 
like it, the bill was finally defeated by a vote of 
forty-two to thirty-six.
Reagan predicted within the speech that
” . . .  if one of the barriers of the Constitution is 
broken down by this act, the States will in the 
future be told that as Congress appropriates money 
to support these schools, it is right and necessary 
that it should follow such appropriations by laws 
regulating the application of this money and the uses 
to which it is to be put; that it may prescribe the 
course of studies, the textbooks to be used, and the 
duties of the teachers and officers charged with the 
administration of the funds so appropriated, and 
might require mixed schools of black and white 
children. . . .”45
Certainly much of his prophecy has been fulfilled.
Reagan's foresight was accurate. The growth of laxity 
that Reagan predicted on the part of the states in financ­
ing their own schools did become a reality and a growing 
problem. Since the individual state officials did become 
lax in accepting complete economic responsibility for their 
schools, particularly in the expanding urban areas,
45^ Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, p.” Iy24«
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federal grants-in-aid have opened the door to increasing 
control of state schools by the federal government.
The defeat of the Blair Act had a long delaying 
effect on federal school control. But the United States 
Constitution, the very instrument that Reagan used to 
blunt the first attacks on federal interference in state 
control of education, has been used, since 1954>^ through 
interpretive measures to achieve the same purpose. An 
analysis of whether the effect is "good1' or “bad” is not 
the object of this section. It is sufficient to say that 
enough of Reagan's long-range prediction has come to be 
fact to make an^uncomfortable nation over the past two 
decades of American history.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
Following the Civil War, the high rate of illiter­
acy, particularly among the freedmen of the South, was 
recognized as a problem. At the same time, federal monies 
increased the treasury to a point that caused a trend 
toward the reduction of tariff rates. The high tariff
i /r
For example: the Federal grants-in-aid to the
State of Texas for education in 1972 amounted to $176,717>244 
and an amount was proposed for 1973 of $1$4>2$2,63#. 
Governor's Recommended Budget for 1972-1973»
j n
Brown vs. Board of Education, Topeka (Kansas), 
opened the educational integration doors.
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proponents espoused the cause of educational funding by 
the federal government as a means of reducing the federal 
treasury to assure the maintenance of the tariff rate. At 
this time, many southern educators felt that the South 
should be aided in educating the large number of illiterate 
blacks that had been poured into their educational systems. 
Three previous bills, known as Blair bills, had been 
killed in one House, or the other, prior to the intro­
duction to the Senate of the fourth, and last, Blair 
Education Bill. Senator Reagan spoke in opposition to 
the fourth Blair bill and it was with this speech that 
the present chapter is concerned.
Reagan presented four developmental themes in his 
speech: (1) the preservation of the autonomous rule of
education by state and local governments; (2) the preser­
vation of the rights of states; (3) the retention of the 
federal form of government rather than central despotism; 
and (4) the avoidance of further sectional strife. He 
used examples and authority as logical proof of his argu­
ments. The first two themes employed less use of example 
than authority but the last two themes relied heavily on 
example as proof. Reagan derived ethical appeal through 
his reputation as a defender of states rights, a reputation 
that was well-established prior to the speech. His stand­
ing on the particular educational act had also been 
established by a prior speech. His ethical appeal was
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enhanced during the speech through his attempts to , 
establish his good character as a peaceful man who was a 
loyal national son, interested in the preservation of his 
country’s democratic principles. Reagan demonstrated 
his intelligence by his thorough knowledge of materials 
pertinent to the issue. He also attempted to establish 
goodwill through praise of his colleagues.
Emotional appeals were also present in the speech. 
He attempted to arouse pride within the southern segment 
of the audience, and he also made a limited attempt to 
discredit his opponent with a feeling of scorn. He 
attempted to arouse loyalty to the federal form of 
government and a fear of centralization.
The effect of Reagan's speech was difficult to 
ascertain because of the length of time that the topic 
had been under discussion and because of the changes 
effected by the press and by fluctuating popular will.
Also his speech must be judged one of a number of oppos­
ing speeches. A possible immediate result was the winning 
of the Western vote and some of the Southern votes through 
Reagan's emphasis on the flaws within the bill. The bill 
was defeated. Centralization was delayed by the defeat 
but in the 1950's and 1960*s centralization of educational 
power through constitutional interpretation, the very 
weapon Reagan used in his argument to defeat the bill,
has become a fact that has caused an uncomfortable atmos­
phere on the American national scene.
CHAPTER IV
THE SILVER SPEECH TO THE SENATE,
DECEMBER 30, 1S90
ISSUE AND OCCASION
The nation began, and continued, on the bimetal 
standard until 1$7#, when the Bland-Allison Act put the 
United States onto the gold standard alone. The "hard 
money" industrialists were naturally interested in main­
taining the monometal standard. However, the nation 
struggled during the lSSO’s in the throes of a major 
depression. Farmers and ranchers in the South and the 
West were hard put to maintain their lives much less 
their land, crops, and stock. Small businesses in all 
parts of the nation were unable to keep their doors open. 
These people felt that if silver returned, with its 
inflationary effect, it would provide a panacea for their 
ills. The monometalists argued that failure to remain on 
the gold standard would mean the silver standard
. . .  would succeed the gold standard, and the 
purchasing power of the American dollar would 
decline to the commercial value of the silver 
dollar— a drop of nearly 50 percent.!
"Kj. D. Hicks, G. E. Mowry, and R. E. Burke,
The American Nation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1964), pp7'I92-T9T:
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In order to appease the free silver men, the Republicans 
devised an act that would blunt the free coinage of 
silver. Aware of Sherman's popularity in the West, the 
Republican leadership engaged in a subtle game of com­
promise between the differing pressure groups and gave 
the act his name. The Sherman Silver Purchase Act was 
passed in 1390. It contained provisions for buying the 
approximate maximum domestic production of silver and 
paying for it with treasury notes. The notes were to be 
redeemable, at the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in gold or silver coin. It was pointed out by 
some Democrats and free silver men that the silver was 
not to be minted into coin and therefore this act was an 
empty gesture. Since the sound money men insisted that 
gold be the redemptive metal, the amount of money in
circulation did not increase materially and the price of
2
silver continued to drop.
The men who had loaned the money that sustained 
the nation's economy and the conservatives of both parties 
argued for the return of the single metal standard so 
that their investments would not lose value. The debtors, 
who were more numerous but not so influential, and the
2
Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A Social and 
Political History of American Finance, l3b5-l&79' 
(Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 19&4), pp•
113-119, 142-144, 162, 222-224, 403-404, passim.
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inflationists who were in position to gain, agitated and
argued for the unlimited coinage of silver which they
3
thought might have allowed the economy to level off.
The times bespoke a chaotic atmosphere of economic 
upheaval that made the isolation of the single issue of 
silver difficult. Perhaps the most enlightening account 
was the financial policy stated by the economists 
Friedman and Swartz in a blunt analysis of the silver 
issue:
1. The overall effect of the liberal movement 
toward inflation was actually deflationary since it dis­
couraged foreign investment in this nation and led native 
investors to seek foreign markets.
2. Although conservatives wanted stabilization 
of the dollar value, their dominated instrument, the 
Treasury, actually caused the opposite effect. Basically 
this self-destructive action was effected by buying up 
bank notes themselves, thus decreasing the volume of 
these notes on the market.
3. The conservative-controlled Treasury also 
attempted to force silver on to the market. However, this 
attempt only devaluated the American dollar on the inter­
national market and caused an unbalanced market and the
3Ibid.
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exportation of gold. The problem could have been avoided 
simply by buying and stockpiling the silver.
4. Friedman and Swartz concluded that the way 
people think about money can be the most important element 
of contention. Fear that the silver purchase by the 
government threatened the gold standard and national 
inflation was groundless. The silver could have been 
absorbed indefinitely without serious threat.^
But this analysis was made with the benefit of
hindsight and the problem as a whole was less easily seen
at that time. Certainly the Sherman Silver Act did not
quiet either side in the currency controversy. Rather it
seemed to add fuel to the fiery oratory on the Senate
floor where it was condemned as a log-rolling device to
5
secure the western vote for the McKinley Tariff Act.
Reagan's speech occurred in the year after the 
act was passed. He asked for an amendment to the silver 
act allowing free coinage thereof. The Senate passed the 
free coinage bill by a vote of 39 to 27. Fifteen 
Republicans voted for, and one Democrat, Wilson of
^Milton Friedman and A. J. Swartz, A Monetary 
History of the United States, 1&67-1&90 (Princeton: 
University Fress, National Bureau of Economic R. E. S., 
1963), pp. 120-133.
^For Reagan's discussion of the Tariff Act, see: 
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, Index.
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Maryland, voted against the measure. It did not pass the
House and so continued to be an issue into the Twentieth 
6Century.
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
The top ranking Republicans had given the Sherman 
Silver Act as an inducement to the Western segment of the 
Senate audience and had received in return the Western 
vote that secured the McKinley Tariff Act. The Sherman 
Silver Act of 1890 had seemed at least a step in the 
direction of aiding the American economy. Many Southerners, 
including Reagan,' had spoken in behalf of the Silver Act 
early in 1890, but by December of that year when Reagan 
again addressed the Senate on the Silver Act, sentiment 
had begun to change heavily. The act had not increased 
the flow of money but had decreased the gold in the 
national treasury. These actions occurred only two years 
prior to the panic and major depression of 1893• The 
silver issue now split the party lines and became a 
sectional issue once more. The politicians were incapable 
of organizing the diverse groups. One historian stated
£
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 1323.
7Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, pp. 2829-2834> bi73-6l76.
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" . . .  in most important votes on the greenback and
silver issue before 1896, party lines in Congress dis-
integrated.” The debates were marked with "party
chaos" and "the majority that pushed it through was non-
9
partisan and almost wholly sectional."
Senator Sherman of Ohio, and Blaine of Maine 
spoke steadily and strongly against bimetalism. Senator 
Hoar of Massachusetts, Senator Hiscock of New York, and 
Senator Edmund of Vermont were three of the most out­
spoken of the conservatives.
The senators from Kansas, Idaho, Colorado, and 
Nevada strongly upheld the silver coinage concept and 
formed a receptive audience to Reagan's speech although 
they were generally thought to adhere to Republican lines. 
Senator Plumb of Kansas, Senator Mitchell of Oregon, 
Senators Jones and Steward of Nevada, and Senator Daniel 
of Virginia were all strong debators, joining Reagan's 
fight for free coinage of silver.
The party lines were down and the sections and 
ideologies formed the basis of division on the silver 
issue. The Northern conservatives, whether Democrat or 
Republican, wanted the gold standard and verbally fought
Garraty, New Commonwealth, p. 249. 
9Ibid.
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on the Senate floor for it. The West and South banded 
together forgetting the Republican West and Democratic 
South in the united stand for free coinage of silver.
DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
Reagan employed four basic themes in his speech 
asking for remonetization of silver. These themes were: 
(1). that the money-class and the monometalists were the 
same group; (2) that this group was infringing upon the 
economic rights of the people through the original 
demonetization act and through a continuing of the mono­
metal program; (3) that the same group was infringing on 
the rights of the populace by introducing a bill that was 
attempting to detain action on the silver issue as well as 
attempting to centralize power; and (4) that these actions 
had no basis in constitutionality.
Reagan's development of his first theme was based 
upon example and causal reasoning. He suggested that this 
group had secured the passage of the first demonetization 
act of 1&73 with a resultant slump in the economy that 
caused great economic stress to the debtor class. He 
then stated that the same group had passed the 1&7& and 
the 1&89 silver bills in order to limit the amount of 
silver coined and by this method to maintain silver as a 
commodity such as "wheat and cotton" with its basis of 
redemption in gold. Since this had been the resultant
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effect of the two previous bills, the theme was credible.
He then offered a less well-formulated and documented 
supporting argument that the present bill was designed 
to help the same class once more since they had been 
hoarding the silver and the present bill forced the 
government to buy it at their prices. This would " . . .  
enable them to make a speculation off the Government and 
the people, while at the same time they prevented silver 
from being made money in the full sense • . . that is, 
a unit of value receivable for all debt, public and 
private.""^
Reagan’s sympathy and interest were with the 
agrarian South and the land and mineral-rich West.
Within his own state he had worked toward the early survey 
of the land and the later growth of Texas' land and 
mineral resources. He now proudly represented a state 
that was a combination of both these elements of survival 
and growth. He was identified as a friend and defender 
of the average citizen in all sections of the nation.
These were the people who were not suffering under a great 
and growing depression."*''*' Reagan saw the monometal program
^Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 879.
^Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, The American Nation, 
pp. 191-193.
as one of the fundamental causes of this problem. The 
farmer, rancher, and the small business man needed a more 
abundant flow of money in order to maintain their hold­
ings and raise their economic standard. The act of 
demonetization had ” . . .  caused a reduction in values 
of all property and products of about 33 percent; it took 
from the people about one-half of the metal money of the
world; and it increased the burdens of all indebtedness
12from one-third to one-half." Reagan indicated that he 
was aware that this would cause monetary loss to the 
moneyed class but he reminded the senators that they had 
shown no thought of the average citizen when they in­
creased by " . . .  33 percent the indebtedness of the
13debtor class by a law." J Coupled with the intense feel­
ing of loyalty toward, and frustration over his inability 
to help these people, Reagan also believed that the 
program that had supplanted bimetalism was unconsti­
tutional. He saw the monometalists’ program as a breach 
of the Constitution and he argued that until silver was 
again freely coined and "silver can be restored to the 
place it occupied under the Constitution" the issue would
12Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 8§1.
13Ibid.
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be perpetuated on the Senate floor.^ Reagan apparently
felt strongly on this issue for he had often spoken
the 
16
15before on  topic and he continued to do so after
this speech,
Reagan was also aware of the opposing element
within his audience and their effort to supplant the issue
with one more to their liking. One of the issues that was
presented in an effort to supplant the silver issue was
that of federal control of elections within the states.
Reagan admonished the Senators that in allowing this to
happen they were injuring the economy of the nation. He
warned then that
. . .  in the present condition of the country it 
seems to me that, instead of spending our time in 
the discussion of a bill providing for elections 
and providing to strike down the rights of the states 
to provide their own election laws, we had better be 
considering the means of relieving the threatened 
financial disaster of the country’s (sic).17
However, Reagan seemed to fall into the same trap he
warned against for he included a long statement concerning
14Ibid., p. 879.
15For examples of his speeches and remarks on the 
silver issue prior to this speech see: Congressional
Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 2829-2834, 6032, 
6174.-6175, 6l80; 51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 113-115*
1 ^
For examples of later speeches and remarks on 
this issue see: Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 917-9207 1285, 1291-1292, 1306, 1313.
17Ibid., p. 879.
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the election bill. In this segment of his speech he 
developed the theme that the bill was based on unsure
lg
constitutional grounds. The measure also was illogical 
in its centralization concepts since the central govern­
ing body to supervise the elections must still be drawn 
from the inhabitants of the several states which the bill 
itself deemed incapable of rendering fair election pro­
cesses. The theme appeared to be inserted in answer to 
previous speeches. The theme was developed concisely and 
was not so much further developed as restated along 
previous lines after a taunt from the floor about minority 
rights.
Within his speech Reagan developed the themes 
that the monometalists and the moneyed class were the 
same individuals. These individuals were infringing 
upon the citizens' rights and were doing this unconsti­
tutionally. Apparently in answer to a previous speaker, 
he also argued that the proponents of centralization 
through federal election control were interfering with 
economic legislation; he reaped some of the fruit of his 
own warning by inserting the theme of discrediting the 
franchise bill.
lg
He felt that the section of the Constitution, 
Article I, section 4» did not constitute basis for the 
bill.
MODES OF PROOF
128
Reagan again used logical, ethical, and emotional 
appeals in the speech asking for remonetization of silver.
LOGICAL PROOF
Reagan made use of example and causal relation­
ship within the silver speech. He also made limited use 
of authority as a proof.
Reasoning from example
Several times within the speech, Reagan compared 
silver to other commodities that must be purchased with 
gold. He gave specific examples of those commodities as 
"corn,” "wheat," "cotton," and "pork" to be valued by 
gold. Each of the commodities used as examples having 
par value with silver under the gold standard were 
necessities of life. Three of them were staple foods and 
the other a basic commodity necessary for clothing. In 
this manner, Reagan appeared to be assuming silver was 
also a basic necessity of life through his choice of 
comparative examples. These examples also had further 
connotative value since Reagan spoke in behalf of the 
people of the agrarian South and West and these were the 
basic economic staple crops of these sections which were 
as necessary for their economic health as silver, according 
to Reagan, was necessary for the nation's economic health.
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Reagan considered the monometal program to be a 
"legislative crime" that was perpetrated upon the nation.
He spoke of the nation's economy prior to the demoneti­
zation as being in healthier condition than following the 
act. The demonetization of silver resulted in an unhealthy 
economic state of being that had pauperized the laboring 
class according to Reagan's reasoning. He gave examples 
of results of the silver demonetization act as bank 
failures, bankruptcy, and the inability of the people to 
pay their debts or taxes. He cited that " . . .  newspapers 
all over the country, from Maine to California and from
the Lakes to the Gulf, were filled with advertisements
19of land other property for sale for taxes."
Reagan reasoned that the monometal program had
been passed initially, in 1&73> without many politicians
being cognizant of the actual demonetization of silver
intended by the Act. The political ignorance argument was
substantiated by Reagan when he cited President Grant's
actions following his signing of the act. The specific
examples used were Grant's message to Congress, on January
11+, 1$75, advising the establishment of three more silver
20mints to be located in Chicago, Saint Louis, and Omaha.
19Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. SyS.
20Ibid.
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This message was sent the same day Grant signed the silver 
demonetization act. The second example used was Grant’s 
letter to Mr. Crowdy sent eight months after the act's 
passage; the letter contained materials showing ignorance 
of the single metal standard.
The ’’laboring classes” and the "new and powerful 
industrial organizations" wanted the remonetization of 
silver according to Reagan's statement. He supported 
this claim with examples of "a convention which met in 
St. Louis" and demanded "free and unlimited coinage of 
silver;" the "National Alliance" which met in "Ocala, 
Florida" demanded the same free silver as did "sub­
alliances and granges all over the country" and "labor
21organizations of various kinds."
The choice of examples used to prove Reagan's 
arguments appeared to be clear and relevant. He chose 
examples that were down-to-earth yet expressive of his 
ideas.
Reasoning from authority
In comparison to his usually abundant employment 
of authorities as proof within his speaking, Reagan was 
frugal in his usage of authority in the silver speech; he 
used authority only three times to support his arguments.
21Ibid., p. $79.
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As proof of wording he wished to refute, he did read a 
portion from the silver bill as reported by the Finance 
Committee of the Senate.
In attempting to prove the ignorance of some 
House members concerning the intent of the first silver 
act, Reagan used the testimony of the ’’Honorable Mr.
Kelly of Pennsylvania" who was a "member of the committee 
which reported the bill containing the provisions for the 
suspension of the silver dollar.” Representative Kelly 
stated in the House on March 9, 187$, that he was ignorant 
of the fact that stoppage of silver coinage was the intent 
of the act. Reagan went on to state that "like testi­
mony" was borne by "many other Representatives and 
Senators, including Mr. Blaine, the speaker of the 
House." This use of Kelly's testimony perhaps would have 
borne more weight if Reagan had simply used Kelly's 
statement bolstered by Blaine's "like testimony." The 
insertion of the nebulous "many other Representatives and 
Senators" seemed to detract from the authorities used to 
substantiate the point. Representative Kelly's position 
on the relevant committee would have carried at least a 
vestage of authority and certainly Blaine of Maine was 
an important political figure in the House. Although only 
Representatives were named as authorities, "many other . . . 
Senators" were referred to as also having stated ignorance 
of the bill's effect. This authority was very close to
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the members of the audience Reagan addressed and this 
authority was apparently used to arouse interest through 
accusation. Reagan did not judge the present Senate but 
employed authority from a closely related source.
Authority as proof was used a third time by 
Reagan when he was speaking on the interpolated theme 
that minority rights were being infringed upon by the 
passage of the election bill. He referred briefly to 
Thomas Jefferson's statement concerning the rights of 
minorities. The idea was undeveloped but provoked several 
minutes of questioning by Senator Spooner asking for 
clarification of Reagan's concept of minority rights.
Reasoning from causal relationship
Reagan reasoned that the demonetization of silver
was causing an economic depression. He argued:
It caused a reduction in values of all property and 
products of about 33 percent; it took from the 
people the use of about one-half of the metal money 
of the world; and it increased the burdens of all 
indebtedness from one-third to one-half.22
He went on to develop this causal reasoning by speaking of
specific effects of demonetization.
One of the consequences of the demonetization of 
silver was that after the fall of prices caused 
by it (sic) it required double the amount of the 
products of the soil, double the number of days'
22Ibid., p. 373
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work, to pay either the public or the private 
indebtedness of the country.23
He stated that demonetization caused ’’the nation to
suffer" from "great financial embarrassment" for several
years.
Causal reasoning was applied to Reagan's argument 
that legislative ignorance caused the passage of the 
first silver act in 1$73» He argued that ignorance on 
the part of political figures, particularly the legis­
lators and the executive had caused them to make into 
law the monometal program. He then presented another 
step in his reasoning from cause-effect relationship 
when he stated that although ignorance had caused the 
initial step, the Senate, in iSyB, in a subsequent act, 
had deliberately caused a continuation of the monometal 
program by amending the House silver act of 1&7$. The 
amendment caused silver to remain on a commodity basis, to 
be purchased by gold, rather than allowing the silver to 
regain its monetary exchange value.
When Reagan spoke about the election bill, he 
stated that it was the purpose of those who brought the 
bill to the Senate floor to cause centralization of power 
and secondly to disallow debate on the important economic 
issue of silver. The effect of centralization he divided
23Ibid.
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into the claim that the act would remove the sovereign 
power from the people and would strip authority from the 
citizens. He further reasoned that the bill was intended 
to gain "partisan advantage, to sustain a party repudi­
ated by the people, and to hold power whether the people 
will it or not."2*1' He went on to state that its effect 
"is to strike down self-government; it is to tell the 
people you are no longer honest enough and intelligent 
enough to be trusted with the passing of laws and
25executing them for the election of your own officers."
His last use of causal reasoning was less well 
developed. He simply referred to the force bill as an 
issue that should take lower precedence than the silver 
issue since the silver remonetization was a means of 
"relieving threatened financial disaster" and the force 
bill was causing a delay in that action.
ETHICAL PROOF
As early as 1877» Reagan took a stand on the silver 
issue. He made this early stand against the moneyed class 
with his anti-monopoly speaking in Congress. He saw the 
situation as one in which the division of riches and
2Z|Tbid., p. 880 
25Ibid.
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poverty could be laid directly at the feet of multi­
millionaires who had used the vote of the same poor they 
had established to legislate laws to protect themselves.
He observed that there ” . . .  were no beggars till 
Vanderbilts and Stewarts and Goulds and Scotts and 
Huntingtons and Fisks shaped the action of government.
Then the few became fabulously rich and many wretchedly 
poor.” He laid the blame for these problems partially 
on the monopolies, partially upon the tariff and "upon 
the demonetization of silver." He stated that remoneti­
zation of silver and the expansion of currency circulation
would "decrease the dependency of the people upon the
2 7moneyed interests . . . "  The next year, 187$, Reagan
spoke in behalf of the Democratic Party’s position and
denounced the Republicans as having advocated "class
legislation" including "high tariff, tight fiscal policy,
demonetization of silver" and aid to monopolies since 
2$1861. Throughout his years in the House Reagan missed
29few opportunities to urge the remonetization of silver.
^Galveston Daily News (October 2, 1$77), and 
Dallas Daily Herald (1877), clipping in R.P.
27Ibid.
28Galveston Daily News (September 22, 26, 29, and 
October 5, 187$)•
2 9 Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st Session, 
pp. 47, 2343, 2693-2695, 4561-4502; 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, pp. 5$$7, 6032, 6034, 6167, 6174-6175, 6180.
Eight months earlier he had stated to the Senate that in
"this absence, this dearth, of currency” the Treasury
30should remonetize silver. He stated that the demoneti­
zation of silver had been "based on class interest . . .
It has been a policy of caring for the rich and taking 
care of the interests of the rich at the expense of the
poor, at the expense of the middle class, at the expense
31of the toiling millions . . .  of this country."^ The 
present speech was thus not Reagan’s maiden speech on the 
demonetization issue. His reputation as a defender of the 
"masses of people" against the "avaricious, ambitious 
gatherers of gold," was long-standing prior to his 
December, 1&90, speech. His character was already 
established as the defender of the people’s rights, the 
enemy of centralization, and the exponent of the idea of 
silver remonetization as a means of restoring a healthy 
national economy.
Within the speech Reagan upheld his previously 
established position by referring repeatedly to the 
economic plight of the people whose rights were being 
infringed upon by the "creditor classes." He directly 
attempted to identify with the people and their will by
30 ^ Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st 
Session, p7 4240.
31Ibid., pp. 4240-4241.
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stating ” . . . I think I represent the feeling of the 
masses of the people . . . ” and he then identified that 
will as being the remonetization of silver. He further 
attempted to establish his position as one that had the 
’’interest of the great American public” as its basis 
rather than ’’any class interest.”
Reagan also added to his ethical stature by 
repeatedly evidencing thorough knowledge of pertinent 
materials of the issues.
Reagan attempted to establish good will only once 
throughout the speech. He referred to the ’’American 
Senate” as the "greatest legislative body perhaps upon 
earth today."
Reagan's ethical character as a friend of the 
people was established prior to the present speech. In 
the speech, Reagan attempted to add to the ethical stand­
ing by establishment of himself as spokesman for the 
people and for the "interest of the great American people." 
He evidenced thorough knowledge of his topics in the 
speech. Reagan overtly attempted only once to gain audience 
goodwill.
EMOTIONAL PROOF
One of the basic emotional reactions Reagan 
attempted to arouse was that of compassion. He attempted 
to awaken enough feeling for "the great American people"
that the free coinage of silver would be reinstated as an
alleviating measure for their suffering. He spoke to
the Senators of the depression that had followed the
demonetization of silver. When ” . . .  bankruptcy covered
32the country with a pall of d e a t h , t h e  people could not
pay their taxes and " . . .  newspapers all over the
country, from Maine to California and from the Lakes to
the Gulf, were filled with advertisements of land and
33other property for sale for taxes."  ^ Later in his speech 
he again referred to the financial illness of the country 
when he stated "We know that this is . . . difficulty
O /
among men engaged in business in obtaining money," and
when he spoke of the problems of "the producing and
3 5laboring classes of the country."
Another instance of emotional proof came in an 
appeal to the loyalty of the Senators. He reminded them 
of their representative capacity by suggesting that the 
principles of representative government were founded on 
the will of the people and that they were honor bound to 
do that will. He stated that " . . .  the people are
32Ibid., p. S7S.
33Ibid.
3Zt'Ibid., p. £79.
35Ibid.
sovereign; they are the government making power; . . . 
they are the law-making power through their representa­
tives . . . "3^ He further cited that the will of the 
people was to return silver to the position it held
"from 1792 to 1373" as "money, the unit of value for all
37public and private debts." He took this form of
reasoning another step further, inferring that if loyalty
to the people's will was not present, then the Senators
might fear the reaction of their constituents. He did
not explicitly state that they need fear replacement but
he reminded them subtly that " . . .  they (the people)
are capable of making and administering governments that
will give peace and security to society and protection
3$to life and to property."^ He continued with an implied
threat. The senators now working on this bill would, in
the near future, stand for re-election. He noted that
the people were cognizant of the facts surrounding the
silver issue and that
They mean to stop that swindle. They mean to 
stop the use of this Government to promote the 
fortunes of the few at the expense of the many.
They know that the free and unlimited coinage of 
silver is of more value to them, and likely to give
36Ibid., p. 330. 
37Ibid., p. 379. 
3SIbid., p. 330.
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larger relief by the increase of the volume of 
currency, than any limited amount that may be 
agreed to.39
He scarcely needed to draw the conclusion from this 
statement.
Reagan made attempts to arouse compassion for the 
people. He made a limited attempt to stir the loyalty of 
the Senators to the people they represented. He also 
attempted to elicit a limited reaction of fear for their 
positions as elected representatives.
EVALUATION
As was the case with the speeches discussed in 
Chapters II and III, the effectiveness of the silver speech 
must be judged with the recognition that other speakers 
also advocated remonetization of silver. The silver issue 
had long been a topic of public interest and debate,^ and 
this factor also tended to make the effectiveness of 
Reagan’s speech difficult to isolate.
Reagan had spoken before on the silver issue^ and 
had advocated most of the concepts which he developed in
39Ibid., p. 379.
^Unger, The Greenback Era, passim.
^For examples of Reagan’s remarks and speeches 
concerning silver see: Congressional Record, 50th
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 47, 2343, 2693-2695, 4501- 
4502; 51st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 4240-4241* 5337,
6032, 6034, 6174-6175.
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this speech. These concepts stemmed from the premise 
that the monometalists were the creditor class and this 
class was seeking the continued demonetization of silver. 
Reagan saw the remonetization of silver as a panacea for 
the economic ills of the common man. There was little new 
ideological material presented but Reagan restated 
strongly and compactly his previous themes on the silver 
issue. One new idea that Reagan incorporated into the 
December speech presented was that the silver issue had 
begun through legislative and executive ignorance. He 
presented concrete proof of President Grant's ignorance 
of demonetization of silver but he was vague in his proof 
of the legislators' like ignorance.
Reagan's ideas on the silver question incorporated 
progressive idealism. He spoke for the individual rights 
of a "sovereign people" and against a powerful central 
governing force that suggested the old royalist idea of a 
power outside the people. He spoke against a "money- 
class" within the economic and societal structure. He 
conceived of such a class as drawing not only its suste­
nance but also its ever-growing power over the individual 
citizen from the same citizen who was being forced to 
contribute to the growth of that power. He laid the 
blame at the door of legislators who had conceived and 
executed the monometal program partially through ignorance.
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Reagan predicted within his speech that the silver 
issue would remain a problematic thorn in the legislative 
side until silver was returned to what Reagan considered 
its proper and constitutional role of valued currency 
along with gold. Apparently the majority of the Senators 
agreed with him for the immediate result of a vote of 
thirty-nine for and twenty-seven against the bill evidenced 
partial agreement. However, the House of Representatives 
failed to pass the Act at this time. The monometal 
program did, as Reagan suggested, continue to be a legis­
lative topic^ until bimetalism once more returned as the 
financial basis of the United States economy.
Although it would be an impossible task to prove 
the monometal program was exclusively, or even primarily, 
the cause of an economic distress, it surely was a contri­
buting factor.^ The United States faced two great 
depressions before the remonetization of silver was 
effected. One of the economic lows followed Reagan's 
speech by less than two years.^ The panic of 1#93 was,
^Reagan remained in the Senate less than one year 
past the passage of the Silver Act by the Senate in 
December of 1&90, yet he spoke on the topic five more 
times. Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session, 
pp. 917-9207 1285, 1306, 1313.
^Friedman and Swartz, Monetary History, passim.
^Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, American Nation,
p. 91.
143
according to history, one of the worst that ever confronted
the nation. During the years Reagan addressed the Senate
and following his senatorial terms, the United States'
trade with other nations was affected by an unbalanced
market and exportation of gold as a result of the silver
45demonetization law. The second great depression followed 
the first World War. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, under an 
amendment to the A.A.A. Program which authorized him 
" . . .  to reduce the gold content of the dollar and to 
coin silver . . . , finally remonetized silver. Since 
Roosevelt was viewed as a redeemer for the nation's 
economic ills, at the time of low economic ebb, perhaps 
Reagan's ideas and reasoning can be said to be affirmed 
by later history.
The silver issue, as most great economic problems 
are wont to do, took on political ramifications. Both 
political party platforms, in 1892, contained planks 
concerning silver and soon after the conventions, the
I
Senate again passed a bill for the free silver coinage.
A5^Friedman and Swartz, Monetary History, p. 132.
i £
* Henry A. Graff and John A. Kraut, The Adventures 
of the American People (New York: Rand McNally and Co.,
1968), p.'l^y.----
^ A t  this time, eighteen Democrats and eleven 
Republicans voted for the bill and eighteen Republicans 
voted against the silver monetization bill. Congressional 
Record, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 5719.
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The bill was killed in the House once more. In 1S94 and 
1396, silver was one of the major issues in the campaigns 
and the issue was discussed freely in the legislative
i d
bodies and by the populace. The issue continued to be 
politically mentioned into the turn of the century but 
was not resolved until the 1930's.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
The national economy was at a near depression 
stage in the last months of 1S90 and the southern and 
western segments of the nation were the hardest hit 
financially. The agrarian South and the mineral rich 
West felt that the remonetization of silver would allow a 
freer flow of money and economic stimulation would result. 
The earlier Sherman Silver Act had not resulted in remoneti­
zation or in improved economic conditions. By the time 
Reagan addressed the Senate on December 30, 1S90, political 
party lines were down and the South and West were banded 
together for economic survival. Reagan addressed the 
Senate and employed four developmental themes in an 
attempt to gain the majority vote from that body for free 
silver coinage. The themes were: (1) the monometalists
and the moneyed class were the same group; (2) this group 
was infringing upon the economic rights of the people
^Public Opinion, Vol. XVII, pp. 212-3OS.
through demonetization of silver; (3) that the same group 
was infringing upon the popular right by attempting to 
deter action on the silver issue as well as attempting 
centralization; and (4) that these actions were un­
constitutional. Reagan basically used example and causal 
reasoning as logical proof but also included limited 
usage of authorities as proof. Reagan's ethical character 
as defender of the popular rights, enemy of centrali­
zation, and exponent of the concept of remonetization of 
silver was established prior to the speech. He attempted 
to add to his ethical reputation within the present 
speech by identification with the popular will and the 
best "interest" of the nation. He also made a limited 
attempt to gain good will. Reagan further added to his 
ethical stature by evidencing thorough knowledge of the 
issues involved. He made use of emotional proofs, and he 
attempted to arouse compassion for the people and made a 
limited attempt to stir a feeling of loyalty within the 
legislative group for their respective constituents. He 
also made a limited attempt to elicit a reaction of fear 
within the audience that they might personally lose their 
respective legislative positions.
The direct effectiveness of Reagan's speech on 
silver, in December, 1$90, was difficult to isolate. 
However, his speech, in conjunction with other persuasive 
measures, had the immediate effect of Senatorial passage
of the act. Reagan restated strongly and compactly within 
the speech the theme that he had expressed in earlier 
speeches to the Senate. He added only one new argument, 
which was his emphasis on the ignorance of legislators 
and the executive about the demonetization of silver. He 
predicted that silver would continue to return to the 
Senate floor until the obvious economic stress of the 
populace was relieved by a return to the bimetal standard. 
Since the issue did return repeatedly to the Senate floor 
until the 1930’s when F. D. Roosevelt reinstated silver 
as money, history seems to have proved Reagan to be 
correct in his ideas presented within the speech.
CHAPTER V
THE FORCE BILL SPEECH TO THE SENATE,
JANUARY 16, 1S91
ISSUE AND OCCASION
Federal election laws, or force laws, were born 
during reconstruction days. They were never truly 
effective and they heard their own "death knell" some 
twenty-two years later in the speeches of opposition on 
the floor of the United States Senate.'*'
The "Invisible Empire," or the order of the Ku 
Klux Klan, began in Tennessee before the former Con­
federates were replaced by the reconstructionists. It 
spread throughout the South in a sweeping movement of 
counter reconstruction. The organization was designed to 
terrorize Negroes through its ghoulish dress, ominous 
official titles such as "dragons," "furies," "nighthawks," 
and by the weird ritualistic meetings and night rides.
^Ellis Paxton Oberholtzer, A History of the United 
States Since the Civil War (New Yorlcl The Macmillan Co. , 
1937), p. 13#; Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, pp. 139&-1433.
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Along with the terrorizing of the Negroes went the 
ostracism of radicals from society and business, the 
purchase of votes, violence against the Negro, the 
glorification of the Caucasian race and the adulation of 
white womanhood. Through these methods, the Klan moved 
to counter every phase of Radical Reconstruction in the 
South. Whippings, murder, lynchings, and drownings 
were hazards faced by Negroes and white militiamen who 
undertook to support the congressional reconstruction in 
the South.^
If this reconstruction was to be possible, it
became apparent that the lawlessness that was destroying
economic and political stability in the South had to be
diminished. The several states began to pass "Ku Klux
laws,” but these were relatively ineffective. Therefore
Congress, in 1$70, passed one law designed to protect the
franchise rights of the Negro and in 1&71 passed another
3
law to reinforce the previous year's act. The "Third 
Enforce Act" in 1$71,^ made it treason to be active in the 
Ku Klux organizations. However, the counter-reconstruction
2
Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, The American Nation, 
pp. 39-40.
3
John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the 
Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago fress, 1961),
p. 16b.
4Ibid., p. 167.
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forces had already established their stronghold through 
political pressure, economic strictures, and violence.
They had bested Radical Reconstruction in its formative 
years. The South began to elect the former Confederates 
to local, state, and national political office.
The concept of federal interference in state 
elections took second place to the expanding economy of 
the North and the growing economy, with its problems, of 
the South and the West. But the issue reappeared, closely 
intertwined with the currency and tariff acts, during 
Reagan’s terms in the Senate. At this time it became
5
known as the ’’Force Act” and ’’the bayonet of the polls."
That the Negro and the Republicans were being restricted
in their voting privileges in the South was an accepted
fact and the Republicans were preparing an attempt to
change this southern policy. In his A History of the
United States Since The Civil War, Oberholtzer stated:
The Federal government might interfere and give 
supervision in the states to elections of repre­
sentatives in Congress, a fact stated and restated, 
and confirmed by exercise, during the period of 
Reconstruction. But in the administration of 
President Hayes the practice had been abandoned.
It was determined that the game was not worth the 
candle. More evil than good had come from such an 
assertion of Federal authority. Now, after an 
interval during which the South had been reborn 
industrially, and had accommodated itself to a new
^Charles E. Russell, Blaine of Maine, His Life 
and Times (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., lyjjij,
p. 187.
150
economic and social order, it was gravely proposed 
to revive measures which had so fired the anger of 
the people and disturbed the peace. Republican 
"Bourbons" wished to make "bloody shirt” speeches; 
radical Northern politicians thought that they saw 
in the issue which should be raised fresh oppor­
tunities to discredit the Democratic party and 
prevent it from again coming into power.°
The Republicans started a program reimposing the election 
restraints of reconstruction days, and this "force act" 
was calculated to provide federal supervision of Con­
gressional elections to protect, by military force if
7necessary, every legal voter.'
In the election of 1&90, the Democratic party 
received a larger number of votes than it had for many 
years. It came closer to being the majority party rather 
than the minority party. Accustomed to wielding House and 
Senate power, the Republicans searched for an issue that 
would restore the heavy majority power to them. They had 
succeeded in the years following the War by waving the 
"bloody shirt" to those northerners who were not party 
indoctrinated. The staunch Democrats would not be per­
suaded by these tactics but the middle-of-the-road voter 
previously had been persuaded and might be persuaded once
£
Oberholtzer, United States Since Civil War,
p. 116.
7
'On the face of the bill, it was to pertain to 
all sections on a non-partisan, non-sectional basis.
The New York Times (March 17, 1$90).
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more. Therefore, the Republicans again brought out the 
sectional interest issues. In particular, the voting 
rights of the citizens were brought back into political
g
focus. The voting rights problem had as its central 
theme the black vote, or rather the infringement upon the 
black voters. The "bloody shirt" tactics did not work, 
however, for a Democratic majority was returned to Congress 
in 1391. Reagan continued to fight^ the attempt of the 
Republicans to interfere in federal elections and in so 
doing, to discredit the Democratic Party's southern strong­
hold. He summed up well his concepts, the issue, the 
speech, and occasion in his Memoirs:
One of the last measures with which I was 
concerned was the "Force Bill," which involved danger 
to our political system. This was in 1&91. The bill 
under consideration was one drawn ostensibly to 
regulate by Federal authority the election of the 
members of Congress, and the President and Vice- 
President of the United States. I believed this 
measure to be unconstitutional, subversive of the 
form of the Federal Government, and that it endangered 
popular liberty in this country. Senator Evarts of 
New York had made a well-considered speech in favor 
of the bill, and evidently expecting that it would 
become a law made an earnest appeal as to the duty of 
the people to obey the Constitution and laws. The 
next day he was followed by Senator Dixon of New 
Jersey, who also favored the bill. I feared the
g
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 1429.
9
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session, 
pp. 451-4^u, i>79-5^3, &I+V-B4B. For good coverage see the 
Austin Statesman Weekly (January 30, 1$90). Also covered 
in Walton to Reagan, August 12, 1&90, and Reagan to 
Greenwood, February 11, 1&91, R.P.: Letters.
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effect of the speech of Senator Evarts, if unanswered, 
on public opinion, and endeavored to have an answer 
made by Senator Gray of Delaware, Senator Morgan of 
Alabama, or some other of our stronger speakers.
Those to whom I spoke said such a speech could not be 
replied to without time for preparation and con­
sideration. When I could get no one else to under­
take it I determined to try to answer it myself 
rather than let it go to the public unanswered. And 
in probably twenty minutes after I reached the con­
clusion I began my speech without notes or documents 
of any kind; and under such conditions closed the 
general debate on this great q u e s t i o n .10
The issue was the old one of sectional difference and 
Republican versus Democrat. Here was an attempt to con­
trol by federal interference, backed by threatened force, 
the election process in the South. Here was a Republican 
attempt to once more discredit the Democratic party, which 
had had the misfortune of backing the losing side in the 
Civil War. The issue may not have been within the ex­
perience of the newcomers to the Senate but was certainly 
within Reagan's experience. The speech was given to a 
Senate which seemed to need reminding of the problems of 
sectional differences that had once ended in War. The 
Senators appeared to be on the brink of allowing these 
differences to merge once more and perhaps to be magnified 
through elective franchise interference. The occasion was 
offered to one of the oldest statesmen from the South, a 
man who was aware that the sectional differences needed to
“^ Memoirs, pp. 246-247
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be guarded against. He grasped the opportunity and 
occasion to attempt through this speech to forestall such 
action.
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
The Democrats fought passage of the Federal
Election bill in the House in every way possible under
parliamentary procedure.
They made dilatory motions, stayed away from 
sessions, and demanded interminable roll calls. . . .  
No other measure called for such exercise of dis­
cretion, good nature and aplomb on the part of a 
speaker as did the Federal Election Bill which was 
finally passed and sent to the Senate.H
Senators Sherman of Ohio and Chandler of New Hampshire 
both introduced Federal election bills in 1&90. Both men 
had been particularly active in open hostility to the 
South. Senator Hoar, the advocate of Republican Party 
policy, took up the battle for the "Force Bill."^ How­
ever, the country was not favorably disposed toward this 
bill. Well-known Republicans in the South were fearful of 
the consequences and let this be known. The press con­
demned the "force bill" as an attempt to revive sectional 
animosity and as a scheme to gain Republican advantage in
■^Oberholtzer, Since the Civil War, p. 117•
12Lester Burrell Shippee, Recent American History 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924)> P« !??•
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the Congressional elections and in the forthcoming 
Presidential election in 1892. The effect of the intro­
duction of this bill coupled with monetary problems— both 
tariff and silver— caused a change in the Senatorial 
audience that Reagan faced. H. T. Peck, writing a history 
of the times, stated:
The election, therefore, proved to be veritable 
cataclysm. The Republican majority in the House 
was swept away. When Congress met in 1891, the 
Democratic Representatives numbered 235, and the 
Republicans only 88; while in the Senate the 
Republican majority was reduced from 14 to 6. A 
significant fact was the strength which had been shown 
in the West by a new party which now became known as 
the "Populists," who elected nine representatives and 
two senators. In the South, out of 121 members, 
there were only three Republicans. Even in New 
England, the Democrats secured a fair majority.^
When the force bill appeared before the Senate, 
the Republicans from the West united with the Democrats to 
prevent the force issue from holding up the silver issue. 
In the next session, it was again debated with Senators 
Hoar and Evarts of New York leading the debate. It was 
at this time that Senator Reagan spoke against the Force 
Bill in the Senate.
Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years of the 
Republic: 1885-1905 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company,
T9o6), p. 214.
DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
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Reagan developed three basic themes within his 
speech against the force bill. His first theme was that 
the constitutional power to elect their own officials 
belonged to the states and that the force bill was an 
attempt to usurp the rights of the states. His second 
theme was that the democratic system of government was on 
trial with the force bill. His third theme was that 
partisan politics was the cause of conflict.
Reagan approached his states rights theme by 
possible dual construction of the article of the Consti­
tution that provided for the election of Representatives 
and Senators. The Article’*"**' first stated that the power 
to regulate the time, place, and manner of holding 
elections was to be prescribed by the states but it went 
on to state that "Congress may, at any time, by law, make 
or alter such regulations.” Reagan attempted to clarify 
the obvious conflict within the article by explaining the 
early history of the clause. Some of the states had 
hesitated to send delegates to the Continental Congress 
and the question arose whether the States might not decline 
to elect Senators and Representatives and thus dissolve the 
Union. Reagan argued that, so long as the states were
"^United States Constitution, Article I.
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providing representatives to both Houses of Congress, the 
first rule of states' power to elect these officers 
prevailed. He further developed the theme by suggesting 
that "any just interpretation . . .  any reasonable 
interpretation” would admit that, so long as the discharge 
of the duty by states existed, Congress had no right to 
usurp the power of those states. He further stated that 
since the War there had been a prevalent opinion by one 
faction that the Constitution had been changed and that 
the rights of the states had been "substantially obliter­
ated." However, according to Reagan the belief was an 
untruth and nothing had superceded the tenth Amendment, 
which granted power to the states over that which was not 
specifically given to the central government.
The theme was not a new one with Reagan. He had
stated the concept of states rights through strict
15Constitutional interpretation many times ' before but 
this was the most thorough development of the theme that 
he had presented to the Senate.
Reagan's second theme was that the democratic 
system would be endangered by the passage of the force
15For some examples of speeches and remarks upon 
this theme see: Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 507-50&7 ;52±7-3218; 44th Congress, 2nd 
Session, pp. 702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, pp.
335, 696; 45th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 3799, 8546;
50th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 2202-2205, &069-8070;
51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. &78-SS1.
bill. This theme was closely tied to the states' rights 
theme. He developed the theme by a discussion of the 
principles of the sovereignty of the people and their 
capacity for self-government. He compared the sover­
eignty of the people with other forms of sovereignty and 
asked who were to be the governors if not the people of 
the states. This portion of his development of the theme 
was a restatement from an earlier speech which contained 
the same topic. However, the remainder of his thematic 
development within the speech was a presentation of new 
argument on the theme. He suggested that the proponents 
of the bill saw Congress as responsible for "the morals,
the habits, the individual conduct of the citizens of
17the United States." ' He further suggested that these
proponents saw Congress in a position to act as though
there were "no Constitution, no States, no State boundaries
1$no State laws, no State rights." He repudiated his 
opponent's claims by reminding the Senate that the indi­
vidual citizen was subject to the laws of his own state 
and that "neither Congress nor the Federal courts can take 
jurisdiction of him” as proven by "a long line of decisions
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session,
pp. -----  ---------
17Ibid., p. 1430. 
lgIbid.
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made by the United States Supreme Court. He concluded 
his development of the theme that the people were sovereign 
and that they were capable of self-rule within their own 
states by the argument that if the theory of this bill 
were true, Congress would not only be responsible for 
interference in the elective franchise, bribery, and 
corruptions" that occurred within the states but would 
also be called upon to punish "murder . . .  robbery, 
arson" and "all crimes in the catalogue.” Reagan felt 
that Congress would not wish to carry the law to that 
extreme but argued that in principle the force act would 
bestow this responsibility upon Congress.
Reagan’s theme that partisan politics was causing
conflict was developed strongly through causal reasoning,
example, and analogy. Reagan reasoned that centralization
was not a new topic to be presented to the United States
Senate. He reminded the Senators of the Federalist Party,
"under the lead of some strict consolidationists," had
attempted a like usurpation of power from the citizens
and had been "buried in the tomb of the Capulets" never
to be "resurrected by the name of Federalist." He
developed this partisan theme further by stating that the
Republicans were " . . .  arguing in the same set phrases
that they did fifteen years ago when the Republicans of
19New England were controlling this continent . . . "
^Ibid., p. 1430.
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Reagan admitted that it was unfortunately true 
that sometimes the elective franchise was interfered with 
in every state in the Union and even tentatively admitted 
that it "may be" that there was more of this in Southern 
States than elsewhere. He stated that, if it were true, 
it was because the Republican Party had for political 
purposes conferred the right of suffrage upon "a people 
not capable . . .  of exercising that right,” He vividly 
reminded the Senate of the transgressions upon the rights 
of southerners by the Republican Party during the Recon­
struction. He asked: "Are political exigencies to induce
us to commit a greater crime than has ever been committed
. . . to the right of suffrage by striking down the sover-
20eignty of the States and of the people?"
Reagan carried the theme of conflict caused by 
partisan allegiance one step further. He suggested that 
money was one of the roots of partisan conflict and he 
deplored the fact that all parties recognized money "as an 
agency in elections." He then used ancient Rome’s decay, 
including her "hired legions," as a basis of comparison 
for what could happen to the United States if partisan 
politics was allowed to control through the "instrumen­
tality of money."
20Ibid., p. 1 4 3 1 .
MODES OF PROOF
Reagan employed logical, ethical, and emotional 
proofs to support his arguments against the force act.
It is the object of this section to examine the proofs 
used.
LOGICAL PROOF
Reagan utilized authority and analogy several 
times within his speech against the force act as logical 
proof. He also made a limited use of example and he 
relied extensively upon causal relationship for logical 
proof.
Reasoning from example
Reagan identified specific examples of type of
crime for which Congress would be held responsible if the
force act was fulfilled. These examples of crimes were
21’'murder,” "arson,” and "robbery." He specified that
these were "moral" crimes and drew the conclusion that
Congress would be held responsible for not only these
22
examples but for "all crimes in the catalogue." He 
developed this argument to explain that Congress, if the 
force act passed, would be responsible for the moral fiber 
of all the citizenry. These particular types of crime
21Ibid., p. 1430. 
22Ibid.
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were obviously chosen by Reagan to serve as examples since
they ranked high on the societal list of immorality along
23side "bribery and corruption"  ^within the states’ elective 
process.
Examples were used as logical proof one other 
time. Reagan argued that the force act would not only 
affect the Southern section of the nation but would also
r
affect other sections of the country in an adverse manner.
i
He listed the States of New Hampshire, Nebraska, Minnesota, 
Colorado, New Jersey, and Connecticut as having "political 
troubles." While these examples did not have further 
developing materials, and the description "political 
troubles"2 -^ was ambiguous, they were used to fulfill a 
purpose. The states named were Western and Northern in 
locale and were also Republican in partisan partici­
pation; thus the use of them as examples of areas to be 
affected by the force act appeared to be strong logical 
argumentation aimed at the Republican representatives of 
those sections.
These two instances constituted Reagan’s only use 
of this form of logical proof within the present speech.
23Ibid
2^*Tbid
Reasoning from authority
This form of logical proof was less abundant in 
the speech on the force act than in most of Reagan's 
Senatorial speeches. He directly quoted from the Consti­
tution only three times. First he read the section that 
spoke of congressional power to regulate or alter the
election process "except as to the places of choosing 
25Senators." ' The section was the one upon which the 
force bill was based. The second reading was a repetition 
of the first with additional materials from the Consti­
tution that Reagan seemed to feel was necessary. The 
rereading appeared in no way to shed more light on the 
meaning of the passage but was apparently used to emphasize 
his point. He then gave an historical review of the 
reasons the founding father had inserted this section 
which Reagan felt was the only provision of the Constitution 
of the United States "of double and doubtful construction 
like this."26
At this point, he explained that the article was 
provided by the early Congress as a means of perpetuating 
itself for "some of the States were very slow, very tardy 
in sending their Representatives to the Continental
25Ibid., p. 1429. 
26Ibid., p. 1427.
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27Congress . . . " ' He turned once more to a quotation 
from the tenth amendment of the Constitution, which 
stated that those powers not delegated to the United 
States government, "nor prohibited to the States, are
23reserved to the States respectively or to the people.” 
Another use of reasoning from authority was 
employed. In developing the idea that the newly en­
franchised freedmen were not qualified voters yet were 
given the franchise right, Reagan argued from the 
authority of a Republican leader’s view. He stated that 
the late Senator Martin from Indiana and "other distin­
guished Republicans" had "declared that the black people
were incapable of intelligently exercising the elective 
2 9franchise." The particular authority chosen was that 
of a well-known Republican who served in the Senate during 
the period of reconstruction. This reasoning from 
authority apparently had a dual purpose. The first was 
to establish that the people of the South faced the grave 
problem of the elective franchise being bestowed upon an 
ignorant mass of voters. The authority chosen had the 
further connotative value of pointing out the extent of 
wrong that could be perpetrated deliberately by one section
27Ibid.
od
Ibid., p. 1423. 
29Ibid., p. 1431.
164
of the nation upon another section if the power be 
centralized in one segment or group.
The three quotations from the Constitution and a 
quote establishing the cognizance of the wrong perpetrated 
earlier by the Republicans upon the South provided the 
only use of authority as a mode of proof in the speech 
against the force bill.
Reasoning from analogy
Reagan used this form of argument when he spoke
of the Republican position on the force bill as being
similar to those "fifteen years ago when the Republicans
30of New England were controlling this continent."^ He
concluded that the position was indefensible now since
the "star of the empire is on its way westward, that no
section of the country, that no half-dozen States are any
31longer to control the destiny of this great Republic."-'
He also compared the United States of 1&91 to
Rome at the time of its decadence and fall. He spoke of
the power of money to allegedly "buy" the legislators and
even the President.
However, this may be, the fact that money is 
recognized as an agency in elections by all 
political parties in this country is a palpable 
and it is a mournful fact. Rome held the name of
30Ibid.
31Ibid., p. 1430
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a republic for three hundred years after liberty 
was dead and despotism was e n t h r o n e d ,32
Having established the relationship of the two 
governments as similar in their despotic desires and 
actions, he further pursued the analogy, now tempering 
it by asserting his trust that the analogy was a possi­
bility and not yet a reality. His conclusion was that 
"Rome reached the point where the government was put up 
for sale to the highest bidder. I trust we are not to
have our hired legions to take charge of this Government
33through the instrumentality of money." ^
Reagan used analogy one other time. When speaking
about the Republicans1 repeated efforts at centralization,
he warned them that the people had already repudiated
the "idea and the promoting Republican party at a very
recent day." He continued this line of reasoning with a
rather blunt, and certainly uncomplimentary, analogy
concerning the Republican segment of his audience:
But that warning voice seems not to be heard, and 
one listening to the debates in this body has his 
mind involuntarily turned to what Napoleon said of 
the Bourbons, that they never forgot and never 
learned anything.34
Reagan apparently intended the analogy to reflect the
attempted usurpation of power through centralizing
32Ibid., p. 1431.
33Ibid.
3/|Tbid., p. 1430.
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legislation that the Republican party had repeatedly 
backed. He saw the Republicans' attempt to centralize 
power once more through the force act as an attempt to 
gain a stronghold over the people, despite their will, 
through control of the elective franchise power. Reagan 
viewed the force act as an attempt to replace "the 
sovereignty of the people" with a power outside of the 
people. Perhaps Reagan's use of the particular analogy 
of the Republicans and Bourbons would seem peculiar if 
he had not used Napoleon's famous derogatory statement 
as cause of the analogy. Another purpose served by the 
statement, was the continued effort on the Republicans' 
part to attempt to acquire central control through 
legislation. Reagan reasoned that they "never forgot" 
centralization and "never learned" the will of the people.
Reagan used reasoning from analogy three times 
within the speech. This form of logical proof was used 
less frequently within his speaking than example, 
authority, or causal reasoning, yet he apparently used 
analogy to attack the reputation of his life-long foe, the 
Republican Party.
Reasoning from causal relationship
One of the numerous tools used by logicians includes 
the tracing of lines of cause and effect. Reagan, who had
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3 5been described as "a deep logician" made extensive use
of causal relationship in his speech against the force act.
He attempted to show that the complete downfall of
the Federalist Party was effected by the efforts of
"Hamilton, the elder Adams, and Knox"^ who he described
as "extreme consolidationists" to usurp the power of the
people and centralize that power. He argued that the
cause of their downfall was the enactment of the "alien
and sedition laws" that constituted an attempt "to
interfere with the liberty of the citizen" and thus
constituted an attempt to "overthrow our system which
recognized the capacity of the people for self-government
37and their sovereignty. . . . "  This action had "caused 
the burial in the tomb of the Capulets of the party which
3g
enacted it. . . .  " He concluded that the proponents
39of the force act had "gone far beyond” what "any 
Federalists of that time ever dreamed of."^3
33Culpepper, Virginia, Exponent (April 16, 1&$5).
* Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 1430.
37Ibid., p. 1429.
3SIbid.
39Ibid.
^°Ibid.
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He stated that the cause of the "double and 
doubtful construction" of the single constitutional clause 
upon which the Force Act was founded was the tardiness of 
some of the States in sending representatives to the 
Continental Congress. The tardiness had caused the 
national forefathers to insert the statement that Congress 
could make laws concerning the elective process, to 
counteract the State's decision not to send representatives 
and thus dissolve the Union. However, Reagan argued that 
so long as the States fulfilled their Representative and 
Senatorial obligations, the Congress had no right to 
enact such laws.
Reagan further argued that partisan allegiance 
was the cause of conflict concerning the elective pro­
cesses. He asserted that if the senators "could forget 
that they have political and party ends to accomplish by 
violating the Constitution we should be in a very much 
safer condition than I feel the American people are 
tonight."^
In attempting to establish a causal relationship 
between the Republican party strong-arm tactics and the 
Southern problem with Negro voting, Reagan developed an 
involved cause-effect pattern. He stated that the 
Republicans deliberately, and knowingly, initiated the
41Ibid., p. 1430
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cause when they gave the right to vote to an immense 
number of freedmen who were incapable of'voting intelli­
gently. The Republicans compounded their wrong by dis­
enfranchisement of the ex-Confederates and by teaching, 
through propaganda, the Negro to hate and to distrust the 
Southern Whites among whom they must live. Reagan 
contended that the effect of these early Republican 
wrongs was the root of the present day political problems 
in the South. Within the context of this causal reason­
ing, Reagan gave vivid first-hand descriptive detail of 
the results of the Radical Reconstruction. He had lived 
through these times and was recalling actual experiences 
to an audience comprised generally of men who knew the 
period involved only through hearsay.
John H. Reagan used causal relationship extensively 
in his refutation of the Force bill. While some of his 
causal reasoning was complex, it never lacked clarity of 
detail or purpose.
ETHICAL PROOF
Reagan’s entire political career produced a repu­
tation as a staunch southern statesman devoted to the 
cause of states rights and political equality for all 
sections of the nation. Although he had believed in the 
Union enough to say almost upon the eve of the Civil War 
”1 repudiate all sectional heresies. I repudiate everything
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that is not national . . . Reagan believed enough in
the rights of the States to join the South in secession 
from that Union. After the War, Reagan worked toward 
the consolidated Democratic Party front to counteract 
the harsh Reconstruction rule of the Republican Party.
He believed enough in the Democratic Party, upon whose 
platform he served for his entire life as a member of 
Congress, to turn down an offer of the vice-presidential 
candidacy of the Anti-Monopoly Party^ even though he 
espoused their economic ideology. As a Representative 
in Congress Reagan defended the cause of the southern 
states a number of times.^ He based his defense upon 
strict constitutional construction aimed at preservation 
of the rights of the states.
Therefore, when Reagan addressed the Senate to 
refute the force bill, an effort to usurp states rights, 
his reputation as a staunch defender of states rights 
was already established. His ethos was enhanced by the
I o
^ Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 1467.
^Reagan to Henry Nichols, March 28, 1384;
Reagan to James Weaver, May 26, 1834; and Weaver to 
Reagan, April 28, I884, in R.P.: Letters.
^Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st 
Session, pp. 507-508, 3217-3218; 44th Congress, 2nd 
Session, pp. 702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, p. 696; 
45th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 8546; 50th Congress, 2nd 
Session, pp. 2202-2205, 8069-8070; 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, pp. 878-881.
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fact that he spoke from personal experience. Here was a 
man who had lived through civil strife and had served as 
representative of his people's ideas before, during, and 
after the Civil War. He was speaking to his less 
personally experienced audience concerning the force act 
which he saw as a possible renewal of sectional strife.
Within the speech, Reagan made one of his rare
attempts to deliberately and directly establish his
character to his senatorial audience. This did not occur
as a part of his prepared speech text but was in answer
to a question from the opposing group. Senator Hoar, a
member of the Republican Party, disliked his role as a
member of the minority group. Hoar asked "if Reagan had
given up any of his political principles when he had been
in the minority for twenty-five years?" Reagan answered
lightly and humorously. He treated the attack as if it
had been directed personally to him, rather than toward
his party. He then answered seriously, using the attack
to his advantage.
I have never been the advocate or promoter of 
monopoly. I have never been the advocate of 
centralization. I have never been the advocate or 
promoter of injustice and oppression. I have 
advocated what I understood to be the constitutional 
rules of right, and I had no occasion to change my
principles.55
45Ibid
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The rarity of Reagan’s direct reference to himself and 
his position was enough to call special attention to the 
strength of his feelings about a cause that conjured so 
many unpleasant memories from the past.
The reply may also have been a defense of his 
character based on his reputation as an outspoken 
defendant of the southern position and the rightness of 
this position. He indicated that since he was upright 
and the causes he rallied to for twenty-five years were 
just and right, this cause also should be considered 
in the light of justice and righteousness.
Reagan further attempted to establish his good 
character by invoking the blessing of God upon the cause 
that he served. That he felt God was on his side was 
indicated through the words of his prayer:
I pray God for the good of our country, for the 
good of humanity, that this great Republic, standing 
as the great exemplar for the lovers of liberty all 
over the world, may not be stricken down in the house 
of its friends by the passage of such a law as this, 
that the world is not to be taught that the Senate 
of the United States believes the people of the 
American States incapable of self-government.4°
He used another method of establishing his good 
character, and that was an offer to give his own life for 
the cause for which he argued. After describing the evils 
the force bill might bring about, he asked the Senate
i A
^ Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd 
Session, p. 1431.
173
not to allow these evils to be wrought upon the nation 
and added:
I pray not, Mr. President; I suppose life is 
as dear to me as it is to most people, and those in 
near relation to me are as dear to me as to most 
people; but, as God is my judge tonight, if I could 
save the American people from this act by giving up 
my life, I would surrender it as freely as I ever 
performed any act in my life.47
He thus presented himself as a man of good 
character. He also created a positive image as an 
ethical speaker through his thorough knowledge of the 
materials pertinent to the issue and his good sense in 
choice of materials presented.
He also made a limited attempt to establish good 
will through his complimentary reference to at least one 
of his opponents. He complimented Mr. Everts of New York 
on his ability as a logician.
Reagan’s reputation as a defender of his section 
of the country through advocacy of their states rights was 
already established before he spoke. He added to his 
ethical stature by supporting those rights in an effort to 
save the nation from more sectional strife. He presented 
himself as a man of intelligence and good character. He 
made a limited attempt to establish audience good will.
w ibid
EMOTIONAL PROOF
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Reagan appealed to the emotions of "loyalty,” 
"justice," and "fear" in this speech.
He appealed to the audience's loyalty to the form 
of government proposed by their forefathers. The latter 
were presented as men who in "the formation of our 
government," entered upon a great experiment "of trusting 
the formation of the Government to the people themselves."
He also appealed to the audience's loyalty to the
id
Constitution "which we have all taken an oath to support." 
The same Constitution, he argued, gave those power not 
specifically delegated to the national government to the 
states.
He further appealed to their loyalty to their own 
constituents who would lose the power to govern them­
selves and to make laws concerning themselves and who would 
even lose the power of selecting their own representatives. 
This constituted an appeal to the emotional stimuli of fear 
also. Specifically, it was an appeal to the fear that 
someone outside the people themselves would become the 
governing power. To prove this argument, he spoke of 
the possible dissolution of the Democratic party and 
inferred the dissolution of the Republican party also.
^Ibid., p. 1429
175
Finally, he appealed to his listeners* sense of 
"justice.” The citizenry must be allowed to continue, 
through the existing laws to govern themselves and to 
continue to have the freedom to adhere to the party 
lines of their choice.
He first summed up the good which would be ac­
complished by a vote against the force bill. He asked 
the Senators who would govern under the enacted law, and 
he further pleaded that it might be their will that the 
people of the various states "may be allowed to exercise 
the right which they have for more than a hundred years 
enjoyed here, that they may be trusted to carry on their 
State governments, and that they may not be held incapable 
of doing so."^
He then put his opponents in a position of appear­
ing to do harm to the audience; in fact, he suggested that 
their position was an attempt to dissolve the very body 
composed by his auditors. He compared the Republicans' 
proposal to what occurred just prior to the downfall of 
Rome.
He then put himself and his cause in good light 
by invoking God's blessing on a cause that he felt strongly 
enough to die for.
49ibid.
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Reagan appealed to the loyalty of the Senators to 
their forefather's established mechanisms of self- 
government, to the Constitution and to their own consti­
tuents. He attempted to establish a sense of fear that 
the people would no longer be sovereign and an outside 
force would govern. He appealed to the senators' sense 
of justice to the populace; he asked that they be allowed 
to continue to follow the partisan politics of their 
choice.
EVALUATION
Since Reagan's speech closed the general debate 
on the force bill and was applauded from the galleries it 
may be assumed that the address was effective in stirring 
the audience's attention and approval. Another indication 
of this approval was the defeat of the force bill.
Again it must be remembered that the voting result
was a product of many factors. However, Reagan's speech
was one of the few given against the force bill and thus
it was less difficult to isolate the direct result of
defeat of the effort to centralize elective franchise
50power and break the solid Democratic South.
50In January 1&91» the bill was put aside for the 
more economically important issue of silver. It did not 
return. Ibid., p. 912.
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The nation was suffering under economic depression 
and had already displayed a change of attitude toward the 
Republican party and their more than twenty years reign.
The Democrats had gained a majority the preceding year.
There was little doubt that the force bill was designed 
to break the Democratic stronghold in the South since 
this single-party strength had helped achieve the existing 
majority.
The Republicans sought an issue that would evoke
enough emotion to swing the northern Democrats back to
the sectional voting pattern. However, the senators'
thoughts, by now, with the exception of a handful of men
51like Reagan and Sherman, were products of a generation
52removed from personal war experience. Senator Hoar, 
who was one of the most outspoken proponents of the force 
bill, had not known the actual war as an adult. Reagan 
had known the war, had lived it, and his arguments were 
persuasive partially for this reason.
Reagan saw the force act as a threat not only to 
the Democratic party but as a threat to the entire framework 
of the federal system as perhaps the result may have been 
if the force act had passed.
■^Buck, p. 267.
52Peck, Twenty Years, p. 214; and, Congressional 
Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 1398-1433•
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The fear that it might become a law had the
resultant effect of causing most of the southern states
to tighten the constitutional provisions for elective
franchise qualification. The poll-tax, literacy test,
and ’’grandfather clause” were results of the fear of the 
53act. If fear of the force act could force such changes 
in southern elective politics, it is certainly impossible 
to estimate the changes the passage of the act might have 
wrought.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
Federal interference in the elective franchise 
system of the states had been met with violent opposition 
during the Reconstruction period. It was now seriously 
put forward by the Republicans twenty years later in the 
form of what the southerners labeled the "force act."
The force act was seen by one historian as an effort to 
allow the "Republican Bourbons" to make "bloody shirt" 
speeches and to "discredit the Democratic party and
Cl
prevent it from again coming into power." ^
The Democratic party had gained the majority in 
Congress and the Republicans sought an issue that would
^Dewey, National Problems, pp. 162-173. 
'^Oberholtzer, Since Civil War, p. 116.
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swing the majority back to them. However, the West was 
seeking financial succor which they felt would be ac­
complished through silver coinage and they saw the force 
act as an interference in securing the necessary silver 
legislation so the western ideas were joined with those 
of the south when Reagan addressed the Senate in 
opposition to the force bill.
Within his speech, Reagan developed three themes:
(1) the constitutional power to elect their own officials 
belonged to the states and the force act was an attempt 
to usurp the states rights; (2) that the democratic 
system of government was on trial with the force bill; 
and (3) that partisan politics were the cause of conflict.
These themes were supported by logical proof, 
including reasoning from example, authority, analogy, and 
causal relationship. Causal relationship was relied upon 
most extensively to support Reagan's arguments.
Reagan's reputation as a staunch Democrat who 
believed in the rights of the states was already established 
before he addressed the Senate upon the force act. His 
ethical stature was further enhanced by the fact that he 
was speaking about personal experiences gained during a 
time in past history that a similar law had been enforced. 
Within the speech, Reagan made one of his rare efforts to 
attempt overtly to establish his character by direct 
reference to his personal beliefs. He used another
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method of establishing his good character when he offered 
to give his own life for the cause for which he argued.
He also created a positive image as an ethical speaker 
through his thorough knowledge of materials pertinent to 
the issue. He made a limited attempt to gain audience 
goodwill.
Appeals were made, within the speech, to the 
audience's feeling of loyalty to the Constitution, federal 
form of government, and to their constituency. Reagan 
attempted to arouse a feeling of fear that the power to 
govern themselves would be removed from the people and 
he asked that the populace be allowed to follow the 
partisan politics of their choice.
Reagan's efforts to discredit the force bill as 
shown through his senatorial speech were joined with other 
persuasive elements to cause the force act to be taken 
from the legislative dockets. The effects of fear that 
the bill would be passed caused the southern states to 
take precautionary steps against the Negro voter including 
the levying of poll-tax, the insertion of the literacy 
test and "grandfather clause." It was impossible to 
ascertain the possible resultant change had the force act 
gained the status of law.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
. SUMMARY
John Henniger Reagan was an important figure on 
the Texas political scene for over half a century. He 
served his state as judge, representative, Confederate 
cabinet member, senator, and first Texas Railroad Com­
missioner from I&46 to 1903. He was twice offered the 
governorship of Texas, and twice he refused. He took a 
leading role in the re-establishment of the Democratic 
Party in his state and in the rewriting of the Texas 
Constitution of IB76.
Historians refer to Reagan in two basic roles.
Each role reflects his political concepts. His ideas 
were a combination of progressive idealism and conserva­
tive ties. He was referred to as a strong defender of 
states rights, with particular emphasis on the rights of 
the South and the West, through strict constitutional con­
struction and he was also viewed a defender of the rights 
of the individual against economic and political infringe­
ment.
lBl
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Reagan’s ideas and arguments won him popularity 
in his home state and recognition on a national basis as 
well. His states rights concept received a degree of 
periodical coverage because of his arguments pertaining 
to decentralization of government and his defense of the 
rights of the individual were nationally prominent. His 
progressive arguments that sought railroad and monopoly 
control through legislative measures and his demands for 
free and unlimited coinage of silver, which he saw as 
the panacea for the ills of the South and the West, were 
covered by periodicals throughout the nation.
Reagan’s struggle on behalf of economic controls 
needed during his tenure as United States Senator seemed 
to be a long-range and tireless effort. While not always
popular throughout all sections of the nation, Reagan's
ideas were well-known. A spokesman for the rights of the 
states and for the individual rights of the people, he 
was closely identified with both causes.
Although Reagan's ideas were pertinent to the
great issues of social change during the years 1&&7-1&91,
no previous study of his senatorial speaking was found. 
The present study was conducted in order to understand 
how Reagan's senatorial speeches contributed to an under­
standing of the issues about which he spoke. Two 
limitations were imposed upon the study. The first 
limitation restricted the study to four speeches chosen
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for their typicality of issue, theme, and development.
The second limitation was the decision to consider only 
the ideas contained in Reagan’s speeches since the con­
cepts he advocated were nationally significant.
The method employed was to examine the collection 
of speeches and other materials in the Congressional 
Record, and histories involving the pre-Civil War period, 
the war period, and post-war period to the turn of the 
century. Periodicals, government documents, biographies, 
and other data pertinent to the speaker, the speeches, 
and parallel historical development were examined. The 
materials were organized to present the background of the 
man and an analysis of the four speeches chosen for 
typicality: (1) the railroad-monopoly abuse speech;
(2) Reagan's speech against the Blair Education Act;
(3) a speech asking for remonetization of silver; and
(4) his speech against the force act. The analysis of 
these speeches included a discussion of the background of 
the specific issues involved, the audience composition and 
alignment, the themes developed, and the proofs used in 
their development. Finally his speeches were evaluated.
Reagan's political ideology was based on two 
primary concepts: preservation of states rights and the
protection of the individual from infringement upon his 
economic and political rights. These two basic ideas
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produced the themes used in the speeches analyzed in the 
present study.
The first concept of preservation of states rights 
was expressed in Reagan’s railroad-monopoly speech. He 
contended that state rights should be upheld through use 
of the state courts for trial of abuse cases involving 
monopolists and railroads. Such a procedure would not 
only expedite a quicker clearing of the over-burdened 
federal court dockets but would also put power into the 
state courts by providing them with nationally binding 
laws. The states rights concept appeared in the Blair 
Educational Act speech in Reagan’s themes concerning 
preservation of the state and local autonomous rule over 
schools. He developed the idea that the existing edu­
cational system and all the rights that belonged to the 
states were endangered by the federal funding of schools. 
The Force Act speech again made use of Reagan’s states 
rights concept. He saw the force bill as an effort to 
revoke the fundamental right of the states to elect their 
own officials.
The concept of the rights of the individual 
citizen gave rise to several themes in the four speeches. 
Reagan urged the use of legislative procedure to eliminate 
infringements upon the economic and political rights of 
the people. In the first speech he spoke against the 
economic domination of railroads and monopolies over the
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small oil shippers and he demanded protection for the 
political rights of these individuals through opening the 
state courts for the smaller, less wealthy litigants in 
abuse cases. He also presented this particular idea in 
the themes employed in the silver speech. There the 
villains were the moneyed class and monometalists who 
were infringing upon the economic rights of the people 
through the monometal program. He again voiced his 
belief in the speech of the individual rights when he 
argued that the sovereignty of the people and their 
right to govern themselves was in jeopardy.
Reagan presented another theme in his Blair Act 
Speech and the Force Act Speech that gave evidence of his 
concern for the sectional and partisan interests of his 
audience. He attacked the discriminatory nature of the 
Blair Act funding clause that offered the "new" West a 
definite advantage over the Southern states with their 
illiterate blacks. In the Force Act Speech, he developed 
the theme of political partisan allegiance that was 
causing conflict in the legislative halls.
Reagan offered logical, ethical, and emotional 
proof to support these themes. He relied most heavily 
upon logical proof, employing most often example, 
authority, and causal relationship. He also used analogy 
but with less frequency. His more than twenty years as a 
Representative in the lower House, where he voiced his
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ideas on the pertinent issues of the day with knowledge 
and intelligence, allowed him to address the Senate with 
an already established ethical stature. His adherence 
to his already established reputation as defender of 
states rights and advocate of the rights of the individual 
citizen added to his ethical character. His ethos was 
further enhanced by his attempts to gain the goodwill of 
the audience, but this was an unusual occurrence. He 
indicated throughout his speeches that he was a man of 
good character and intelligence through his knowledge and 
his devotion to the laws and precedents of the nation.
Reagan used emotional appeals less frequently 
than logical and ethical appeals. He made limited attempts 
to invoke the feeling of fear, loyalty, and justice within 
his senatorial speeches. He made a much stronger appeal 
to the compassion of his audience for the individual 
whose rights were being infringed upon politically and 
economically.
An evaluation of the effectiveness of Reagan's 
senatorial speaking was difficult to ascertain. In any 
political speech, the interests and influences upon the 
individual members of the audience will affect the achieve­
ment of the stated goals of the speaker and will intensify 
the difficulty of isolating the effect of a particular 
speech. The political nature of congressional speeches 
further complicated the picture, and thus the effect of
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the ideas presented in any single speech, particularly 
when the debate was strong, was difficult to ascertain. 
Several of the elements which affected such an audience 
were: (1) the popular national will as reflected through
the periodicals; (2) the will of the particular consti­
tuents who elected the senators to represent their 
interests; (3) influence affected by special interest 
groups involved in the issues; (4) partisan and sectional 
alignment; and (5) the number of speeches on the same 
issue given in conjunction with the speech to be analyzed. 
However, some generalized effects of Reagan's ideas 
coupled with those of his fellow speakers can be seen.
These included the initiation of some early governmental 
controls over monopolies and railroads, the defeat of the 
Blair Educational Act with the result of continuation of 
state funded and controlled schools and the death of the 
Force Act that was an effort to break the solid Democratic 
South.
CONCLUSIONS
Reagan's ideas in these speeches belonged basically 
to the school of progressive idealism; the one exception 
was Reagan's strict conservative tie with the past through 
his states rights concept. There seemed to be evidence 
that this conservative tie was a carry-over from his
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earlier experiences in the Civil War and the aftermath 
of that war. He repeatedly referred to "the narrow 
boundary” between stable government and anarchy and to 
the Republican regime ”of fifteen years ago.” He appeared 
to be aware of every attempt to centralize power and 
viewed each new attempt as an attack against the rights 
of the states, particularly the southern states. Since 
he had earlier witnessed legislative sectional strife 
turn into the holocaust of war, perhaps he was somewhat 
sensitive to any sectional agitation or legislative 
source of sectional agitation. Whatever the cause of 
his sensitivity, it occasionally caused Reagan to insert 
a clause concerning state rights into otherwise system­
atically logical arguments on another issue. The 
irrelevance of the interpolated sectional material, 
whether spontaneously caused by a question or taunt from 
the floor or whether inserted in answer to a previous 
argument from the preceding speaker, seemed to detract 
from Reagan's speech although it furthered his image as 
a watchful opponent of centralizing concepts. Reagan's 
dogmatic espousal of the concept of states rights and 
strict constitutional construction forced him into the 
role of spokesman for the position of the South. If the 
name "southern apologist" simply refers to a person who 
states the popular position, in his belief, of his section 
of the nation, then Reagan should bear the title. However,
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if the name implies any necessity to feel that the South 
had erred prior to, during, or after the war, then it 
would be a misnomer.
His deep devotion to his Southern states rights 
theme may have also caused him to appear to a casual 
observer to be lacking in tact toward opposing members 
of the Senate. But considering the deep feelings this 
old statesman must have had, with his psychological war 
wounds re-opened by his Republican opponents' sectional 
legislation, the tactlessness assumes a different aspect. 
Tactlessness denotes a person not aware of his attack on 
his opponent. Reagan seemed acutely aware of any insult 
he hurled at his fellow legislators. His antagonism was 
deep-rooted and found expression through both direct and 
subtle barbs aimed at his opponents. These opponents 
must have been doubly obnoxious to Reagan since the 
majority had known the war through hearsay, rather than 
personal experience, yet they were legislating upon issues 
which resulted from the war and which entailed long-term 
ramifications. Reagan's one conservative tie seemed to be 
a genuine product of past bitter experience and tended to
color the man's speeches whether detrimentally or as an
)
aid to support a relevant theme.
Reagan's progressive ideas were innovative and 
well supported. They evidenced intelligent, far-sighted 
thinking and a great deal of research, and thorough
preparation to produce the political concepts which he 
presented to his senatorial audience. History appears to 
vindicate most of his progressive ideas. That monopolies 
and railroads required governmental control is now beyond 
dispute. They are still powerful, even with control by 
an outside legislative power, and operate under cover of 
subsidiaries and puppet competition. Yet, the initial 
congressional control Reagan asked for did place a 
restriction on corporate giants. The railroad commission 
of Texas is still one of the most powerful political 
units in the State. Reagan's ideas about the monometal 
program were also vindicated. He stated that silver 
would remain an issue before the Senate until bimetalism 
was returned and this proved true; silver remained an 
issue until 1934 when Roosevelt remonetized it.
The issue of federally supported schools did not 
die with the Blair Act's death, as Reagan had hoped, but 
exists today. Since the issue of school funding and 
control is not yet decided, eight decades later, it is 
impossible to say whether he was correct in his assumption 
that federal funding was synonymous with complete federal 
control. Almost certainly the system, had it changed at 
that historical point, would have evolved differently. 
Vindication, or evidence of a bad choice of sides, belongs 
to yet another generation or more.
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Interference in state election laws was an intense 
issue that has since proved the generally accepted 
desirability for federal nonintervention in intrastate 
affairs. However, the issue is still unsolved today.
The federal government at a relatively recent date removed 
the poll tax assessment and federal intervention in state 
processes has been in focus again in Reagan’s home state 
with the federal court decision nullifying Texas candidate 
filing fees. The states have maintained some of their 
rights and the federated union Reagan cherished still 
remains. The Constitution remains the basic law of the 
land but Reagan’s plea for strict interpretation has 
apparently fallen out of favor in recent years.
The final conclusion drawn from the study is that 
John Henniger Reagan was a deep logician, a far-sighted 
intellectual and a statesman of whom Texas, and the 
nation, should be proud. However, he apparently was not 
an outstanding orator although his ideas were presented 
well enough to influence the outcome of legislation that 
affected national policies then and now.
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